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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Ian R. Appel 
Todd A. Gormley 
 Michael R. Roberts 
 
 In the first chapter (“Governance by Litigation”) I study the role of shareholder 
litigation rights in corporate governance.  To empirically identify the effects of 
shareholder lawsuits, I use the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in 23 
states between 1989 and 2005. These laws impose a significant obstacle to lawsuits 
against directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty. UD laws are associated with 
increased use of governance provisions (e.g., classified boards) that entrench managers or 
otherwise limit shareholder voice. I also document fewer institutional blockholders, 
changes to financial policies and CEO compensation, and impaired performance for firms 
subject to UD. Overall, my findings cast doubt on the notion that shareholder lawsuits 
primarily benefit attorneys rather than corporations or their shareholders 
 In the second chapter (“Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners” with Todd 
Gormley and Donald Keim) we examine whether and by which mechanisms passive 
investors influence firms’ governance structures. Our empirical strategy exploits variation 
in passive institutional ownership that results from stocks being assigned to either the 
Russell 1000 or 2000 index. Our findings suggest that passive investors play a key role in 
influencing firms’ governance choices; ownership by passive institutions is associated 
with more independent directors, the removal of poison pills and restrictions on 
shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, and fewer dual class share structures. 
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Passive investors appear to exert influence through their large voting blocs—passive 
ownership is associated with less support for management proposals and more support for 
shareholder-initiated governance proposals.  Consistent with the observed differences in 
governance having a positive influence on firm value, we find that passive ownership is 
also associated with improvements in firms’ longer-term performance. 
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CHAPTER 1: GOVERNANCE BY LITIGATION 
 
I. Introduction 
A rich literature in financial economics studies inefficiencies arising from the 
separation of ownership and control. Factors that help to resolve agency problems include 
managerial labor markets (Fama (1980)), legal protections (La Porta et al. (1998)), and 
the market for corporate control (Grossman and Hart (1980)). However, shareholders 
generally exert little influence over these aspects of corporate governance. Rather, they 
are primarily confined to three fundamental rights associated with equity ownership: 
voice, exit, and litigation. While the voice and exit have recently received considerable 
attention in the literature (Edmans (2014)), the role of litigation in corporate governance 
remains unclear. In this paper, I study the effects of shareholder litigation rights on 
governance and other corporate policies.  
I focus on a particular type of shareholder lawsuit, known as a derivative action, 
which alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by directors or officers.1 Corporate law in the 
U.S. requires fiduciaries to exhibit prudent judgment (the duty of care) and refrain from 
self-serving conduct (the duty of loyalty). Derivative lawsuits serve as an ex post 
enforcement mechanism for these duties. Between 2000 and 2009, over 13% of firms in 
my sample were involved with derivative litigation. Yet, there are several reasons why 
the effects of these lawsuits on firms may be minimal, if not negative. First, shareholders 
may be able to adequately exert governance through alternative mechanisms, making 
litigation rights redundant. In addition, the “business judgment rule” largely shields 
                                                           
1 These lawsuits are called “derivative” because shareholders sue directors or officers on behalf of the 
corporation. Further institutional background is provided in the next section. 
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managers from liability for corporate decisions. Even when not protected by this legal 
doctrine, directors and officers face a very small chance of personal liability due to the 
pervasive use of exculpatory charter provisions, indemnification contracts, and directors 
and officers (D&O) insurance (Black et al. (2006)). Finally, financial recoveries from 
derivative lawsuits tend to be low while legal fees are often high. In fact, some critics 
maintain that the primary beneficiaries of litigation are lawyers rather than corporations 
or shareholders (Romano (1991)).  
Others argue derivative lawsuits confer benefits that potentially outweigh their 
costs. First, most settlements include reform of corporate governance practices. In fact, 
such reforms are often the primary goal of litigation (Erickson (2010)). For example, a 
2008 settlement from a derivative lawsuit against the directors of Schering-Plough 
implemented annual director elections and removed supermajority voting requirements, 
while a 2005 settlement involving OM Group featured the termination of the CEO and 
appointment of two shareholder-nominated directors. In addition to settlements, 
derivative lawsuits may confer the benefit of future deterrence by imposing non-
pecuniary costs (e.g., reputational penalties) on directors and officers.2 Such costs may, in 
turn, discourage certain behaviors by managers.  
Quantitatively assessing the effects of derivative litigation poses a significant 
challenge. One possible empirical strategy is to match firms facing litigation to a control 
group. This approach suffers from two main drawbacks. First, lawsuits are not randomly 
assigned. While a matching strategy minimizes ex ante observable differences between 
groups, breaches of fiduciary duties are also inextricably linked to unobservable 
                                                           
2 Brochet and Srinivasan (2014), Ferris et al. (2007), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), Karpoff et al. (2008) 
provide empirical evidence of indirect costs associated with litigation. Helland (2006) finds contrasting 
results. 
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characteristics of managers (e.g., value of private benefits, sensitivity to reputational risk, 
etc.). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the matching strategy limits analysis to the 
realization of a lawsuit and cannot account for variation attributable to the deterrence 
function of litigation. 
In this paper, I empirically identify the effects of litigation using variation 
generated by universal demand (UD) laws at the state of incorporation level. These laws 
impose a significant hurdle to derivative lawsuits. Specifically, UD laws require 
shareholders to seek board approval prior to initiating derivative litigation. The board 
rarely grants this approval, however, because lawsuits typically name the directors 
themselves as defendants. I use UD laws as the “treatment” in a difference-in-differences 
framework. The main specification includes firm, industry-year, and state-of-location-
year fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across firms and time-
varying differences across industries (e.g., demand shocks) and headquarter locations 
(e.g., local economic conditions). This identification strategy addresses the two main 
shortcomings of the matching strategy. First, because UD laws are adopted at the state of 
incorporation level, they are largely unrelated to the characteristics of individual firms. 
Second, UD laws decrease the threat of future litigation and therefore account for 
deterrence effects. 
I first show UD laws affect the incidence of derivative litigation. To do so, I 
assemble a database of over 900 derivative lawsuits involving public corporations using 
SEC filings and other sources. I find UD laws are associated with a decrease in derivative 
litigation of approximately 0.7 percentage points, a drop of over one third relative to the 
sample mean. The magnitude of this effect is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the 
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effect of UD laws discussed in the next section. However, I argue this estimate is, if 
anything, a lower bound on the change to the threat of future litigation.  
Next, I turn attention to the effect of UD laws on the governance structures of 
firms. I use the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al. (2009)) as the primary governance 
outcome. I find UD laws are associated with about a 10% increase in the entrenchment 
index, indicating increased use of antitakeover provisions relative to the control group. 
The change in governance structures is largely driven by increased use of poison pills, 
supermajority voting requirements, and classified boards. I obtain qualitatively similar 
results for the GIM index (Gompers et al. (2003)), which considers a wider array of 
governance provisions. UD laws are also associated with a drop in the presence of large 
institutional blockholders. Additional evidence points to this being a consequence of the 
increased use of antitakeover provisions.  
I also consider the effect of litigation on different corporate policies that are 
potentially sensitive to agency conflicts. First, UD laws are associated with a shift in the 
composition of CEO pay that reduces sensitivity to firm performance. Specifically, the 
ratio of cash compensation to total compensation increases by approximately 6%. 
However, this is offset by a decline in equity-linked compensation, leaving total pay 
unchanged. Second, I document a decline in share repurchases following the adoption of 
UD. While this result may support the idea that managers retain cash to engage in 
“empire building,” there is no change to measures of firm size or investment. Rather, I 
find lower debt issuance and book leverage, consistent with managers either attempting 
to reduce firm risk or otherwise lessen the disciplining effects of debt.  
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Finally, I show UD laws are associated with weaker accounting performance. 
Specifically, ROA declines by approximately 0.8 percentage points for firms subject to 
UD. Consistent with the idea that shareholder voice and exit may substitute for litigation 
rights, I find the drop in profitability is driven by firms with low institutional ownership. 
The effect is also stronger for small firms, which may have weaker external governance 
mechanisms (e.g., monitoring by regulators) and firms with high cash flows, which may 
be more prone to agency conflicts (Jensen (1986)).  
The interpretation of the results rests on the assumption that the adoption of UD 
laws is independent of unobserved variables that influence corporate policies and 
outcomes. Political economy factors are of particular concern in this regard. For instance, 
it may be the case that firms incorporated in a particular state lobbied for the statutes in 
response to heightened risk of litigation. To address this concern, I restrict the sample of 
treated firms to Pennsylvania, where UD was implemented by the state supreme court in 
Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997). The effects of lobbying are likely muted for this sample of 
firms since UD was not enacted by legislators as a matter of public policy, but by the 
courts for the sake of consistency with judicial precedent. This test yields results similar 
to the main analysis.  
This paper builds on the literature that studies the effects of shareholder litigation. 
The bulk of this literature focuses on class action lawsuits (e.g., DuCharme et al. (2004); 
Hanley and Hoberg (2012); Hopkins (2014); Arena and Julio (2014); Lowry and Shu 
(2002)). Derivative litigation is the specific focus of Ferris et al. (2007). A related line of 
literature considers the effects of fiduciary duties and director liability on firm policies 
and stock returns (e.g., Becker and Strömberg (2012); Donelson and Yust (2014); 
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Grinstein and Rossi (2014)). I contribute to this literature by offering a novel 
identification strategy to study litigation that accounts for its deterrence effects. My 
results suggest such effects influence multiple dimensions of corporate behavior and 
ultimately impair performance.  
I also offer new insights into the broader literature on corporate governance. A 
voluminous literature studies the relation between governance indices and different 
corporate policies and outcomes (e.g., Bebchuk et al. (2009); Chava et al. (2009); 
Cremers and Nair (2005); Gompers et al. (2003)). Other papers study factors that lead to 
firms implementing anti-takeover provisions in the first place (e.g., Schoar and 
Washington (2011); Field and Karpoff (2002)). I complement these papers by showing 
that the threat of litigation can also shape the governance structures of firms by 
restraining the adoption of provisions that entrench managers or otherwise limit 
shareholder voice.  
Finally, this paper is related to previous work on the effects of state antitakeover 
laws. In their seminal paper, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argue business 
combination (BC) laws reveal managerial preferences to “enjoy the quiet life.” Other 
papers have analyzed the effect of BC laws on innovation (Atanassov (2013)), use of debt 
(Francis et al. (2010); Garvey and Hanka (1999)), executive compensation (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (1999)), diversifying acquisitions (Gormley and Matsa (2014b)), payout 
policy (Francis et al. (2011)), and differential effects based on industry competition 
(Giroud and Mueller (2010)). This paper provides a new environment to study the nature 
of agency conflicts that arise from shocks to corporate governance. I show that while 
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shareholder litigation rights are a distinct governance mechanism from the takeover 
market, they have a similar ability to restrain certain behaviors by managers.  
 
II. Institutional background 
A. Derivative lawsuits 
From a legal perspective, a corporation is a creature of statute that exists 
independently of its shareholders. Thus, if directors or officers breach their fiduciary 
duties, the corporate entity itself can initiate litigation. A derivative lawsuit entails 
shareholders suing directors and officers on behalf of the corporation to address such 
actions. By way of example, suppose a manager wastes corporate assets by overpaying 
for an acquisition after failing to perform adequate due diligence. The primary recipient 
of harm from this action is the corporation because it (not the shareholders) was the 
owner of the wasted assets. Shareholders may be injured as well (e.g., by a lower stock 
price), but this injury is indirect in nature since it results from damage to the corporation. 
Therefore, in order to seek redress for this breach of fiduciary duty, shareholders can sue 
the manager derivatively on the corporation’s behalf.3 
 Derivative lawsuits address a wide range of transgressions by directors and 
officers. In a sample of lawsuits filed between 1982 and 1999, Ferris et al. (2007) find the 
most common allegations pertain to the duty of care (41%), the duty of loyalty (26%), 
mishandling corporate information (16%), and issues related to M&A (7%).The authors 
                                                           
3 Allegations made in In re Hewlett Packard Shareholder Derivative Litigation related to HP’s $10.3 
billion acquisition of Autonomy match this general fact pattern. See: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-19/hp-said-to-be-in-settlement-talks-over-autonomy-
lawsuits.html. 
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note this is not necessarily representative of the composition of lawsuits in more recent 
years.4 Appendix B provides specific examples of derivative lawsuits from SEC filings.  
Any financial recovery from a derivative lawsuit is paid to the corporate treasury; 
shareholders do not directly receive a payment. Firms typically provide directors and 
officers with D&O insurance policies that (in most cases) cover payouts related to 
shareholder litigation. Settlements are therefore circular in nature: they are paid on behalf 
of the directors and officers by the corporation's insurance policy back to the corporation. 
The benefit of such a settlement is potentially offset by higher future premiums. In 
addition, most states allow firms to adopt charter provisions that limit (or eliminate 
entirely) financial penalties for transgressions related to the duty of care. Thus, lawsuits 
alleging (gross) negligence by directors or officers are unlikely to result in a meaningful 
financial recovery.  
Governance reform is also a key aspect of derivative lawsuit settlements. Erickson 
(2010) finds that over 80% of settlements include changes to governance practices, about 
half of which consist solely of governance reform without a cash payment to the 
corporation. Ferris et al. (2007) also document changes to the structure of boards (e.g., 
higher outside representation) following derivative lawsuits. In theory, such reforms may 
mitigate agency conflicts and outweigh the costs associated with litigation. It is unclear if 
this is the case in practice; Romano (1991) argues governance settlements are largely 
“cosmetic” in nature and simply serve as justification for large legal fees. 
While derivative lawsuits address harm to the corporate entity, class action 
lawsuits address direct harm to shareholders. Specifically, these lawsuits allege a 
                                                           
4 Specifically, the “high water mark” for duty of care allegations came in the wake of the Smith v. Van 
Gorkom decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985. 
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violation of rights associated with equity ownership. For example, interference with the 
shareholder franchise constitutes direct harm to shareholders and would likely be grounds 
for class action litigation. Class actions often involve only a subset of all shareholders 
(e.g., those who purchased shares during some period) and are a response to a sudden 
drop in stock price. In contrast to derivative lawsuits, any financial recovery is paid to 
shareholders since they are the primary recipient of harm. Allegations related to 
acquisitions and federal securities laws are usually brought as class action lawsuits, 
though shareholders can (and often do) initiate parallel derivative claims. While there is a 
“gray” area between class action and derivative lawsuits, plaintiffs almost always prefer 
the former. This stems from the fact that derivative lawsuits involve a number of 
procedural hurdles, the most important of which (the “demand requirement”) I discuss 
below.  
 
B. Initiating a derivative claim 
The “fundamental tenet” of corporate law holds that the board of directors 
manages the business and affairs of a corporation (Swanson (1992)). Under normal 
circumstances, the board alone has the power to initiate litigation on behalf of the 
corporation. Thus, prior to commencing a derivative action, shareholders must first 
demand that the board take corrective action (through litigation or other means) to 
address the alleged wrongdoing. This is known as the “demand requirement.”5 The board 
can, in turn, either accept or refuse the shareholder demand. However, this decision often 
poses a conflict of interest for directors. Specifically, derivative lawsuits usually name 
                                                           
5 While derivative lawsuits can be filed in both state and federal courts, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the demand requirement for cases filed in federal court is determined by a firm's state of incorporation 
(Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services (1991)). 
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some (if not all) members of the board as defendants, so directors “almost inevitably” 
decide against proceeding with litigation (Swanson (1992)). While shareholders take 
control of the lawsuit if the board of directors wrongly refuses demand, courts generally 
review this decision under the deferential business judgment rule and rarely overturn the 
board's decision. 
The futility exception to the demand requirement allows shareholders to usurp the 
board’s power and initiate a derivative action without the approval of directors if the 
board cannot fairly evaluate the demand. The circumstances under which courts deem 
demand to be futile vary between states. Delaware courts use a two-prong test, articulated 
in Aronson v. Lewis (1984), requiring shareholders to allege “particularized facts” that 
cast a reasonable doubt on the directors being disinterested and independent or the 
challenged transaction being a valid exercise of business judgment. The fact that 
plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery at this point in the proceedings hinders these 
efforts. However, courts permit discovery once plaintiffs establish standing through 
demand futility. This, in turn, compels most boards to consider settling the claim. 
Shareholders almost always prefer to argue demand futility rather than make a demand 
because of courts’ reluctance to overturn demand refusal.  
Critics note several shortcomings of the demand futility doctrine. First, corporate 
law provides mechanisms to help conflicted boards maintain objectivity. For example, 
boards can appoint special litigation committees (SLCs) consisting of independent and 
disinterested directors to evaluate demand requests and determine whether litigation 
behooves the corporation. Second, the demand requirement allows boards to take 
corrective action rather than immediately proceed with litigation. The exhaustion of intra-
11 
 
corporate remedies therefore serves as a “safeguard against strike suits” (Aronson v. 
Lewis (1984)). Finally, the futility exception propagates inefficiency from the perspective 
of judicial economy. Due to its ambiguous nature, demand futility engenders “gobs of 
litigation” (Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services (1991)). Most of this litigation focuses 
on the issue of demand futility rather than the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by 
directors or officers of the corporation (Swanson (1992)).  
 
C. UD laws 
In response to criticisms over the demand futility doctrine, 23 states have 
implemented UD: the earliest were Georgia and Michigan in 1989, and the two most 
recent were Rhode Island and South Dakota in 2005. Table 1 reports the full list of states 
of incorporation along with corresponding effective year and statute reference. Most of 
these states adopted the UD concept from a proposal offered by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) in the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a model set of 
corporate laws followed (at least in part) by many states. The MBCA requires 
shareholders to make demand in every case unless irreparable harm to the corporation 
would ensue. If demand is refused by the board, courts can only review whether this 
decision constituted valid business judgment (Pinto and Branson (2013)).6 Kinney (1994) 
notes “the effect of the MBCA approach is that if a majority of the board or committee is 
independent - and the corporation is likely to have ensured that it is - then the court will 
dismiss the derivative suit.” Thus, commentators widely regard UD as a significant 
                                                           
6 The American Law Institute (ALI) proposed a different UD standard. Specifically, the judicial standard 
(and deference afforded to the decision of directors) depends on the nature of allegations. Pinto and 
Branson (2013) state this approach is less pro-defendant than the MBCA rule, yet still stricter than the 
approaches used in Delaware and other states without UD. In addition, the language in Florida's statute 
differs from the MBCA but has similar implications. 
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obstacle to derivative litigation. In a case study of 3 states that adopted UD, Davis (2008) 
concludes that the provision weakens the deterrence function of derivative litigation. 
Others use stronger language. For instance, some declared UD would “probably make 
derivative litigation impossible to maintain in all cases” (NY Times, 11/29/93), while 
others called it “a death knell” for derivative lawsuits (ABA Journal, March 1994).  
In this context, the restriction of shareholder litigation rights is largely a 
nonpartisan issue: of the 23 states with UD, ten had Democratic majorities in both houses 
of the legislature at the time of adoption, seven had Republican majorities in both houses, 
four had a mixed legislature, and one (Nebraska) has a nonpartisan legislature. In the 
final state (Pennsylvania), UD was implemented by the state supreme court. One 
potential concern for this analysis is confounding policies that may be correlated with UD 
laws. The relatively uniform distribution of legislator ideologies allays such concerns. 
However, firms and other interest groups did lobby for the laws as a means to curb 
frivolous litigation. For instance, New York Governor Mario Cuomo only supported UD 
“after getting a personal lobbying pitch from Jack Welch, Chairman of General Electric.” 
But, members of the New York State Assembly “put off action on the bill…after 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader attacked the measure” (ABA Journal, March 1994). 
These anecdotes suggest the passage of UD laws may be endogenously related to 
lobbying efforts by firms or other interest groups. Throughout the paper, I take a number 
of steps to address this issue. 
Davis (2008) provides evidence that UD laws affect conduct (self-dealing) that 
could be targeted by derivative litigation. Specifically, in a sample of 77 corporations, 
median CEO compensation increased 22% and related party transactions increased 19% 
13 
 
in the two years following the enactment of universal demand laws relative to the prior 
two years. Examples of transactions documented in this study include the following: 
Opening a corporate office in Pakistan, the residence of the company’s chairman 
and controlling shareholder (Burke Mills Inc.); the $4.5 million sale of a company 
to an entity controlled by the chairman of the board (Cash America International); 
regularly housing management trainees and other employees at hotels co-owned 
by the CEO (Food Lion Corp.); cash advances to the controlling shareholder and a 
diverse range of business dealing with his son in law (Ingles Markets, Inc.); and 
$200,000 in payments for using a controlling shareholder’s aircraft. (Davis 
(2008)) 
The author notes these transactions are not necessarily improper and perhaps even benefit 
the respective corporations. However, the findings suggest UD laws have a discernible 
effect on aspects of managerial behavior that may be deterred by derivative litigation. 
 
III. Hypothesis development and methodology 
A.  Hypothesis development 
From a theoretical perspective, the role of shareholder litigation rights in 
corporate governance is unclear. One possibility is that alternative governance 
mechanisms serve as substitutes for derivative litigation, muting (if not eliminating 
entirely) its effects. For example, recent papers show blockholders can exert governance 
through both “voice” and “exit” (Edmans (2014)). This line of literature argues direct 
intervention (e.g., a proxy fight) and the credible threat of selling shares are important 
mechanisms for disciplining managers. However, engaging in voice and exit can be 
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costly. For example, Gantchev (2013) estimates the costs of a campaign ending in a 
proxy fight to be over $10 million. In addition, selling a large bloc of shares may entail 
significant transaction costs. Theories of voice and exit are also predicated on the 
presence of at least one large shareholder in the first place, and their effectiveness may be 
limited if ownership is more dispersed. If these mechanisms are either too costly or 
otherwise ineffective, litigation may be a viable recourse for shareholders to enforce 
fiduciary duties. This idea is further supported by the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
generally work on a contingent fee basis, thereby limiting the costs borne by shareholders 
and reducing free-rider problems that may otherwise discourage direct intervention.  
Firms are also subject to various external governance forces that may substitute 
for derivative lawsuits’ role in enforcing fiduciary duties. A particularly important 
mechanism for the purpose of this paper is oversight by outside entities. In the U.S., the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ), stock 
exchanges, and the press all play a role in policing the behavior of managers. The 
penalties imposed by these organizations may serve as a substitute for private litigation. 
However, there are reasons to suspect that this substitution effect is imperfect. 
Specifically, the incentives and abilities of external organizations to monitor managerial 
behavior are likely lower than that of shareholders. This is particularly true for smaller 
firms, which are less likely to be closely monitored by the press and regulators (Davis 
(2008)). 
If alternative mechanisms are not perfect substitutes, derivative lawsuits may help 
to enforce fiduciary duties and thereby affect different dimensions of corporate behavior. 
Many of these behaviors (e.g., shirking by managers) are not directly observable. 
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However, one dimension that is observable is the governance structures of firms. 
Derivative lawsuit settlements largely center on governance reforms, so one may 
naturally expect litigation to be associated with future changes to governance. However, 
litigation may also affect governance through indirect channels. Specifically, derivative 
lawsuits may serve a deterrence function if they impose non-pecuniary costs (e.g., 
reputational penalties) on directors and officers. This function potentially operates 
through two different channels. First, because governance reform is often one of the main 
goals of derivative litigation, shareholders may be less likely to initiate litigation (all else 
equal) if a firm already has “best practice” governance policies in place. This may lead 
managers (especially those facing a high risk of litigation) to implement such policies in 
an attempt to preempt lawsuits over unrelated matters.7 Second, while the corporate codes 
of every state permit the use of defensive governance provisions, directors are not 
afforded unlimited discretion in their use. If governance provisions are deployed with the 
primary goal of entrenching directors and officers rather than defending the corporation's 
interests, shareholders may have cause to initiate litigation.8 Thus, the use of these 
provisions may be discouraged if heightened litigation risk is costly for directors or 
officers.  
                                                           
7 Anecdotal evidence supports this claim. For instance, in the 2008 “What Directors Think” survey from 
Corporate Board Member and PricewaterhouseCoopers 56% of directors of public companies state they 
think good corporate governance affects the likelihood they will be named in litigation, and 66% believe it 
affects the odds they will be exonerated. In contrast, just 27% of directors think good corporate governance 
has an effect on stock price. 
8 Mathias et al. (2014) note a common “entrenchment-type claim involves an attack on the adoption or 
refusal to modify 'poison-pill' plans or director retention plans that make it difficult for a hostile takeover 
attempt to succeed, or other defensive actions taken by the board of directors…The relief sought in these 
types of cases is the nullification or modification of the challenged takeover defense mechanism.” See 
Crandon Capital Partners (derivatively on behalf of Willamette Industries) v. Shelk (2005) for an example 
of such allegations. 
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Changes to the governance structures of firms may influence other dimensions of 
corporate behavior. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) argue that managers 
have some discretion over their wages, and the compensation of uncontrolled managers 
will increase beyond competitive levels. In addition, a number of theories posit that 
managers prefer to reduce payouts to shareholders so as to increase cash at their disposal 
(e.g., Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986); Zwiebel (1996)). The motives for reducing 
payouts could result from several different agency conflicts. For example, managers may 
want to undertake unproductive investments from which they derive personal benefit 
(i.e., engage in “empire building”), decrease the risk associated with their undiversified 
human capital, or to lessen the disciplining effects of debt. 
While the direct and deterrence effects of derivative lawsuits may help to align 
the incentives of shareholders and managers, it is not necessarily the case that they 
improve corporate performance. This stems from the fact that litigation imposes direct 
costs on firms (e.g., D&O insurance premiums, legal fees, distraction to managers). In 
addition, lawsuits may impose indirect costs such as deterring managers from pursuing 
risky ventures that increase litigation risk. Thus, the effect of shareholder litigation rights 
on firm performance is ultimately an empirical question. In any case, the role of 
alternative governance mechanisms discussed above suggests that the benefits of 
derivative lawsuits may be most apparent for firms in which voice and exit are weaker 
mechanisms or which are subject to less scrutiny from outside entities.  
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B. Empirical methodology 
I use UD laws as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effects of derivative 
lawsuits. The difference-in-differences specification is given as follows:  
 = 	
 +  +  +  +  
 The dependent variables for firm i in industry j, state of location k, state of incorporation 
s, and year t are denoted by . 
   	
 is an indicator for whether a firm is incorporated in a state that has a UD 
law at time t. The coefficient on the indicator () is the difference-in-differences estimate 
(i.e., the average effect of UD laws for the treated group relative to the control). I include 
firm (), industry-year (), and state-of-location-year () fixed effects in the main 
specification to control unobserved heterogeneity that is time-invariant (at the firm level) 
and time varying (at the industry and state-of-location level). The treatment group in this 
experimental design consists of firm incorporated in states with UD laws. Because the 
“events” are staggered over time in this setting, the control group consists of both firms in 
states that never have UD laws as well as firms incorporated in states that eventually 
adopt UD. For example, when firms in North Carolina are treated in 1995, firms in 
Pennsylvania (treated in 1997) serve as a control. This structure helps to reduces noise 
and biases that may be present when drawing inferences from a single event (Roberts and 
Whited (2010)). 
As a falsification test, I examine whether UD laws have an “effect” prior to their 
implementation. I use the following specification to examine dynamic coefficient trends:  
 = 	
(−1) + 	
(0) + 	
(+1) 
+	
(2+) +  +  +  +  
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Here  	
(−1) is an indicator for one year prior to the effective year, 	
(0) is an 
indicator for the effective year, etc. If UD laws have a causal effect on different firm 
policies and outcomes, the effect should occur following the implementation of the law, 
not before. In other words, the coefficient on 	
(−1) should be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero and the effect should be driven by later years.9  
I do not include industry adjusted variables in the above specifications because 
such controls lead to inconsistent estimates (Gormley and Matsa (2014)). Rather, I use 
fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity within firms and 
time-varying heterogeneity across industries (e.g., demand shocks) and headquarters 
location (e.g., local economic conditions, political economy factors). Industry-year fixed 
effects are constructed using 3-digit SIC codes. For convenience, I refer to state-of-
location-year fixed effects simply by state-year. It is important to note that it is not 
possible to include state-of-incorporation-year fixed effects in the above specifications as 
this would be perfectly collinear with 	
. 
  I report multiple specifications for the main results, including firm fixed effects 
with year fixed effects and firm fixed effects with industry-year fixed effects. The small 
sample sizes for some robustness tests in this paper make using higher dimensional fixed 
effects impractical. I do not control for firm level characteristics (e.g., accounting 
variables) in the regressions. Such controls may be affected by UD laws, and including 
them would result in an inconsistent estimate of treatment effect. However, in unreported 
analysis I find qualitatively similar results when standard firm-level controls are included 
                                                           
9 It should be noted that, in most cases, the effective year is the same as the enactment year for UD laws. 
However, in a few cases the enactment year comes after the effective year. In these cases, UD laws may 
affect firm behavior prior to implementation. However, the results reported in Section 4 suggest this is not a 
significant concern for my analysis.  
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in the specification. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), I use robust standard 
errors clustered at the state of incorporation level. 
 
IV. Data and summary statistics 
A. Main sample and construction of independent variable 
The sample consists of firms in the Compustat-CRSP merged database between 
1985 and 2009. I omit financials (SIC 6000 – 6999), utilities (SIC 4900 – 4999), and 
public administration/non-classifiable firms (SIC 9000 – 9999). I drop firms with missing 
or zero values for sales or market capitalization. In addition, I limit the sample to firms 
with greater than $20 million in assets to mitigate the effects of small firms on outcome 
variables normalized by total assets. The final sample consists of 79,049 firm-year 
observations. I use Compustat-CRSP to construct a number of variables related to 
corporate policies and outcomes. These measures are defined in Table A.1. All 
accounting variables are winsorized at the 1/99% levels.  
The main explanatory variable in this paper is an indicator for whether a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has a UD law. However, using the incorporation state reported 
by Compustat introduces measurement error into the empirical design because only the 
most recent state of incorporation is reported. Thus, firms will be incorrectly classified 
into the “treatment” group if they recently re-incorporated to a state with UD from one 
without. The measurement error induced by this misclassification will not result in biased 
or inconsistent estimates as long as it is not correlated with the explanatory variables. 
However, this assumption may not hold if some firms endogenously choose to re-
incorporate to states that offer a higher level of protection from shareholder litigation. To 
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address this problem, I use the historical state of incorporation as determined by Gormley 
and Matsa (2014b) to construct the independent variable. The historical state of 
incorporation is identified using data from Cohen (2012), SEC Analytics, and a legacy 
version of Compustat. I use the current state of incorporation for post-2006 observations 
not covered by this dataset. While I do not find strong evidence of UD laws influencing 
re-incorporation decisions, I drop observations for firms that change states of 
incorporation to account for the possibility that heightened protection from litigation may 
influence this decision for some firms. This has little effect on the main results; consistent 
with previous findings (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003); Gormley and Matsa 
(2014b)), the current state of incorporation differs from the historical state of 
incorporation for fewer than 5 percent of firm-year observations in my sample. 
 
B. Litigation variables 
An important aspect of this paper is measuring the incidence of derivative 
litigation. One institutional factor that complicates this task is the fact that such actions 
can be initiated in both state and federal courts. Although there are centralized databases 
for cases filed in federal court, this is not the case for state courts. Furthermore, electronic 
databases for individual state courts often do not extend far back into the sample (e.g., 
Delaware Chancery filings can be searched from 2000 onwards). One potential solution 
offered by the literature is to use legal databases to search for cases that resulted in a 
written judicial opinion. However, this potentially imposes a bias as some courts (most 
notably, federal courts and the Delaware Chancery) issue more written opinions than 
others (Armour et al. (2012)).  
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I assemble a database of derivative lawsuits using two sources: Audit Analytics 
and SEC filings. The Audit Analytics litigation database contains derivative lawsuits filed 
in federal courts after 2000. I require lawsuits to be classified as both “derivative” and 
“stockholder suits” to be included in my final sample. After merging with the main 
sample, this yields a total of over 300 derivative lawsuits filed in federal courts for firms 
in my sample. Approximately two-thirds of these cases are between 2005 and 2007, 
consistent with the observation by Erickson (2010) that derivative lawsuits pertaining to 
option backdating during this period were often filed in federal courts.  
There are two shortcomings of relying solely on Audit Analytics to measure 
derivative litigation. First, the sample starts in 2000, after the majority of states 
implemented UD. This is problematic since the difference-in-differences methodology 
used in this paper requires both “pre-treatment” and “post-treatment” periods. Second, 
Audit Analytics is limited to cases brought in federal courts and significantly 
underestimates the prevalence of derivative lawsuits. To address these shortcomings, I 
perform a keyword search of SEC filings using the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite starting 
in 1994 to identify annual reports, quarterly reports, proxy statements that discuss 
derivative litigation. Specifically, I search for the terms “derivative lawsuit”, “derivative 
action”, “derivative litigation”, and “derivative suit.” I then read each document to find 
the date litigation was filed on behalf of the firm and to exclude uses of these terms in 
contexts besides the filing of a lawsuit. Firms provide varying degrees of additional 
information about derivative cases in SEC filings. While some detail specific allegations 
and settlement agreements, others only vaguely reference allegations and do not provide 
details on case outcomes. For this reason, I do not attempt systematically collect 
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additional information on the allegations or outcomes of individual cases. Firms often use 
ambiguous terms (e.g., “shareholder lawsuit”) rather than specify the exact nature of the 
claim in SEC filings. I do not include these instances in the sample. Combining with the 
Audit Analytics sample yields a total sample of over 900 derivative lawsuits involving 
firms in my sample.  
Data on class action suits are from the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse, which includes records for all class action lawsuits filed by shareholders 
after 1995. I use this database to construct an indicator variable that equals one when a 
class action lawsuit is filed against a firm. 
 
C. Governance variables 
Measuring corporate governance is another challenging aspect of this paper. The 
influence afforded to shareholders to control managerial decisions is based on a 
confluence of internal and external factors and cannot be fully captured by a single 
measure. The use of antitakeover provisions is one dimension of corporate governance 
that is both quantifiable and indicative of an agency conflict. Thus, following the 
governance literature, I use the GIM (Gompers et al. (2003)) and entrenchment (Bebchuk 
et al. (2009)) indices as measures of corporate governance. The GIM index consists of 24 
governance provisions, while the entrenchment index consists of a subset of six 
provisions most frequently targeted by nonbinding shareholder resolutions. The data are 
obtained from Riskmetrics (ISS). Due to methodological changes in the updated version 
of database, I restrict attention to the legacy version, which (approximately) covers S&P 
1500 firms in alternating years between 1990 and 2006. Following standard practice in 
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the literature, I fill in missing entries with the previous observation to facilitate the 
analysis of dynamic coefficient trends.  
Previous papers (e.g., Bhagat et al. (2008); Klausner (2013)) express skepticism 
regarding whether some governance provisions have a meaningful impact on managerial 
entrenchment. For instance, Klausner (2013) argues that several governance provisions 
contained in the GIM index either have no effect on managerial entrenchment or do so 
only under very limited circumstances. However, by construction, the entrenchment 
index contains the provisions which “have systematically drawn substantial opposition 
from institutional investors” (Bebchuk et al. (2009)). Adopting these provisions is 
therefore costly for managers and indicative of an agency conflict. For this reason, I use 
the entrenchment index as the primary measure of corporate governance in this study, 
though I show the GIM index yields qualitatively similar results.  
The entrenchment index consists of indicators for six governance provisions that 
shareholders most frequently target through non-binding shareholder resolutions. Two of 
these provisions – poison pills and golden parachutes – are regarded as defenses against 
hostile takeovers. Poison pills allow shareholders to purchase shares at a discount if the 
holdings of a blockholder exceed a specified threshold. Golden parachutes provide 
payouts to management in the event of a change in control. The board of directors can 
normally implement these governance provisions without shareholder approval. The 
other four provisions set limits on shareholder voting rights. First, classified boards have 
varying term lengths for directors. This provision may entrench directors since a dissident 
shareholder cannot gain control of the board in a single election. Second, supermajority 
voting for mergers moves the threshold of shareholder votes to approve a merger above 
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the normal 50%. Similarly, limits on shareholder amendments to the bylaws and charter 
require shareholder votes to exceed a threshold above 50% to change these corporate 
documents. The provisions related to shareholder voting rights are often stipulated in the 
corporate charter, thus requiring a shareholder vote to amend.  
 
D. Other outcomes 
Institutional ownership data are firm from the Thomson Reuters 13F stock 
ownership summary. Specifically, this database provides the percentage of outstanding 
shares owned by institutional investors and the holdings of the largest institutional 
investor. I drop observations for which the total institutional ownership is greater than 
one. I create a blockholder indicator that equals one if the holdings of the largest 
institutional owner exceed 10% of shares outstanding. In addition, I create an indicator 
for blockholder entry that equals 1 if a firm does not have a blockholder at time t-1 but 
does at time t. The indicator for blockholder exit is analogous. I restrict the sample for 
blockholder entry and exit to five years after the adoption of UD laws for treated firms 
because, over long periods, blockholder entry rates will necessarily influence blockholder 
exit. However, this is less of a concern over a shorter time frame. 
CEO compensation data is from Execucomp. The data are available annually for 
S&P 1500 firms starting in 1992. I identify CEOs in Execucomp using a combination of 
the “ceoann” variable and the provided start/end years for firm CEOs. If “ceoann” and 
start/end years identify multiple CEOs for a given firm-year observation, I defer to the 
Execucomp classification. I calculate CEO cash compensation as the sum of salary, 
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bonus, long-term incentive pay (LTIP), and other compensation (e.g., tax 
reimbursements, severance payments, etc.).10  
 
E.  Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for the main outcomes are reported in Table 2. Panel A 
provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and 25th/50th/75th 
percentile values. Of particular interest in this table is the prevalence of derivative 
litigation. Derivative lawsuits are filed in approximately 1.9% of all firm-year 
observations. The incidence of class action lawsuits is higher on average (2.8%). There is 
some overlap between the filing of derivative and class action suits; 36% of firms subject 
to a derivative lawsuit are also subject to a class action lawsuit in the same year. This 
statistic is consistent with the idea that there is often a “gray” area between derivative and 
class action lawsuits, and certain forms of corporate malfeasance may engender both 
forms of litigation. 
Figure 1 plots the fraction of firms subject to derivative and class action lawsuits 
between 1996 and 2009. The higher frequency of class action lawsuits is primarily driven 
by a flurry of securities lawsuits in 2001. In that year alone, class action suits were filed 
against almost 8% of the firms in my sample. In contrast, derivative lawsuits peaked at 
approximately 5% of the sample in 2006, with over 150 derivative actions relating to 
options backdating practices (Armour et al. (2012)). Class action lawsuits do not see a 
                                                           
10 Due to a methodological change in Execucomp, I follow the standard practice of setting options equal to 
“option_awards_blk_value” pre-2006 and “option_awards_fv” post-2006. Similarly, stock awards are 
given by “rstkgrnt” pre-2006 and “stock_awards_fv” post-2006. The variables related to cash compensation 
do not change across time periods.   
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corresponding increase stemming from backdating allegations. Rather, the figure 
indicates a nadir in class action litigation in 2006.  
Panel B compares the pre-treatment values for firms incorporated in UD states 
(“eventually treated”) and those incorporated elsewhere (“never treated”). Specifically, 
the panel reports the mean value for each group for the first three years data are available 
during the sample. Any firm-year observations treated before or during this period (as is 
the case when the data do not span the entire period of analysis) are excluded. The first 
column restricts the sample to firms incorporated in states that do not have UD at any 
point during the sample. Column (2) restricts the sample to firms incorporated in states 
that have UD at some point during the sample. Column (3) reports the p-value from the 
paired t-test comparing these values, adjusted for clustering at the state of incorporation 
level. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Overall, firms in the two groups are 
similar along a number of observable dimensions prior to treatment. In particular, both 
treated and control firms are subject to similar levels of class action and derivative 
lawsuits. The firms in both groups also have similar governance structures prior to 
treatment; the mean value of the entrenchment and GIM indices are not statistically 
different (p-values for the paired t-test are 0.22 and 0.84, respectively). The mean values 
for the blockholder indicator, CEO compensation, and accounting variables (ROA, capex, 
log(PP&E), net debt issuance etc.) are also similar across both groups. Overall, these 
statistics suggest the treated and control firms are similar along a number of observable 
dimensions prior to UD laws. In the robustness section, I perform additional tests to 
assuage concerns regarding unobservable differences between the groups that could pose 
a challenge for empirical inference. 
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IV. Results 
A.  Litigation 
Anecdotal evidence suggests UD presents a significant obstacle to derivative 
litigation and may discourage the use of this legal mechanism. The difference-in-
differences results reported in Table 3 confirm this intuition. The dependent variable in 
this table is an indicator for derivative litigation. This variable is available starting in 
1994 (the first year electronic SEC filings are available), so the sample of treated firms 
consists of those incorporated in states treated after this year. The specification in column 
(1) includes firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) uses firm and industry-year fixed 
effects. Finally, column (3) reports results for the specification that includes firm, state-
year, and industry-year fixed effects. The estimated coefficients range from -0.68 to -0.76 
percentage points and are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. In terms of 
economic magnitude, UD laws are associated with a decline in derivative lawsuits of 
approximately one third relative to the sample mean. Column (4) reports the coefficient 
trend. The coefficients for 	
(−1) and 	
(0) are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Consistent with a causal interpretation of the results, the estimates one and two or 
more years after the effective date are negative and statistically significant at the 10% and 
1% levels, respectively.  
In some respects, these estimates may serve as a lower bound on the threat of 
derivative litigation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many lawsuits initiated in UD 
states are either dismissed for failure to make a demand if the plaintiffs argue demand 
futility, or refused by the board if a demand is made. Some commentators speculate that 
judges may be more lenient in allowing other forms of shareholder litigation because of 
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this. However, in unreported results, I do not find evidence of such an effect. 
Specifically, I use an indicator for class action litigation as the dependent variable for the 
main specification with firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects. The coefficient 
of -0.001 (standard error=0.005) is neither statistically nor economically significant. This 
is consistent with the idea that shareholders prefer to launch class action lawsuits if this is 
a viable alternative, so restrictions on shareholder derivative litigation have little 
relevance for class actions.  
 
B. Governance structures 
i. Indices 
Table 4 report the effect of UD on the entrenchment index. The estimated 
coefficients range from approximately 0.22 to 0.29, implying an increase (i.e., higher use 
of antitakeover provisions) of over 10% relative to the sample mean. Column (4) reports 
the dynamic coefficient trend. The bulk of the effect occurs in the year following the 
effective date. However, the timing of this increase should be viewed with caution 
because governance data from Riskmetrics is only available for alternating years; the 
increase in the entrenchment index may (at least partially) have occurred during the 
effective year. Figure 2 shows the coefficient trend for 4 years before and after treatment. 
Each point in this figure can be interpreted relative to year zero (the omitted year). While 
the “parallel trends” assumption cannot be proven, this figure suggests the documented 
results are not driven by an upward trend in the variable in the years before UD.  
Table A.2 reports results for the GIM index. The coefficients range from 0.32 to 
0.48, implying an increase of about 4% relative to the sample mean. Consistent with the 
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notion that the GIM index contains some provisions subject to less opposition from 
shareholders, the estimates reported in this table are statistically noisier, and the 
specification in column (3) is not significant at conventional levels. The smaller 
economic magnitude of this effect also may partially stem from the inclusion of some 
variables in the GIM index that are not plausibly affected by UD (e.g., previously enacted 
state laws).  
Table 5 reports estimates for the individual governance provisions in the 
entrenchment index, as well as for the use of blank check stock. The results indicate 
significantly higher use of poison pills (11 percentage points) following the adoption of a 
UD law. This result is significant at the 10% level, and accounts for over a third of the 
increase in the entrenchment index. In column (2), I also find an increase in the use of 
blank check stock, a variable not included in the entrenchment index. The presence of 
these shares allows boards to implement a poison pill without shareholder approval, and 
is arguably a more meaningful outcome than the actual presence of a pill (Cremers and 
Nair (2005)). The results for classified boards and supermajority voting requirements are 
also positive and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Although 
economically significant (6 percentage points), the estimated increase in golden 
parachutes is statistically noisy. Interestingly, the point estimates for provisions that limit 
shareholders' ability to change the corporate bylaws or charter are negative, though both 
are not statistically significant. The increased use of some provisions (e.g., classified 
boards) may seem inconsistent with the fact that they require ratification from 
shareholders and cannot be adopted unilaterally by the board. It is important to 
remember, however, that the changes are interpreted relative to the control group and 
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may reflect a lower likelihood of removing a provision rather than actively implementing 
it. Consistent with this, in unreported analysis I find that the change in classified boards is 
driven a drop in declassifications rather than an increase in the implementation of new 
classified boards for firms incorporated in UD states. The effect is particularly strong for 
the second half of the sample, which coincides with the period when shareholders began 
to push firms to implement annual elections for directors.  
As discussed in Section 2, UD laws may affect the use of antitakeover provisions 
through two channels. First, the drop in the prevalence of litigation may lead to fewer 
settlements containing governance reforms. Second, weakened deterrence effects may 
lead managers to deploy governance provisions for the purpose of entrenchment or 
otherwise limiting shareholder voice. While it is not clear how to empirically disentangle 
these effects, evidence suggests the findings can at least partially be attributed to the 
deterrence function of litigation. Specifically, Figure 2 shows that there is an abrupt jump 
in the use of antitakeover provisions in the first 2 years of UD. However, because 
derivative lawsuits are relatively rare (about 2% of firm-year observations) and not all 
suits end with settlements containing governance reforms, it is unlikely that the observed 
effect can be entirely attributed to the lower incidence of derivative litigation after the 
adoption of UD.  
ii. Blockholders 
Next, I turn attention to the effect of UD laws on the presence of large 
blockholders, an important component of corporate governance due to their incentives to 
monitor and ability to exert governance through voice and exit. The direction of the effect 
of UD on blockholders is ambiguous. On the one hand, derivative lawsuits help to 
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mitigate free-rider problems that traditionally arise with shareholder interventions 
because attorneys usually take these cases on a contingency fee basis. Thus, restrictions 
on shareholder litigation rights may increase incentives to monitor and form large blocks. 
On the other hand, the use antitakeover provisions documented above may directly affect 
the ability of shareholders to accumulate large blocks, or otherwise discourage the 
formation of large stakes by making an eventual takeover more costly.  
The dependent variable in Panel A of Table 6 is an indicator for the presence of 
an institutional blockholder owning more than 10% of outstanding shares. UD laws are 
associated with a decline in blockholders of approximately 4 percentage points. Column 
(4) shows the dynamic coefficient trend. The coefficient for one year prior to the 
effective year is small and not statistically different from zero, but the coefficients 
corresponding to 	
(0) and 	
(+1) are economically large (approximately 7 
percentage points) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The point estimate for 
	
(2+) is smaller in magnitude but remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
From a theoretical standpoint, however, the 10% threshold used to define blockholders is 
arbitrary. Thus, in Table A.3 I examine the effect for alternative variables pertaining to 
institutional ownership. The dependent variable in columns (1) - (3) is the size of the 
largest shareholder (as a percentage of shares outstanding). The estimates suggest a drop 
of about 0.5 percentage points, or 6% relative to the sample mean. However, columns (4) 
– (6) report no change in total institutional ownership, suggesting the effect is 
concentrated amongst large shareholders.  
The decrease in blockholders could plausibly result from an increase in exit or a 
decrease in entry. Specifically, the elevated use of antitakeover provisions documented 
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above may make future takeovers more costly for blockholders owning “toe-holds” in 
firms and lead to an increase in exit. This effect may also discourage blockholder entry 
by reducing the option value of a potential takeover. Further, the use of poison pills may 
mechanically affect blockholder entry by effectively barring the formation of new stakes 
above a specified level. Panel B of Table 6 sheds light on whether this result stems from 
blockholder entry or exit. The dependent variable in columns (1) - (3) and (4) - (6) are 
indicators for blockholder entry and blockholder exit, respectively. I restrict observations 
to 5 years after the implementation of UD laws for treated firms because, in the long-run, 
changes in blockholder entry will mechanically affect blockholder exit. The results 
indicate the drop in blockholders is driven by a decrease in blockholder entry. This, 
combined with the fact that there is no change in institutional ownership, suggests a 
potential link to the use of poison pills. Specifically, Bebchuk and Jackson (2012) report 
that most poison pills have thresholds of 10% or 15% and effectively bar the formation of 
new blocks above these levels but have no effect on smaller blocks. Thus, the results 
suggest the deployment of antitakeover provisions may affect the ownership structures of 
firms.  
In sum, UD laws are associated with changes to two important dimensions of 
corporate governance. First, I document an increase in the use of antitakeover provisions 
that are generally opposed by shareholders. In addition, I find UD laws are associated 
with a decrease in large blockholders. Given that incentives to monitor are increasing in 
block size, this suggests weaker oversight by at least some shareholders.  
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C. Corporate policies and performance 
i. CEO compensation 
I next consider the effect of UD laws on CEO compensation. Previous papers 
(e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003)) document an effect of governance shocks 
on the level of CEO compensation. In contrast to this, I find a change in the composition 
of pay but not the level. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7, where the 
dependent variable is the ratio of cash compensation (defined as the sum of salary, bonus, 
long-term incentive pay, and other pay) to total compensation. Because Execucomp starts 
coverage in 1992, the treated sample consists of firms incorporated in states that 
implement UD after this year. I find that UD laws are associated with an increase of 2.5-
3.9 percentage points in cash compensation, or about 6% relative to the sample mean. 
The estimates are significant at the 5% level or lower for specifications (2) and (3), but 
not statistically significant at conventional levels for the first specification (p=11%). This 
increase is offset by a decline in equity-based compensation, and the level of total pay is 
unchanged. Panel B reports the estimates for the individual components of pay 
normalized by total compensation. While these point estimates are statistically noisy, 
they paint a consistent picture. In particular, the coefficients for different types of cash 
compensation are all positive, while those for stock based and options based 
compensation are negative, with the effect on options statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  
Previous research indicates that cash-based compensation, even forms nominally 
linked to firm performance (e.g., bonuses), exhibits less sensitivity to changes in 
shareholder wealth than equity-based compensation (e.g., Murphy (1999)). Thus, the 
34 
 
results suggest boards implement weaker incentives for CEOs following the adoption of 
UD laws. While I cannot disentangle whether this results stems directly from lower risk 
of litigation or increased use of antitakeover provisions, this finding is consistent with the 
view that weaker governance arrangements provide leeway for executives to influence 
aspects of their own pay. Specifically, risk averse CEOs prefer higher cash compensation 
because their human capital is tied to firms (Bebchuk and Fried (2003)). Thus, the results 
are consistent with worsening agency conflicts associated with UD laws.  
ii. Financial policies 
An extensive literature also studies the effects of agency conflicts on payout 
policy (e.g., Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986); Zwiebel (1996)). These theories posit 
that managers want to reduce payouts to shareholders in order to increase cash at their 
disposal. Evidence of behavior consistent with this is presented in Table 8. The 
dependent variables are share repurchases (defined as total share purchases minus 
changes in preferred stock) and cash dividends. Both variables are normalized by total 
assets. The effect on repurchases is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
for the specifications in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The point estimate for the 
specification including industry-year and state-year effects is smaller in magnitude and 
statistically noisier (p=16%). The estimates (approximately -0.003) are economically 
large relative to the sample mean (0.014), and economically small relatively to the 
sample standard deviation of (0.041). This stems from the fact that share repurchases are 
zero for over half of the firm-year observations in the sample. The point estimates for 
cash dividends in columns (3) - (6) are an order of magnitude smaller and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
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The above results are consistent with theories that view payout policy in light of 
agency conflicts. However, it is not theoretically clear what managers will do with these 
funds. Table 9 reports the effects of UD laws on firm size, investment, and financial 
policies to shed light on this question. The estimate for PP&E is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, suggesting universal demand is not associated with an 
increase in firm size. Similarly, column (2) indicates there is not an increase in 
investment associated with UD. Column (3) reports the effect on cash holdings 
normalized by total assets. The coefficient is positive though not statistically significant 
at conventional levels (p=16%). Column (4) indicates a drop in net debt issuance of 
approximately half of a percentage point. While this result is statistically significant at the 
5% level, in unreported analysis I find that the estimate is statistically noisier for 
alternative specifications that exclude state-year fixed effects. Column (5) shows a drop 
in leverage of approximately 4% relative to the sample mean. There are several potential 
economic explanations for the decrease in debt issuance and leverage. For example, the 
results may reflect a revealed preference of managers to decrease risk associated with 
their undiversified human capital or lessen the disciplining effects of debt.  
iii. Profitability 
Finally, I analyze the effect of universal demand laws on accounting performance. 
One justification for UD is that frivolous litigation wastes corporate assets (e.g., funds for 
legal expenses, the attention of directors, etc.) and potentially discourages risky ventures 
that may increase litigation risk. If this is the case, UD laws may be associated with 
improved performance. However, the deterrence effects of litigation may also mitigate 
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agency conflicts and ultimately lead to a positive effect on performance. My findings are 
consistent with the latter view. 
Table 10 reports the effect of UD laws on return on assets. UD laws are associated 
with a decline in ROA of about 0.08 percentage points. The effect is statistically 
significant at the 10% level or lower for each of the specifications. The magnitude of this 
estimate is similar to that found by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) for BC laws. 
Column (4) reports the coefficient trends. Consistent with a causal interpretation, the 
coefficient for 	
(−1) is statistically indistinguishable from zero while the coefficients 
for 	
(+1) and 	
(2+) are larger in magnitude, and the coefficient for 	
(2+) is 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Next, I investigate heterogeneous effects on ROA. Specifically, I test whether the 
effect is driven by firms with weaker alternative governance mechanisms or those that are 
particularly prone to agency conflicts. However, such analysis is complicated by the fact 
that variables such as institutional ownership, firm size, and cash flow may be affected by 
UD laws (at least for some subsets of firms). Thus, interacting the measures directly with 
the UD indicator may result in inconsistent estimates of the treatment effect. Hence, I 
follow Gormley and Matsa (2011) and slightly alter the basic methodology to 
accommodate the use of pre-measured values in a triple difference framework with 
staggered events (i.e., I use values based on the year before treatment). Specifically, for 
each “event” I construct a cohort consisting of the observations for firms treated in that 
year and all other untreated observations in the sample. By way of example, consider the 
2004 cohort. The treatment group consists of firms incorporated in Massachusetts, the 
only treated state in that year. I exclude all other previously treated observations from 
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other states to form the control group. I generate the final sample by pooling the cohorts 
associated with each event. I then run the main specification on different subsets of the 
sample based on the pre-treatment value of the variables of interest. As before, the 
regressions include includes firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects with robust 
standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation. Each cohort consists of 
observations from 5 years before and after the adoption of the UD law. I limit the 
analysis to cohorts with over 300 treated firm-year observations in the full sample to 
avoid unnecessary bias from cohorts with few treated observations.11 
Table 11 reports the results of this analysis. The top half of column (1) shows the 
point estimate of the effect on firm performance is slightly positive (though statistically 
indistinguishable from zero) for firms with above the median institutional ownership in 
the year prior to treatment. However, the effect is negative and significant at the 10% 
level for firms with below median institutional ownership. This result suggest that the 
ability of institutional investors to monitors managers and exert governance through 
voice and exit can mitigate the negative effects of UD laws on firms. Column (2) reports 
similar results when firms are split based on size. In particular, the negative effect on 
performance is entirely driven by small firms. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
large firms have stronger external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., scrutiny from capital 
markets, regulators) which can substitute for the attenuation of shareholder litigation 
rights. Finally, column (3) shows the results are driven by firms with high cash flows, 
consistent with the idea that such firms are more prone to agency conflicts (Jensen 
(1986)). In each case the difference between groups is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
                                                           
11 Specifically, I limit the analysis to the cohorts treated in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2004. 
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VI. Robustness 
A. Political economy factors 
A potential concern with the interpretation of the results is the effect of lobbying. 
If firms incorporated in some states stood to benefit comparatively more from universal 
demand (e.g., due to threat of litigation), they may have lobbied politicians more 
aggressively to pass legislation. Legislators may respond to lobbying if they fear doing 
otherwise would impair their ability to secure future campaign contributions from 
executives, trade groups, etc. This, in turn, would suggest UD laws are endogenous to 
corporate outcomes. State-of-location-by-year fixed effects mitigate these concerns to an 
extent since they control for common shocks to firms located in a particular state (e.g., 
local economic conditions). To further address this issue, I confine the treated sample to 
an environment with weaker incentives to respond to lobbying. Specifically, in 
Pennsylvania the ALI formulation of universal demand was implemented by the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania (SCOPA) in Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997). In justifying this 
action, the court noted the inherent contradiction between the demand futility doctrine 
and the business judgment rule: 
Delaware law permits a court in some cases ("demand excused" cases) to apply its 
own business judgment in the review process when deciding to honor the 
directors' decision to terminate derivative litigation. In our view, this is a defect 
which could eviscerate the business judgment rule and contradict a long line of 
Pennsylvania precedents (Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997)). 
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This suggests universal demand in Pennsylvania was not a response to public policy 
concerns. Rather, courts instituted the rule for the sake of consistency with judicial 
precedent. 
Although SCOPA justices are elected, they have relatively weak incentives to 
pander to corporate interests. This stems from the use of retention elections for justices 
on SCOPA as well as two lower appellate courts in in Pennsylvania. Since 1969, the state 
has used traditional, partisan elections to fill open seats on these courts. However, once 
elected, justices face retention elections (requiring 50% “yes” votes) every 10 years until 
reaching the age of mandatory retirement. Retention elections are unopposed and non-
partisan. Goodman and Marks (2006) note the elections in Pennsylvania are traditionally 
“foregone conclusions,” and jurists do not run extensive campaigns or seek outside 
contributions. In fact, between 1969 and 2005 incumbents succeeded in all retention 
elections (Goodman and Marks (2006)).This has arguably changed in recent years due to 
the involvement of various interest groups in retention elections. In fact, in 2005 the first 
(and only) appellate judge failed to win a retention election. Thus, while legislators 
potentially implement policies to court corporate campaign contributions, this was 
unlikely the case for SCOPA justices when UD was adopted. 
In Table 12, I restrict the sample of treated firms to those incorporated in 
Pennsylvania. The control group consists of firms incorporated in states without UD 
laws. The specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects. The magnitude of 
the effect on the entrenchment index is slightly larger than the estimate in Table 4 and 
significant at the 1% level. The estimates for blockholders, CEO compensation, share 
buybacks, and ROA also are also similar in magnitude to the main analysis and 
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statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. Overall, this analysis suggests the effects 
documented in this paper are not primarily driven by lobbying or other political economy 
factors.  
 
B. Additional tests 
Additional robustness tests are reported in the appendix. First, following Karpoff 
and Wittry (2014), I consider whether other widely studied legal changes confound my 
analysis. Specifically, I control for business combination laws, control share acquisition 
laws, fair price laws, directors' duties laws, poison pill laws, and the 1995 Unitrin court 
decision in Delaware.12  The results are reported in Table A.4. The estimated effects of 
UD laws are similar in magnitude to the main analysis and statistically significant at the 
10% level or lower. The regression specification used for this test includes firm and 
industry-year fixed effects. Including state-year fixed effects yields similar results (both 
in magnitude and statistical significance) for the entrenchment index, blockholders, cash 
compensation, and ROA. The point estimate for share repurchases remains negative but 
is statistically noisier, as is the case with the main analysis. Overall, this test provides 
assurance that other widely studied legal changes do not confound my analysis.  
Next, I limit the sample of control firms to those incorporated in states that 
closely follow the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) but do not have a UD 
statute.13 The treated firms are the same as the main analysis.  As noted in the background 
section, many states that have UD adopted a version of the rule from the MBCA, a model 
set of legal rules created by the American Bar Association. This test addresses the 
                                                           
12 See Karpoff and Wittry (2014) for further discussion of these legal changes.   
13 Specifically, control firms are those incorporated in AL, CO, IL. KY, MD, NM, ND, OR, SC, TN, and 
WA. The list of these states is from Lyon (2014). The treated firms are the same as the main analysis. 
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possibility that my findings are driven by a spurious correlation resulting from 
incorporation in a state that closely follows the MBCA. A number of large incorporation 
states (e.g., Delaware, New York, California) are excluded from this analysis. I include 
firm and year fixed effects in the regression specification; higher-dimensional fixed 
effects are impractical in this setting due to the relatively small sample size. The results, 
reported in Table A.5, serve as further confirmation of the main analysis. Specifically, the 
estimates for the entrenchment index, blockholders, CEO cash compensation, and share 
repurchases remain statistically significant. The effect of UD on firm profitability is 
similar in magnitude to the main analysis (-0.0075), but not significant at traditional 
levels (p=12.5%). These results also suggest that the findings are not driven by a 
“Delaware effect” because firms incorporated in Delaware are not included in this 
analysis. In unreported analysis, I find that the results are also robust to dropping firms 
incorporated in any single state that has UD.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Shareholder lawsuits are a controversial issue in both legal and policy circles. 
Many academics and corporate insiders bemoan the ubiquity of strike suits and argue 
litigation primarily serves to enrich the plaintiffs' bar at the expense of corporations and 
shareholders. Others contend litigation conveys benefits through both settlements and its 
deterrence function.  
In this paper, I use UD laws as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effects of 
shareholder litigation rights on corporate behavior. My findings highlight the important 
role of litigation in shaping the governance structures of firms. Specifically, I document 
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an increase in the use of antitakeover provisions after a state has adopted UD. This 
finding likely stems from both a direct effect of fewer settlements as well as weaker 
deterrence under UD. In addition, I find that firms have fewer institutional blockholders, 
potentially resulting from the use of antitakeover provisions. UD laws are also associated 
with changes to compensation and financial policies. Specifically, CEO cash 
compensation increases, while share repurchases and book leverage decline. Ultimately, I 
find that weaker shareholder litigation rights are associated with a decrease in firm 
performance, though alternative governance mechanisms (e.g., institutional ownership) 
mute this effect.  
The findings of this paper suggest a number of avenues for future work. First, 
while I show UD laws are associated with a number of changes to corporate behavior and 
outcomes, the welfare implications are not obvious. In addition, a better understanding of 
the nature of the agency conflict that leads to these effects may have important 
implications for the design of managerial incentives.  
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Figure 1 
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuit Time Series 
This figure shows the fraction of firm-year observations in the sample subject to new derivative 
or class action lawsuits between 1996 and 2009.  Derivative lawsuit data are from SEC filings 
and Audit Analytics. Class action data are from the Stanford Securities Class Action database.  
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Figure 2 
Entrenchment Index Coefficient Dynamics 
This figure shows the coefficient dynamics for the effect of universal demand laws on the 
entrenchment index.  The regression specification includes firm, industry-year, and state-of-
location-year fixed effects.  Each point estimate is relative to the effective year (i.e., year zero). 
The dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.  
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Table 1  
UD laws 
This table lists the states with universal demand laws the corresponding effective year and statute 
reference. The final column reports the number of firm-year observations in the sample. Source: 
Model Business Corporation Act Annotated (2013) and state statutes/ session laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year State Citation Firm-Year Observations
1989 GA Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-742 1,083
MI Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1493a 981
1990 FL Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.07401 1,528
1991 WI Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.742 812
1992 MT Mont. Code. Ann. § 35-1-543 17
VA Va. Code Ann § 13.1-672.1B 1,025
UT Utah Code. Ann. § 16-10a-740(3) 322
1993 NH N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.42 6
MS Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.42 65
1995 NC N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-42 679
1996 AZ Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-742 143
NE Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2072 79
1997 CT Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-722 338
ME Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-C, § 753 65
PA Cuker v. Mikalauskas 1,921
TX Tex. Bus. Org. Code. Ann. 607.07401 1,666
WY Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-742 48
1998 ID Idaho Code §  30-1-742 30
2001 HI Haw. Rev. Stat. §  414-173 71
2003 IA Iowa Code Ann. §  490.742 215
2004 MA Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 156D, § 7.42 1,819
2005 RI R.I. Gen. Laws. §  7-1.2-710(C) 113
SD S.D. Codified Laws 47-1A-742 54
Total = 13,080 (16.6%)
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Table 2  
Summary statistics 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the full sample. All accounting variables (except those in 
logs) are normalized by total assets. CEO cash compensation is normalized by total 
compensation. Panel B reports ex ante firm characteristics for the first 3 years data are available 
prior to UD. Column (1) restricts observations to firms incorporated in states that do not enact 
UD during the sample period (i.e., "never treated").  Column (2) restricts observations to firms 
incorporated in states that enact UD at some point during the sample period (i.e., "eventually 
treated").  Column (3) reports the p-value (adjusted for clustering at the state of incorporation 
level) from the paired t-test comparing these values. Standard deviations are reported in 
parenthesis. 
 
Panel A 
 
Variable Obs Mean SD 25% 50% 75%
1(Derivative Lawsuit) 50190 0.019 0.137 0 0 0
1(Class Action Lawsuit) 42938 0.028 0.165 0 0 0
Entrenchment Index 17064 2.091 1.327 1 2 3
GIM Index 17064 9.005 2.798 7 9 11
Poison Pill 17064 0.556 0.497 0 1 1
Blank Check Stock 17064 0.861 0.346 1 1 1
Classified Board 17064 0.573 0.495 0 1 1
Supermajority Voting 17064 0.172 0.377 0 0 0
Golden Parachute 17064 0.586 0.493 0 1 1
Limit Bylaw 17064 0.181 0.385 0 0 0
Limit Charter 17064 0.023 0.151 0 0 0
1(Blockholder) 76382 0.273 0.446 0 0 1
1(Blockholder Entry) 74779 0.056 0.23 0 0 0
1(Blockholder Exit) 74779 0.034 0.18 0 0 0
Max Inst. Size (%) 76382 8.465 6.973 4.525 7.335 10.528
Inst. Ownership (%) 76382 40.547 26.436 17.673 37.619 61.547
CEO Cash Comp./Total 20666 0.558 0.311 0.287 0.529 0.853
Repurchases 79049 0.014 0.041 0 0 0.007
Dividends 79049 0.008 0.019 0 0 0.009
Log(PP&E) 78747 3.883 2.105 2.343 3.693 5.295
Capex 78123 0.066 0.068 0.023 0.045 0.083
Cash 79037 0.17 0.21 0.022 0.078 0.241
Net Debt Iss. 73949 0.012 0.099 -0.019 0 0.027
Book Leverage 78714 0.241 0.219 0.041 0.206 0.371
ROA 78836 0.094 0.153 0.054 0.118 0.176
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Panel B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Untreated Eventually Treated Difference p-value
1(Derivative Lawsuit) 0.013 0.008 0.212
(0.079) (0.072)
Entrenchment Index 1.946 2.196 0.224
(1.391) (1.456)
GIM Index 9.012 9.225 0.839
(2.938) (3.291)
Blockholder 0.148 0.179 0.167
(0.309) (0.332)
Inst. Ownership (%) 29.541 28.837 0.648
(18.981) (18.001)
CEO Cash Comp. 0.707 0.727 0.353
(0.214) (0.211)
Repurchases 0.012 0.012 0.9433
(0.026) (0.027)
ROA 0.117 0.123 0.524
(0.104) (0.100)
Capex 0.075 0.076 0.886
(0.061) (0.059)
Log(PP&E) 3.870 3.714 0.36
(1.901) (1.734)
Cash 0.120 0.107 0.127
(0.139) (0.125)
Net Debt Iss. 0.018 0.016 0.696
(0.082) (0.066)
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Table 3  
Effect of UD laws and occurrence of derivative lawsuits 
The dependent variable is an indicator for if a derivative litigation is initiated in a given year.  
Lawsuit data are from Audit Analytics and SEC filings. The sample runs from 1994 to 2009. UD 
equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed 
effects included in each specification are noted in the table.  Industry-year fixed effects use 3-
digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. Column (4) reports the 
coefficient trend. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) 
are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UD -0.00703*** -.00762*** -0.00682**
(0.00208) (0.00237) (0.00332)
UD(-1) -0.00768
(0.00560)
UD(0) 0.000329
(0.00501)
UD(+1) -.0114*
(0.00611)
UD(2+) -.0121***
(0.00403)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no no
State-Year FE no no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes yes
Observations 50,190 50,190 50,190 50,190
R-squared 0.156 0.221 0.236 0.236
1(Derivative Lawsuit)
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Table 4  
Effect of UD laws on the entrenchment index 
This table reports the effect of universal demand (UD) laws on the entrenchment index (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)). Governance data are from Riskmetrics, and the sample runs from 
1990 to 2006. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand 
requirement. The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in the table.  Industry-year 
fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. Column (4) 
reports the coefficient trend. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UD 0.215*** 0.289*** 0.242**
(0.0648) (0.0906) (0.118)
UD(-1) -0.0532
(0.0535)
UD(0) -0.0363
(0.0504)
UD(+1) 0.235**
(0.109)
UD(2+) 0.368**
(0.161)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no no
State-Year FE no no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes yes
Observations 17,064 17,064 17,064 17,064
R-squared 0.889 0.914 0.923 0.923
Entrenchment Index
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Table 5  
Effect of UD laws on individual governance provisions 
The dependent variables are the six provisions contained in the entrenchment index, as well as an indicator for blank check preferred stock. 
Governance data are from Riskmetrics, and the sample runs from 1990 to 2006. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a 
universal demand requirement. Each specification includes firm, industry-year, and state-of-location-year fixed effects. Industry-year fixed effects 
use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Poison Blank Check Classified Supermajority Golden Bylaw Charter 
Pill Stock Board Voting Parachute Limits Limits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
UD 0.107* 0.0689** 0.0454* 0.0425** 0.0591 -0.00766 -0.00472
(0.0589) (0.0273) (0.0225) (0.0207) (0.0601) (0.0170) (0.00699)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 17,064 17,064 17,064 17,064 17,064 17,064 17,064
R-squared 0.860 0.911 0.948 0.934 0.806 0.932 0.928
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Table 6 
Effect of UD laws on institutional blockholders  
The dependent variable in Panel A is an indicator for a 10\% institutional blockholder. The 
dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) of Panel B is an indicator for blockholder entry in the 5 
year period after treatment.  The indicator for blockholder exit in columns (4) – (6) is defined 
analogously. Blockholder data are from Thomson. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a 
state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed effects included in each specification are 
noted in the table.  Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use 
headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UD -0.0367** -0.0398** -0.0464***
(0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0155)
UD(-1) -0.0192
(0.0214)
UD(0) -0.0672***
(0.0228)
UD(+1) -0.0786***
(0.0261)
UD(2+) -0.0375**
(0.0179)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no no
State-Year FE no no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes yes
Observations 76,382 76,382 76,382 76,382
R-squared 0.383 0.441 0.454 0.454
1(Blockholder)
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Panel B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UD -0.0122** -0.0128** -0.0160*** 0.00421 0.000629 -0.00665
(0.00498) (0.00555) (0.00551) (0.00527) (0.00598) (0.00528)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no yes no no
State-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 74,779 74,779 74,779 74,779 74,779 74,779
R-squared 0.078 0.150 0.168 0.087 0.169 0.185
1(Blockholder Entry) 1(Blockholder Exit)
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Table 7 
Effect of UD laws on CEO compensation 
The dependent variable in Panel A is the ratio of cash compensation to total compensation for 
CEOs. The dependent variables in Panel B are the individual components of pay (normalized by 
total compensation). Compensation data are from Execucomp, and the sample runs from 1992 to 
2009. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. 
The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in the table.  Industry-year fixed effects 
use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are 
estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of 
incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UD 0.0296** 0.0283** 0.0394***
(0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0138)
UD(-1) -0.0159
(0.0204)
UD(0) 0.0272
(0.0333)
UD(+1) 0.00815
(0.0275)
UD(2+) 0.0431**
(0.0173)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no no
State-Year FE no no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes yes
Observations 20,666 20,666 20,666 20,666
R-squared 0.466 0.542 0.567 0.567
CEO Cash Comp. / Total
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Table 8 
Effect of UD laws on payout policy 
The dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) is share repurchases. The dependent variable in 
columns (4) – (6) is cash dividends. Both variables are normalized by total assets. UD equals one 
if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed effects 
included in each specification are noted in the table.  Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, 
and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UD -0.00324** -0.00308** -0.00231 -0.000252 0.000332 0.000620
(0.00131) (0.00116) (0.00164) (0.000453) (0.000635) (0.000546)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no yes no no
State-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 79,049 79,049 79,049 79,049 79,049 79,049
R-squared 0.253 0.321 0.336 0.625 0.670 0.680
Repurchases Cash Dividends
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Table 9 
Effect of UD laws on firm size, investment, and financial policy 
All variables except log(PP&E) are normalized by total assets. UD equals one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. Each specification includes firm, 
industry-year, and state-of-location-year fixed effects, where industry-year fixed effects use 3-
digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by 
OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. * 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log(PP&E) Capex Cash Debt Issuance Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UD -0.00624 0.000738 0.00597 -0.00551** -0.0112*
(0.0235) (0.00207) (0.00419) (0.00271) (0.00665)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
State-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 78,747 78,123 79037 73,949 78,714
R-squared 0.938 0.691 0.814 0.296 0.753
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Table 10 
Effect of UD laws on firm performance 
The dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a 
state that has a universal demand requirement. The coefficient for this variable is the difference-
in-differences estimate. The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in the table.  
Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. 
All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the 
state of incorporation level. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5%  levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UD -0.00772** -0.00741* -0.00822*
(0.00306) (0.00371) (0.00441)
UD(-1) -0.00172
(0.00594)
UD(0) -0.0054
(0.00500)
UD(+1) -0.0091
(0.00692)
UD(2+) -.00890*
(0.00500)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no no
State-Year FE no no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes yes
Observations 78,836 78,836 78,836 78,836
R-squared 0.689 0.729 0.735 0.735
ROA
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Table 11 
Heterogeneous effects on ROA 
This table reports the effect of universal demand laws on ROA for different subsets of firms using 
the triple differences methodology of Gormley and Matsa (2011). The first column restricts the 
sample to firms with above/below the median level of institutional ownership the year prior to a 
UD law.  The second column restricts the sample to firms with above/below the median level of 
assets, and the third restricts the sample to above/below the median level of cash flow normalized 
by total assets.  UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand 
requirement.  All specifications include firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects.  
Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, while state-year fixed effects use headquarters 
location. Coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered 
at the state of incorporation level and * and ** denote statistical significance and the 10% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
High Inst. Ownership Large Firms Low Cash Flow
UD 0.000469 0.00263 -0.000645
(0.00522) (0.00327) (0.00851)
Observations 89,112 91,286 80,156
R-squared 0.703 0.695 0.679
Low Inst. Ownership Small Firms High Cash Flow
UD -0.0115* -0.0112* -0.0100**
(0.00671) (0.00617) (0.00497)
Observations 76,023 76,518 87,457
R-squared 0.708 0.714 0.608
Firm FE yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes
State-Year FE yes yes yes
ROA
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Table 12 
Pennsylvania analysis 
This table restricts the sample of treated firms to Pennsylvania, where universal demand was 
implemented by the state supreme court in 1997. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in PA 
after the adoption of universal demand. The dependent variables are defined in previous tables. 
Each specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects. Coefficients are estimated by 
OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at the and 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E Index 1(Blockholder) Cash Comp. Repurchases ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UD 0.334*** -0.0273** 0.0402*** -0.00612*** -0.00520**
(0.0322) (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.00112) (0.00201)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 15,785 65,528 19,151 67,890 67,712
R-squared 0.918 0.455 0.545 0.328 0.736
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Appendix 
Derivative Lawsuit Examples 
The following excerpts from SEC filings detail allegations and settlements related to 
shareholder derivative actions against four different corporations. 
 
A. Broadcom (2011 10-K) 
In 2006 a number of purported Broadcom shareholders filed putative shareholder 
derivative actions in state and federal court against Broadcom, each of the then members 
of our Board of Directors and certain current or former officers, alleging, among other 
things, that the defendants improperly dated certain Broadcom employee stock option 
grants. In August 2009 Broadcom plaintiffs and certain defendants executed a Stipulation 
and Agreement of Partial Settlement in the federal derivative action, which resolved all 
claims except those against three individuals: Dr. Henry T. Nicholas, III, our former 
President and Chief Executive Officer and former Co-Chairman of the Board, William J. 
Ruehle, our former Chief Financial Officer, and Dr. Henry Samueli, our Chief Technical 
Officer and member of our Board of Directors. 
 
In March 2011, Broadcom, plaintiffs and the three remaining defendants executed a 
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, or Derivative Settlement, in the federal 
derivative action. On May 23, 2011, the District Court entered an order granting final 
approval of the Derivative Settlement. Pursuant to the Derivative Settlement, among 
other things: (i) Broadcom received a payment from Dr. Nicholas of approximately $27 
million, which was recorded as a settlement gain in our consolidated statements of 
income; (ii) Broadcom cancelled unexercised Broadcom stock options held by Dr. 
Samueli valued at approximately $14 million, using a Black-Scholes analysis based on 
the closing price of Broadcom’s Class A common stock on the date the settlement was 
deemed final, which amount was recorded as a settlement gain in our consolidated 
statements of income...Upon Court approval of the Derivative Settlement, Broadcom paid 
plaintiffs’ counsel $25 million of the settlement proceeds for attorneys’ fees, expenses, 
and costs, which was recorded as an operating expense in the consolidated statements of 
income. 
 
B. Johnson and Johnson (2013 10-K) 
Starting in April 2010, a number of shareholder derivative lawsuits were filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against certain current and 
former directors and officers of Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson is named as a 
nominal defendant. These actions were consolidated in August 2010 into In re Johnson & 
Johnson Derivative Litigation...Collectively, these shareholder derivative actions assert a 
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variety of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties, including, among other things, that the 
defendants allegedly engaged in, approved of, or failed to remedy or prevent defective 
medical devices, improper pharmaceutical rebates, improper off-label marketing of 
pharmaceutical and medical device products, violations of current good manufacturing 
practice regulations that resulted in product recalls, and that the defendants failed to 
disclose the aforementioned alleged misconduct in the Company's filings under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Each complaint seeks a variety of relief, including 
monetary damages and corporate governance reforms. Johnson & Johnson moved to 
dismiss these actions on the grounds, inter alia, that the plaintiffs failed to make a 
demand upon the Board of Directors. 
 
C. News Corp. (2011 8-K) 
On February 21, 2011, the Company announced that it planned to acquire Shine Group 
Ltd. ("Shine"), a television and movie production company based in the U.K. which 
produces, among other television shows, Got to Dance , The Biggest Loser , Master Chef, 
and Minute to Win It , for an enterprise value of £415 million, or $670 million (the 
"Shine Acquisition"). Shine's investors included Sony Entertainment and British Sky 
Broadcasting, as well as majority owner Elisabeth Murdoch, the daughter of Defendant 
Rupert Murdoch. The Company's February 21, 2011, announcement also indicated that 
Rupert Murdoch expected Elisabeth Murdoch to join the News Corp. board of directors. 
 
[The] consolidated shareholder derivative complaint…contains five claims. Counts I and 
II relate to the Shine Acquisition, alleging, among other things, that Defendants breached 
their fiduciary duties by agreeing to acquire Shine without considering whether the 
transaction served a legitimate corporate objective and permitting the purchase of Shine 
at an excessive price. Counts III, IV, and V are Oversight-Related Claims, alleging, 
among other things, that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by not investigating, 
between July 2009 and 2011, the hacking claims at News of the World, and as a result, 
the Company was harmed. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Variable definitions 
The following table contains the name, source, and definition for the variables in this paper. Further information on the litigation and governance 
variables is provided in the text. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Name Source Definition
1(Derivative Lawsuit) Audit Analytics + SEC Filings (see text) Equals 1 if derivative lawsuit filed against firm
1(Class Action) Stanford Securities Class Action Database Equals 1 if shareholder class action lawsuit filed against firm
Entrenchment Index Riskmetrics Index of 6 governance provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009))
GIM Index Riskmetrics Index 24 governance provisions (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003))
1(Blockholder) Thomson Reuters 13F Summary Equals 1 if largest institutional investors owns >10% of shares outstanding
1(Blockholder Entry) Thomson Reuters 13F Summary Equals 1 if firm does not have 10% blockholder at t-1 and does at t
1(Blockholder Exit) Thomson Reuters 13F Summary Equals 1 if firm has 10% blockholder at t-1 and does not at t
Max Inst. Ownership (%) Thomson Reuters 13F Summary Percentage of shares outstanding owned by largest institutional investor
Institutional Ownership % Thomson Reuters 13F Summary Total ownership by institutional investors
CEO Cash Comp. / Total Execucomp Ratio of cash (salary, bonus, LTIP, other)  compensation to total
ROA Compustat-CRSP oibdp/at
ROA (net) Compustat-CRSP ni/at
ROE Compustat-CRSP (oibdp-dvc)/ceq
Profit Margin Compustat-CRSP oibdp/sale
Dividends Compustat-CRSP dvc/at
Repurchases Compustat-CRSP [prstkc-(pstkrv(t)-pstkrv(t-1))]/at
Capex Compustat-CRSP capx/at
Net Debt Issuance Compustat-CRSP (dltis - dltr)/at
Leverage Compustat-CRSP (dlc+dltt)/at
Cash Compustat-CRSP che/at
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Appendix Table 2 
Effect of UD laws on the GIM index 
This table reports the effect of universal demand (UD) laws on the GIM index (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003)).  Governance data are from Riskmetrics. UD equals one if a firm is 
incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed effects included in 
each specification are noted in the table. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
UD 0.380** 0.477** 0.317
(0.175) (0.216) (0.245)
Firm FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no
State-Year FE no no yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes
Observations 17,064 17,064 17,064
R-squared 0.927 0.944 0.949
GIM Index
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Appendix Table 3 
Effect of UD laws on alternative ownership measures 
The dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) is the percentage of shares owned by the largest 
institutional investor.  The dependent variable in columns (4) – (6) is total institutional ownership. 
UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. 
Ownership data are from Thomson. The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in 
the table. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10\%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UD -0.497* -0.538** -0.488*** -0.00612 -0.00442 0.00114
(0.269) (0.241) (0.150) (0.00703) (0.00685) (0.00632)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes no no yes no no
State-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Industry-Year FE no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 76382 76382 76382 76382 76382 76382
R-squared 0.547 0.597 0.607 0.779 0.804 0.810
Max Inst. Size (%) Inst. Ownership (%)
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Appendix Table 4 
Controlling for potentially confounding events 
The regression results in this table control for potentially confounding events during the sample 
period (as identified by Karpoff and Wittry (2014)).  In particular, the specification includes 
controls for control share acquisition laws, business combination laws, fair price laws, directors' 
duties laws, poison pill laws, and the 1995 Unitrin court decision in Delaware. The dependent 
variables are defined in previous tables. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has 
a universal demand requirement. Each specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
E Index 1(Blockholder) Cash Comp. Repurchases ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UD 0.238*** -0.0374* 0.0251* -0.00266** -0.00793*
(0.0776) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0109) (0.0045)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Other Event Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 17,064 76,382 20,666 79,049 78,836
R-squared 0.915 0.442 0.542 0.322 0.729
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Appendix Table 5 
Limiting sample to MBCA states 
This table limits the sample to firms incorporated in states with UD or states that otherwise 
substantially follow the Model Business Corporation Act (from Lyons (2014)). Specifically, the 
control sample consists of firms incorporated in AL, CO, IL, KY, MD, NM, ND, OR, SC, TN, 
and WA. The treatment sample consists of firms incorporated in states that adopt a universal 
demand requirement during the sample period (see Table 1).  The dependent variables are defined 
in previous tables. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand 
requirement. Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E Index 1(Blockholder) Cash Comp. Repurchases ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UD 0.212*** -0.0460** 0.0350* -0.00339** -0.00754
(0.0706) (0.0202) (0.0188) (0.00132) (0.00478)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,734 16,753 3,156 17,265 17,203
R-squared 0.896 0.366 0.462 0.252 0.641
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CHAPTER 2: Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners  
(with Todd Gormley and Donald Keim) 
 
 
“We’re going to hold your stock when you hit your quarterly earnings 
target. And we’ll hold it when you don’t. We’re going to hold your stock if 
we like you.  And if we don’t.  We’re going to hold your stock when 
everyone else is piling in. And when everyone else is running for the exits.  
That is precisely why we care so much about good governance.” 
 
— F. William McNabb III, Chairman and CEO of the Vanguard funds 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 While there is considerable evidence that institutional investors influence the 
governance and corporate policies of firms (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales 
(2013); Brav et al. (2008); Hartzell and Starks (2003)), this evidence primarily focuses on 
the role of “activists” that accumulate shares and make demands upon managers or 
“active” fund managers that exit positions when managers perform poorly.  Yet, such 
“active” investors represent only a subset of institutional investors. Increasingly, many 
institutions are instead “passive” investors that hold diversified portfolios of stocks with 
low turnover and do not actively buy or sell shares to influence managerial decisions.14 
The investment objective of such institutions is to deliver the returns of a particular 
market index (e.g., S&P 500) or “investment style” (e.g., large-cap value) with minimal 
fees and expenses.  The rapid growth and large ownership stakes of such passive 
                                                           
14 At the end of October 2014, $3.2 trillion were invested in U.S. equity index funds alone, representing 
36% of total U.S. equity mutual fund assets (estimates provided by Vanguard).  Moreover, The Wall Street 
Journal estimates that the inflows into passively managed funds in 2013 was $336 billion, which is more 
than six times the amount of inflows into more traditional mutual funds during the same period. See  
http://online.wsj.com/articles/investors-pour-into-vanguard-eschewing-stock-pickers-1408579101.  
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investors raises questions about how effectively managers are being monitored. Many 
worry that passive investors lack both the motives and mechanisms to monitor their large, 
diverse portfolios, and that the increasing market share of such “lazy investors” weakens 
firm-level governance and hurts performance (The Economist, 2015).  However, others 
counter that passive investing does not equate with passive ownership.15  In this paper, 
we examine whether passive institutional investors influence firms’ governance 
structures, and ultimately, performance. 
There are many reasons to suspect that the growth of passive investors weakens 
the governance of firms. First, such institutional investors may lack an incentive to 
monitor managers.  Unlike actively managed funds that attempt to outperform some 
benchmark, index funds and other non-index passive funds seek to deliver the 
performance of the benchmark, and any improvement in one stock’s performance will 
simply increase the performance of both the institution’s portfolio and the underlying 
benchmark. Second, such investors may be less able to exert influence over managers.  
Specifically, by seeking to minimize deviations from the underlying index weights, 
passive institutions lack a traditional lever used by non-passive investors to influence 
managers—the ability to accumulate or exit positions.  Third, given their diversified 
holdings across hundreds of stocks, passive investors may lack the resources necessary to 
research and individually monitor each stock in their portfolio.  
And yet, there are reasons why passive investors may seek to improve firms’ 
                                                           
15 For example, the title of this paper, “Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners,” was the title for an article 
written by Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard, in April 2013 highlighting the care Vanguard takes 
when voting proxies. See https://personal.vanguard.com/us/insights/article/proxy-commentary-042013. 
Similar views regarding the distinction between being a passive investor, but active owner, were espoused 
by Rakhi Kumar, head of corporate governance at State Street Global Advisors in The Financial Times on 
April 6, 2014 in an article titled, “Passive investment, active ownership,” and by David Booth, chairman 
and co-founder of Dimensional Fund Advisors, in the New York Times on March 16, 2013 in an article 
titled, “Challenging Management (but Not the Market)”. 
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governance choices and performance.  If fund flows respond to absolute (rather than just 
relative) performance, passive managers will have an incentive to improve overall market 
performance because fund fees are based on assets under management, which will 
increase with both positive fund flows and positive performance (Black (1992)).  
Moreover, because passive institutions are less able to divest their positions in poorly 
performing stocks, they may place even greater weight than active fund managers on 
ensuring effective governance in the firms they own (Romano (1993), p.83). Finally, all 
institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to manage their funds and vote their proxies 
in the best interest of shareholders.  
There are also several mechanisms by which passive investors might exert 
influence.  First, institutions that manage passive funds often own a sizable proportion of 
a firm’s shares, and passive investors are keenly aware of the influence their votes can 
wield.16  Managers’ knowledge that these passive investors are not likely to sell their 
shares anytime soon may also give the views of passive investors greater weight than 
those of active fund managers, which tend to exhibit high turnover rates. Second, the size 
and concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes may facilitate activist investors’ 
efforts to rally support for their demands (Brav et al. (2008), Bradley et al. (2010)).  
Bringing just a few passive institutions on board can lend creditability to an activist 
campaign, and activists are known to gauge the support of a firm’s largest passive 
institutional investors before pursuing demands from management.17  Finally, if acquiring 
                                                           
16 As noted by Rakhi Kumar, head of corporate governance at State Street Global Advisors, “The option of 
exercising our substantial voting rights in opposition to management provides us with sufficient leverage 
and ensures our views and client interests are given due consideration” (see Scott (2014)). 
17 For example, the activist hedge fund ValueAct was successful in obtaining a board seat on Microsoft 
with less than 1% of stock because Microsoft recognized that other institutional investors backed the fund’s 
demand.  Also, passive investor Dimensional Fund Advisors, using their sizable ownership stake of 6.7%, 
helped activist investor Starboard elect three new directors to the board of Regis Corp. in late 2011 (see 
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the expertise to be an effective owner exhibits economies of scale, passive institutional 
investors may be more effective at monitoring managers than retail investors that directly 
hold stocks. While passive institutions may lack the resources necessary to monitor each 
stock in their large, diversified portfolios, they may engage in widespread, but low-cost, 
monitoring of firms’ compliance with what they consider to be best governance practices 
(e.g., Black (1992), Black (1998)).   
Identifying the impact of passive investors on firms’ corporate governance and 
other policies can be challenging.  For example, cross-sectional correlations between 
passive investors and governance choices might not reflect a causal relation since 
ownership by passive investors might be correlated with factors—such as firms’ 
investment opportunities or ownership by active investors—that directly affect firms’ 
choices. Simultaneity bias could also distort these relations. For example, investors in 
passive funds may prefer to track indexes that contain a higher proportion of well-
managed firms, all else equal. 
To overcome these challenges and to assess whether passive investors affect 
firms’ governance, we exploit variation in ownership by passive investors that occurs 
around the cutoff point used to construct two widely-used market benchmarks, the 
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes.  The Russell 1000 comprises the largest 1,000 
U.S. stocks, in terms of market capitalization, and the Russell 2000 comprises the next 
largest 2,000 stocks. Because portfolio weights assigned to each stock within an index are 
value-weighted, a stock’s index assignment has a significant impact on the extent of 
ownership by index funds and other non-index passive funds that use the Russell indexes 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Sommer (2013)). And, in its fight against Agrium, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners first gauged the 
support it had from large institutional investors before going public with its demands. See 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/new-alliances-in-battle-for-corporate-control/ for more details.  
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as benchmarks.  For example, the 750th through 1,000th largest stocks will be included in 
the Russell 1000 and be given very small portfolio weights within the index because they 
represent the smallest firms in their index, while the 1,001st through 1,250th largest stocks 
will be included in the Russell 2000 and be given weights that are an order of magnitude 
larger because they represent the largest firms in their index. Therefore, for each dollar 
invested in a passive fund using the Russell 1000 as a benchmark, very little of it will be 
invested in stocks at the bottom of that index; while for each dollar invested in a passive 
fund using the Russell 2000 as a benchmark, a large proportion of it will be invested in 
stocks at the top of the index.  
Because there is a comparable amount of assets benchmarked to each index 
(Chang, Hong and Liskovich (2014)), this benchmarking by passive funds leads to a 
sharp jump in ownership by passive institutional investors for stocks at the top of the 
Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.  Defining passive 
investors as institutions classified as quasi-indexers by Bushee (2001), the two largest of 
which are Vanguard and State Street, we find that ownership by passive investors is, on 
average, about 2 to 4 percentage points higher for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 
index relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index.  The difference 
represents about 5%-10% higher ownership by passive investors relative to the sample 
average.  Consistent with this difference in institutional ownership being driven by 
passive investors, we find no corresponding difference in ownership among more active 
institutions.  The lack of a difference for the active institutional investors indicates the 
larger ownership of stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 by passive institutional investors 
coincides with a lower ownership of these stocks by retail investors. 
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Exploiting this variation in ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff in an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation, we are able to assess the effect of passive investors 
on firms’ governance structures.  Specifically, we instrument for ownership by passive 
investors with an indicator for being assigned to the Russell 2000 in a given year. Our IV 
estimation relies on the assumption that after conditioning on stocks’ market 
capitalization, which determines index assignment, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index 
does not directly affect our outcomes of interest except through its impact on ownership 
by passive investors. This assumption seems reasonable in our setting in that it is unclear 
why index inclusion would be directly related to governance and other corporate 
outcomes after restricting the sample to stocks near the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff and 
after robustly controlling for the factor that determines index inclusion—stocks’ end-of-
May market capitalization.18  
The governance outcomes we choose to analyze reflect those that the largest 
passive institutional investors explicitly state as being important. While passive 
institutions do vary their voting strategy across firms on governance issues (e.g., see 
Davis and Han (2007)), a common theme of the proxy voting policies of large, passive 
institutional investors is (1) to either withhold support or vote against boards that are not 
sufficiently independent, (2) oppose antitakeover provisions that can reduce board 
accountability, including poison pills and restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call 
special meetings, and (3) oppose unequal voting rights, such as dual class shares (e.g., see 
                                                           
18 Another advantage of our identification strategy is that it does not depend on one’s ability to classify 
passive and non-passive institutional investors.  Because the IV estimation only uses variation in 
institutional ownership that is driven by index assignment, the estimation and its assumptions are not 
sensitive to using either total institutional ownership or commonly-used definitions of passive ownership as 
the key explanatory variable to be instrumented.  The interpretation of the local average treatment effect we 
estimate will remain the same.  See Sections III.B and IV.B for more details.   
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the Appendix for more details on voting guidelines of four prominent passive institutional 
investors). We also analyze outcomes that are directly related to the potential 
mechanisms by which passive investors may exert influence, such as their support for 
management and governance-related shareholder proposals, the types of proposals voted 
on, and the likelihood of activist hedge funds making demands upon management.   
Using our IV approach, we find that passive investors have a significant impact 
on key aspects of firms’ governance structures.  First, an increase in ownership by 
passive investors is associated with an increase in the share of independent directors on a 
board.  Relative to the sample average, a 10% increase in ownership by passive investors 
is associated with a 9% increase in the share of directors on a firm’s board that are 
independent; and this association is even larger before the NYSE and Nasdaq ruled in 
2003 that listed firms are required to have a majority of independent directors. Second, 
passive ownership is associated with the removal of antitakeover defenses. A one 
percentage point increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with 0.5 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of removing a poison pill and of reducing 
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.  These findings are 
economically large given that, on average, only 4% of firms remove a poison pill and 
0.7% of firms eliminate restrictions on special meetings each year during our sample 
period. Finally, an increase in passive ownership is also associated with firms being less 
likely to have dual class shares, a device used to give certain shareholders (e.g., firm 
founders) voting control. 
Our evidence suggests that a key mechanism by which passive investors exert 
their influence is through the power of their large voting blocs.  Passive ownership is 
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associated with a decline in the share of votes in support of management proposals and an 
increase in support for governance-related shareholder proposals.  Relative to the sample 
average, a 10% increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with about a 4% 
decline in support for management proposals and about a 10% increase in support for 
governance proposals. These differences in support are not driven by a change in the type 
of proposals being voted on; we find little evidence of an association between passive 
investors and the composition of management or shareholder proposals. 
We find less evidence of an alternative mechanism by which passive investors’ 
ownership stakes influence governance outcomes—by facilitating the activist efforts of 
other investors. We find no evidence of a positive association between ownership by 
passive investors and the likelihood of a firm experiencing a hedge fund activism event, 
as defined by Brav et al. (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010).  If anything, we find 
suggestive evidence of a decline in hedge fund activism.  However, these findings do not 
exclude the possibility that passive investors’ ownership stakes increase the threat of 
activism by others, and that some of the observed responses are driven by this increased 
threat.  For example, companies may be responsive to the governance views of passive 
investors so as to lessen the likelihood such investors later lend support to an activist 
campaign initiated by others. 
Contributing to the ongoing debate regarding the performance and value 
implications of various governance structures (e.g., Stein (1988), Bhagat and Black 
(2002), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)), we find that an increase in passive ownership is 
associated with an improvement in firms’ future performance. We find no evidence of an 
association between passive ownership and measures of performance in our main IV 
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specification, but if we isolate the longer-term impact of passive ownership by adding 
controls for stocks that recently switched indexes, we find evidence that passive 
ownership is associated with significant improvements in firms’ return on assets (ROA).  
On average, a 10 percent increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with 
about a fifth of standard deviation increase in ROA. We also find that ownership by 
passive investors is associated with reduced cash holdings, a higher dividend yield, and 
suggestive decline in managerial pay, all of which have been associated with 
improvements in performance and reductions in agency problems associated with free 
cash flows. We do not find much evidence, however, that passive ownership is associated 
with differences in firms’ capital structure or investments.  Combined, these findings are 
consistent with passive investors improving firm value by insisting on basic governance-
related changes, as these require a low level of costly monitoring, while avoiding more 
costly interventions to alter firms’ investment or capital structure. 
Our findings are robust to various specification choices.  For example, varying the 
number of stocks we investigate around the cutoff between the two indexes or varying the 
functional form we use to control for firms’ end-of-May market cap, which is the key 
factor determining stocks’ index assignment each year, does not affect our findings. The 
findings are also robust to the definition of market cap we employ.  We use the CRSP 
monthly file to calculate end-of-May market caps, but the findings are robust if instead 
we use the Compustat security monthly file or, when available, Russell’s proprietary 
measure of total market cap.  The findings are also robust to (1) controlling for firms’ 
float-adjusted market cap, which is a proprietary measure used by Russell to determine a 
stock’s ranking within indexes, (2) controlling for firms’ industry, (3) controlling for 
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firms’ stock liquidity, and (4) controlling for whether firms recently switched indexes.  
Finally, the findings are robust to using a narrower definition of passive ownership that 
only includes the ownership stake of the three largest quasi-index institutions (Barclays 
Bank, which owned iShares during our sample period, State Street, and Vanguard) as the 
key explanatory variable, and we find no effect of passive ownership in placebo tests that 
assume jumps in passive ownership at alternative market cap thresholds (i.e., instead of 
the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff).   
 Overall, our findings contribute to the broad literature that studies the effects of 
institutional ownership of common stock.  One strand of this literature analyzes 
institutional investors’ impact on various aspects of corporate governance, including 
governance indices (Aggarwal et al. (2011), Chung and Zhang (2011)), CEO pay 
sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks (2003)), and shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks 
(2000)), while another strand studies the effects of institutional investors on corporate 
policies, including leverage (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent (2014)), dividends 
(Grinstein and Michaely (2005)) and R&D (Bushee (1998), Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales (2013)).  A number of recent papers also highlight the role of specific types of 
institutional investors, such as activist hedge funds (Brav et al. (2008); Klein and Zur 
(2009)) and pension funds (Agrawal (2012); Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998)).  
We contribute to this literature by focusing on passive institutions—a previously ignored, 
but increasingly important, set of institutional investors.  Contrary to the presumption that 
passive investors lack the willingness and ability to influence firms’ policy choices, our 
evidence suggests that passive investors adopt general principles of what constitutes an 
effective governance structure, as proposed in Black (1992), and successfully influence 
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firms’ governance and other policy choices accordingly.  
 The results of this paper also provide new insights into the determinants of firms’ 
governance structures and the mechanisms that allow large shareholders to influence 
managerial decisions. Typically, institutional investors, such as blockholders, are thought 
to influence governance through a combination of “voice” and “exit” (e.g., Edmans 
(2014) and Levit (2013)).19  Voice refers to direct intervention by shareholders through 
either formal (e.g., proxy voting) or informal (e.g., letters to the board) channels (Harris 
and Raviv (2010); Levit and Malenko (2011); Maug (1998); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), 
while exit refers to the threat or actual selling of shares (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009); 
Edmans (2009); Edmans and Manso (2011)).  However, because passive funds maintain 
portfolio weights that are often closely aligned with the weights in their chosen 
benchmark, their ability to influence managers is primarily limited to voice, which is 
thought to constrain their ability to influence corporate outcomes. Our paper finds 
otherwise; while passive investors are not “active” in the traditional sense, their 
significant voting blocs and ability to engage in voice are powerful tools used to shape 
the governance structure of firms and influence firm performance and some aspects of 
corporate policy.20   
                                                           
19 Several papers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) also study the use of hostile takeovers and proxy fights 
by blockholders.  In both cases, the large holdings of these shareholders partially mitigate free rider 
problems which arise in a world with atomistic owners (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
20 In this regard, our findings complement those of Iliev and Lowry (forthcoming), who analyze the 
determinants of mutual funds’ reliance on proxy advisory service companies like Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS).  While not the focus of the paper, Section 4.3 of Iliev and Lowry presents evidence that 
index funds are more likely to “actively vote” their shares (as measured by being less likely to follow ISS 
vote recommendations on non-binding shareholder proposals) when they have substantial holdings in the 
firm. Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2013) find similar evidence that the voting decisions of Vanguard, and other 
large fund families, vary substantially from ISS vote recommendations.  Our findings demonstrate that the 
active monitoring and voice of passive investors results in actual differences in firms’ governance 
structures and corporate policies. 
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 Finally, our work is related to recent papers that use the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff 
to analyze the price effects of additions and deletions from a market index (Chang, Hong, 
and Liskovich (2014)), the importance of institutional investors’ portfolio weights for 
monitoring incentives (Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015)), and the association between total 
institutional ownership and corporate policies like payouts, investment, the composition 
of CEO pay, management disclosure, and acquisitions (Boone and White (2014); Crane, 
Michenaud, and Weston (2014); Lu (2013); Mullins (2014)).  In contrast to these papers, 
we use the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to isolate variation in ownership by passive 
investors, and we analyze the impact of such investors on governance outcomes that 
passive investors explicitly mention as being important (e.g., independent directors, fewer 
takeover defenses, and equal voting rights), and the mechanisms by which passive 
investors might influence such governance outcomes (e.g., proxy voting, shareholder 
proposals, and facilitating activism by others).21  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III describe 
our data and identification strategy. Section IV describes our findings regarding corporate 
governance, while Section V discusses potential mechanisms. Section VI describes our 
findings regarding other corporate outcomes.  Section VII discusses our specification 
choice and robustness tests, and Section VIII concludes. 
                                                           
21 While our identification strategy is similar to that of other papers that use the same Russell 1000/2000 
setting, there are methodological differences between our IV estimation, which isolates changes in passive 
ownership, and empirical specifications used in previous Russell 1000/2000 papers.  We discuss these 
differences in Section VII.C. 
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II. Sample, data sources, and descriptive statistics 
In this paper, we merge stock-level data on institutional ownership and Russell 
equity index membership with firm-level governance, proxy voting, accounting, and 
executive compensation data.  We now briefly describe each data source and our sample. 
   
A. Institutional holdings and Russell 1000/2000 index membership 
We use the 13F holdings data to compute institutional holdings in a stock as a 
percent of its market capitalization. Any financial institution exercising discretionary 
management of investment portfolios over $100 million in qualified securities is required 
to report those holdings quarterly to the SEC using Form 13F.  Qualified securities 
include stocks listed for trading in the U.S., among other securities, and the quarterly 
holdings reported in Forms 13F represent the aggregate holdings of an institution (e.g. the 
Vanguard family of funds), rather than the holdings of any individual portfolio (e.g., the 
Contra fund in the Fidelity family of funds).  These filings are compiled by 
Thomson/CDA and available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We 
calculate the total market cap of each stock using the CRSP monthly file as the sum of 
shares outstanding multiplied by price for each class of common stock associated with a 
firm (i.e., we sum across all PERMNOs associated with each PERMCO). We exclude 
observations where institutional holdings exceed a firm’s market capitalization.22    
We use Bushee's (2001) three sub-categories of institutional investors, based on 
                                                           
22 On occasion, an institution will report its holdings late, so that the report date and filing date in the 
Thomson data are not the same.  As these holdings are not current, we also delete them from our analysis.  
We also correct for the two transcribing errors—errors relating to incorrect prices and incorrect split 
adjustment factors for the fourth quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2000—identified in Blume and 
Keim (2014).   
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portfolio diversification and turnover, to distinguish between index/passive and active 
institutional ownership.  Specifically, we use Bushee's three institutional categories: (i) 
“quasi-indexers" (low turnover, high diversification – e.g., Vanguard and State Street); 
(ii) “transient” (high turnover, high diversification – e.g., Janus Capital Management, 
Morgan Stanley); and (iii) “dedicated” (low turnover, low diversification – Berkshire 
Hathaway, Wellington (Windsor)).23  To generate variables for institutional ownership 
disaggregated into these three types, we compute the percentage of the market 
capitalization for stock i owned by quasi-indexers, transient, and dedicated institutions at 
the end of September of year t.  
Combined, the 13F data and Bushee’s categorization of institutional investors 
confirm the growing importance of passive investors.  This is seen in Figure 1, which 
plots the quarter-end percentage of total U.S. market value held by quasi-indexers from 
June 30, 1984 to June 30, 2010.  As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, holdings by 
passive investors have steadily grown over the last three decades, except for a small drop-
off after the 2008 financial crisis.  The growing importance of passive investors is 
particularly stark among smaller capitalization stocks.  This is seen in the next two panels 
of Figure 1 where we plot quasi-index ownership for firms found in the Russell 1000, 
which reflects the largest 1,000 firms in terms of market cap, and the Russell 2000, which 
reflects the next 2,000 largest firms.  Quasi-indexers owned less than 14% of the 
combined value of the stocks in the Russell 2000 index in June 1984, and more than 40% 
in June 2010 (down from 48% in March 2008).  In contrast, quasi-index ownership in the 
                                                           
23 To avoid changes in the classification of an institution over time, we use Bushee’s “permanent” 
classification.  As discussed in Section VII.B, our findings are also robust to using alternative methods to 
classify institutions.  See Bushee’s website for details: 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.  
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Russell 1000 stocks grew from 29% to just over 46% during the same period.   
Because we are interested in whether an increase in ownership by an institution 
that tends to offer passive funds, like Vanguard or State Street, is associated with 
differences in governance or corporate performance, we define passive ownership at the 
institutional level (using the aggregated 13F data and Bushee’s quasi-index classification) 
rather than at the fund level.  Proxy voting guidelines, particularly those regarding 
governance, are established at the institution level (e.g., see Appendix), and consistent 
with this, Rothberg and Lilien (2006), Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2013), and Rock (2014) 
find that voting decisions are made at the family level and that funds within an institution 
almost always vote uniformly as a block.  Thus, the influence of these passive institutions 
is likely to reflect the totality of their holdings rather than the holdings of a given fund; 
and while many of the largest passive institutions also offer some actively-managed 
funds, our later findings demonstrate that there is no evidence that ownership by actively-
managed funds varies based on a stock’s index assignment.    
Our subsequent analysis is restricted to the sample of stocks found in the Russell 
1000 and 2000 indexes between 1998 and 2006.  We obtain data for the Russell 1000 and 
2000 indexes from Russell, and we start the sample at 1998 because this is the first year 
Russell provides us with its proprietary, float-adjusted market capitalization, which is 
used to determine the rank (i.e., portfolio weight) of each security within an index.  We 
end the sample prior to 2007, which is when Russell implemented a new methodology to 
construct the two indexes such that they no longer necessarily reflect the 1,000 and next 
2,000 largest stocks by market capitalization.  Russell also provided us with their 
proprietary end-of-May total market capitalization values for each year from 2002 to 
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2006. The importance of the end-of-May market capitalizations and of ending the sample 
prior to 2007 is described in Section III.   
 
B. Governance, voting, accounting, and compensation data 
Governance and voting data are largely obtained from Riskmetrics (ISS), which 
provides information on several aspects of corporate governance for firms in the S&P 
1500.  Following Riskmetrics’ classification of a director’s independence, which 
excludes linked directors (e.g., those with business ties to the firm), we calculate the 
percentage of independent directors on the boards of each firm for each year in the 
sample from the director dataset.  The governance dataset from Riskmetrics is used to 
create indicator variables for whether a firm removes restrictions on shareholders’ ability 
to call a special meeting or has dual class shares in a given year. The governance 
database is available for alternating years in the sample, except for 1998 when there is a 
three-year lag.  We also construct several variables related to shareholder proposals and 
voting.  We use the voting results database from Riskmetrics to calculate the average 
percentage of shares that vote in support of management proposals at annual meetings 
and in support of shareholder-initiated governance proposals for each firm.  Because 
annual meetings can occur throughout a year, we restrict the sample to those occurring 
between reconstitutions of the Russell indexes (i.e., between July of year t and June of 
year t+1). 
Our data on poison pills are obtained from Shark Repellent (FactSet).  Shark 
Repellent provides historical information on firms’ most recent poison pill, such as when 
the poison pill was renewed, withdrawn, or allowed to expire.  We define our variable for 
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poison pill removal as an indicator equal to 1 if a firm’s poison pill is either withdrawn or 
allowed to expire at time t, and zero otherwise. Because Shark Repellent only reports 
information on a firm’s most recent poison pill, our indicator only flags firms that 
removed a poison pill during our sample period and did not reinstate a poison pill 
subsequently. 
Annual accounting data are from Compustat, and we use executive compensation 
data from Execucomp.  Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Definitions for all our key variables are provided in Appendix Table 1.    
 
C. Sample and descriptive statistics 
For our main analysis, we restrict our sample to stocks in the 250 and 500 
bandwidths around the cutoff, as determined using the end-of-June Russell-assigned 
portfolio weights for stocks within each index.  This sample spans an economically 
important set of midcap and small cap stocks that includes 1,000 of the 1,500 largest (in 
terms of market capitalization) U.S. publicly-listed firms.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for firms in these two bandwidths around the 
cutoff.  The mean and median values of the main outcome variables are similar across 
both bandwidths.  The average level of institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares 
outstanding) is 64%.  Quasi-indexers are the largest type of institutional investors 
(approximately 38% of shares outstanding), followed by transient (16%) and dedicated 
(9%).  Support for management proposals is high (85%), consistent with the notion that 
many of the issues addressed by these proposals are routine in nature, while support for 
shareholder-initiated governance proposals is considerably lower (36%).  Independent 
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directors make up over half (65%) of the total number of directors for firms in the 
sample.  The table also shows that poison pill removals and the lessening of restrictions 
on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting are relatively rare events in our sample, 
occurring in just 4% and 0.7% of firm-year observations, respectively. About 12% of 
firms have dual class shares.  Finally, firms’ ROA averages about 0.03.  
 
III. Empirical framework 
Identifying the impact of passive investors on firms’ corporate governance and 
other policies can be challenging.  For example, cross-sectional correlations between 
passive investors, governance, and performance might not reflect a causal relation since 
ownership by passive investors might be correlated with factors—such as firms’ access to 
capital, investment opportunities, or ownership by active investors—that directly affect 
firms’ choices. Failure to control for such factors could introduce an omitted variable bias 
that confounds the cross-sectional relations. Simultaneity bias could also distort these 
relations; for example, investors in passive funds may prefer to invest in funds that track 
indexes that contain firms with more payouts, all else equal.  To overcome these 
challenges and to determine the importance of passive investors, we use stocks’ 
assignment to the top of the Russell 2000 index as an exogenous shock to ownership by 
passive investors.  We now describe our identification strategy. 
  
A. Russell index construction and passive institutional investors 
Passive funds attempt to match the performance of a market index by holding the 
basket of representative securities in the particular market index being tracked and 
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weighting each security in proportion to its market capitalization weight in the index. The 
most visible types of passive funds are index funds, which hold nearly all stocks in the 
market index rather than a representative sample.  
Two market indexes widely used as benchmarks are the Russell 1000 and Russell 
2000 indexes.  The Russell 1000 comprises the largest 1000 U.S. stocks, in terms of 
market capitalization, while the Russell 2000 comprises the next largest 2000 stocks.  
Example index and non-index passive funds that use the Russell 1000 as a benchmark are 
the Vanguard Russell 1000 Index Fund (VRNIX) and the BNY Mellon Large Cap Stock 
Fund (MPLCX), while the Vanguard Russell 2000 Index Fund (VRTIX) and DFA U.S. 
Small Cap Fund (DFSTX) are two funds that use the Russell 2000 as a benchmark.   
To account for changes in stocks’ ranking by market cap, the Russell indexes are 
reconstituted each year at the end of June.  On the last Friday of June, Russell 
Investments determines which stocks will be included in the two indexes for the 
following twelve months using market capitalization as of the last trading day in May of 
that year.24  In other words, the 1000 largest stocks at the end of the last trading day in 
May will be included in the Russell 1000, while the next 2000 largest stocks will be 
included in the Russell 2000.25   Each stock’s weight in the index is then determined 
                                                           
24 However, when the last Friday of June falls on the 29th or 30th, the two indexes are reconstituted on the 
preceding Friday.  During the following twelve months, stocks are only deleted from the indexes due to 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings, delistings, and corporate actions (takeovers), while IPOs are added quarterly 
to the indexes on the basis of the market capitalization breaks established during the most recent 
reconstitution. For more details regarding the reconstitution process and eligibility for inclusion in the 
Russell indexes, see Russell Investments (2013). 
25 Beginning in 2007, Russell implemented a “banding” policy where firms within a certain range of the 
cutoff would not switch indexes.  For example, a firm that was in the Russell 2000 index last year but was 
among the 1000 largest firms this year would only move to the Russell 1000 index if its market 
capitalization exceeded a certain threshold. Since our identification strategy relies on controlling for the 
factors that determine a firm’s index assignment each year, we restrict our attention to years prior to the 
implementation of this banding policy where only the end-of-May market capitalization calculated by 
Russell is used to determine firms’ index assignment.  For a press release regarding the implementation of 
this banding policy by Russell, see https://www.russell.com/us/news/press-release.aspx?link=press-
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using its end-of-June float-adjusted market cap.  The float-adjusted market capitalization 
is different than the market capitalization used to determine index membership in that it 
only includes the value of shares that are available to the public. For example, shares held 
by another company or individual that exceed 10% of shares outstanding, by another 
member of a Russell index, by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), or by a 
government will be removed when calculating a firm’s float-adjusted market 
capitalization, as will unlisted share classes.  Therefore, a stock that was the 1,000th 
largest stock in total market capitalization need not be the stock with the smallest 
portfolio weight in the Russell 1000 index.   
A stock’s index assignment can have a significant impact on its portfolio weight 
within its index.  Because stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 pale in size compared 
to the largest stocks in that index, the 1000th largest stock at the end of May will be 
included in the Russell 1000 and be given a very small portfolio weight within its index, 
while the 1001th largest stock will be included in the Russell 2000 and be given a much 
larger weight in its index. For example, between 1998 and 2006, the average portfolio 
weight of the bottom 250 stocks in the Russell 1000 was 0.012%, while the average 
portfolio weight of the top 250 stocks in the Russell 2000 was an order of magnitude 
larger at 0.127%.  This difference in portfolio weights persists over a wide range around 
the cutoff.  This is seen in Figure 2, where we plot the end-of-June portfolio weights of 
the 500 smallest float-adjusted stocks in the Russell 1000 and the 500 largest float-
adjusted stocks in the Russell 2000 for the year 2006. 
 These differences in portfolio weights can have a significant impact on the extent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
releases/2007/PR20070403.htm, and for more details on how the banding thresholds are determined each 
year, see Russell Investments (2013).  
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of a stock’s ownership by passive investors.  Because index funds weight their holdings 
based on the portfolio weights of the underlying index in an attempt to minimize tracking 
error, it is more important that they match the weights of the stocks at the top of the index 
than for stocks at the bottom of the index.  Likewise, non-indexed passive investors will 
pay more attention to deviations from benchmark weights for the largest stocks in their 
portfolios because such deviations will have a greater impact on performance measured 
relative to the benchmark.  In other words, for each dollar invested in a passive fund 
benchmarked to the Russell 1000, very little of it will be invested in stocks at the bottom 
of that index, while for each dollar invested in a passive fund benchmarked to the Russell 
2000, a large proportion of it will be invested in stocks at the top of the index.  Because 
there is a comparable amount of money benchmarked to both indexes (Chang, Hong and 
Liskovich (2014)), the portfolio decisions of passive institutions can lead to a large 
difference in ownership between stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 and stocks at the 
bottom of the Russell 1000.26   
The importance of index assignment for ownership by passive investors is shown 
in Figure 3, where we sort the top 500 stocks of the Russell 2000 and bottom 500 stocks 
of the Russell 1000, as determined using the end-of-June Russell-assigned portfolio 
weights within each index, using their end-of-May CRSP market capitalization for each 
year between 1998 and 2006 and plot the average market capitalization, share of firms in 
the Russell 2000, and end-of-September percent ownership by quasi-index institutional 
                                                           
26 Even though the Russell 1000 is an order of magnitude larger in total market cap than the Russell 2000, 
there is a similar amount of dollars tracking the Russell 2000 because it is the most widely used market 
index for small cap stocks.  The Russell 1000, which spans both large and midcap stocks, is less widely 
used as a benchmark because it faces more competition from other large cap and midcap market indexes, 
including the S&P 500 (which is the most popular market index), the CRSP U.S. midcap index, and the 
S&P 400 midcap index. 
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investors.  By construction, the top-left panel of Figure 3 shows no break in size between 
the 500th and 501st largest stocks in this sample.  But, as shown in the middle-left panel, 
there is a rather large jump in the probability of being assigned to the Russell 2000 index 
around this break. Figure 3 also demonstrates that the end-of-May market capitalization 
reported by CRSP does not perfectly predict a stock’s index assignment.  This is because 
Russell makes a number of adjustments when calculating its proprietary market 
capitalization values such that these values, which are used to determine a stock’s index 
membership, do not perfectly match market capitalizations reported in sources such as 
CRSP.  And consistent with index assignment having an important impact on ownership, 
the bottom-left panel of Figure 3 demonstrates a distinct jump in the ownership of passive 
investors around this midway point.   On average, quasi-index investors own 40.4% of 
the top 500 firms of the Russell 2000, but only own 37.8% of the bottom 500 firms in the 
Russell 1000 (p-value of difference < 0.001).27  
 We find no evidence that index assignment is related to ownership by actively 
managed funds.  This is shown in the remaining two panels of Figure 3 where we plot the 
percent ownership for transient and dedicated institutional investors.  As seen in those 
panels, there is no corresponding difference in either transient or dedicated institutional 
ownership; we formally test and demonstrate this lack of a difference in other types of 
ownership in Section III.C. While some quasi-index institutions may also offer actively-
managed funds, the lack of a difference for other types of institutional holdings suggests 
                                                           
27 The difference of 2.6 percentage points corresponds well to estimates regarding the total amount of 
passive assets tracking each of the two indexes.  For example, taking the estimated dollar value of passive 
assets benchmarked to each index from 1998 to 2006, as reported Table 1, Panel A of Chang, Hong, and 
Liskovich (2014), one can calculate the percent of total holdings in both indexes that is held by passive 
funds that track that specific index.  Using this back-of-the-envelope calculation, the implied passive 
holdings in the Russell 2000 index should be about 1.8 percentage points greater, on average, than that of 
the of the Russell 1000 index during our sample period. 
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the difference in quasi-index ownership shown in Figure 3 is driven by passive funds 
rather than active funds.   
The importance of index assignment for passive ownership is further highlighted 
by looking at the ownership stake of the three biggest passive institutions classified as 
quasi-index investors—Vanguard, State Street, and Barclays Bank (which owned iShares 
during our sample).  These three institutions account for half of the observed difference 
in quasi-index ownership, and on average, the ownership stake of each of these three 
institutions is a third higher among the 500 firms at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to 
the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000.  Moreover, their likelihood of owning more 
than 5% of a firm’s shares, is higher, on average by two thirds for firms at the top of the 
Russell 2000, while their likelihood of being a top 5 shareholder is higher, on average, by 
15%.28  
 
B. Identification strategy and empirical specification  
 The construction of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes thus provides a source of 
exogenous variation in ownership by passive investors.  Stocks at the top of the Russell 
2000 exhibit greater ownership by passive investors because of their inclusion at the top 
of their index, while stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 do not.  Because index 
assignment is determined by an arbitrary rule surrounding the market capitalization of the 
1000th largest firm, this variation in ownership is plausibly exogenous after conditioning 
on firms’ market capitalization.   
                                                           
28 The importance of index assignment can also be seen at the fund level.  Using the Thomson Reuters S12 
fund-level database, we find that among the 50 largest mutual fund holdings for each stock, there are 16.5% 
more fund names that include the word “index” for the 250 stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to 
the 250 stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.  
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 We use an instrumental variable strategy to identify the effect of ownership by 
passive institutional investors on firms’ corporate governance and corporate policies; in 
particular, we use inclusion in the Russell 2000 as an instrument for ownership by 
passive investors. Because index assignment is determined by a stock’s market 
capitalization, and because market capitalization may directly affect a stock’s 
institutional ownership for reasons separate from index assignment, we also include a 
robust set of controls for stocks’ end-of-May market capitalization in our estimation.  
Specifically, we estimate the following: 
   (1) 
where Yit is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t, Quasi-indexit is the percent of a 
firm’s shares held by quasi-indexers in year t, Mktcapit is the end-of-May CRSP market 
capitalization of stock i at in year t, and Floatit is the float-adjusted market capitalization 
calculated by Russell. We control for float-adjusted market capitalization because it is 
used by Russell to compute portfolio weights within each index and could be related to a 
firm’s stock liquidity, which may affect firms’ governance and other corporate outcomes 
(Back, Li, and Ljungqvist (2014); Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013)). We also include year 
fixed effects, , to ensure that our estimates are identified using within-year variation in 
ownership and are not driven by the aggregate upward trend in ownership by passive 
investors (see Figure 1).  Finally, we cluster the standard errors, , at the firm level.29   
 To account for the possibility that ownership by passive investors, as measured 
                                                           
29 We do not include firm fixed effects in our estimation since only a small fraction of our sample firms 
switch indexes at some point during the sample and because many of the governance and corporate 
outcomes we study are likely to be affected by sustained rather than transitory variation in passive 
ownership.  Since firm fixed effects will remove this sustained variation, they will likely not capture the 
relevant variation and thus potentially provide misleading inferences (e.g., see McKinnish (2008); Gormley 
and Matsa (2014)).     
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using Quasi-index, might be correlated with the error term,  , because of the omitted 
variable and simultaneity issues discussed above, we instrument for ownership by passive 
investors using index assignment.  Specifically, we instrument Quasi-index in the above 
estimation using R2000it, which is an indicator equal to one if stock i is part of the 
Russell 2000 index in year t.  As shown in Figure 3, being assigned to the Russell 2000 is 
associated with a significant jump in ownership by passive investors for stocks at the top 
of Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.30   
Our IV estimation relies on the assumption that, after conditioning on stocks’ 
market capitalization, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index is associated with an increase 
in Quasi-index (relevance condition) but does not directly affect our outcomes of interest 
except through its impact on ownership by passive investors (exclusion restriction).  We 
verify the relevance condition below in our first stage estimations, and the exclusion 
restriction seems reasonable in that it is unclear why index inclusion would be directly 
related to our outcomes of interest after robustly controlling for the factor that determines 
index inclusion—firms’ end-of-May market capitalization, as calculated by Russell.  To 
control for firms’ market capitalization, we include a robust set of controls for firms’ log 
market capitalization, Ln(Mktcap), as measured using CRSP data and restrict our sample 
to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 and top of the Russell 2000.31  In particular, 
                                                           
30 The instrumental variable (IV) estimation is implemented using the standard two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation, and as further support of the need for our IV estimation, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, as 
proposed in Wooldridge (1995), rejects the exogeneity of Quasi-index in 10 of the 11 outcomes we analyze 
in Sections IV-VI of the paper.  The OLS estimates when using the 250 bandwidth and a second 
polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap) are reported in Appendix Table 2; the OLS estimates using 
alternative bandwidths or controls for Ln(Mktcap) are qualitatively similar.  The OLS estimates differ 
considerably from the IV estimates reported in Sections IV-VI.  For example, in an OLS estimation, Quasi-
index is unrelated to takeover defenses, while in our later IV estimates, we demonstrate that Quasi-index is 
associated with significantly fewer takeover defenses 
31 At some level, our estimation can be viewed as one that makes use of a threshold event in a non-RD 
estimation, as discussed in Bakke and Whited (2012).  
ε
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we also show the robustness of our findings to varying the number of firms we include 
around the cutoff between the two indexes and to varying the polynomial order N we use 
to control for end-of-May market capitalization.  
The use of R2000it as an instrument allows us to isolate an exogenous source of 
variation in passive ownership.  While non-index funds that passively seek to deliver the 
performance of a benchmark portfolio have discretion over which stocks to hold within 
the benchmark, the instrumental variable never uses such endogenous variation in passive 
ownership; the IV estimation only uses variation in ownership that is driven by a stock’s 
index assignment and the reshuffling of holdings by institutions that seek to minimize the 
tracking errors of their passive funds.  For this reason, our IV strategy is also not sensitive 
to the specific measure of institutional ownership we use in the first stage of the 2SLS 
estimation. In particular, one could use total institutional ownership in the first stage of 
the estimation without affecting the interpretation of the local average treatment effect 
being identified in the IV estimation. We use Quasi-index as our main measurement of 
ownership since it eliminates noise from non-passive holdings and improves the precision 
of our first stage estimates (see below).  However, as shown in Section VII, our 
subsequent findings are robust to using both wider and narrower definitions of 
ownership.   
 
C. First stage estimation 
In this section, we report estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index 
holdings on membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  Specifically, 
we estimate  
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   (2) 
where Quasi-indexit is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-indexers and 
R2000it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is in the Russell 2000 Index at end of 
June in year t.  In our initial tests, we also analyze other outcome measures, including the 
percentage of shares outstanding owned by all institutional investors; the percentage of 
shares outstanding owned by “dedicated” institutions; and the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by “transient” institutions.  The model is estimated over the 1998-
2006 period, and uses a bandwidth of 500 firms and a third-order polynomial.   
 The results, reported in Table 2, confirm that institutional ownership is related to 
membership in the Russell, particularly for passive institutions.  The first column shows 
that aggregate institutional percentage ownership is significantly higher (at the 10% 
level) for the 500 stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 than for 500 stocks at the bottom 
of the Russell 1000.  As expected, this relation appears to be driven entirely by passive 
institutions: the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level for the 
quasi-indexers (column 2), but insignificant for the more active institutional investors, as 
defined by Bushee’s dedicated and transient institutions (columns 3 and 4).  The lack of a 
difference for other institutional investors suggests that the increase in ownership by 
passive institutional investors coincides with a decline in ownership not reported in the 
13F filings, i.e. retail investors.32  
In Table 3 we demonstrate that the estimated relation between quasi-index 
ownership and Russell 2000 membership is robust to using lower order polynomials and 
                                                           
32 The differences in ownership for the three types of investors do not perfectly sum to the overall 
difference in institutional ownership because of the small number of institutions that are unclassified in 
Bushee’s database.   
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smaller bandwidths.  Using a bandwidth of 500 firms and varying the polynomial order 
of controls for market cap, we consistently find an increase in ownership by passive 
investors of 3 to 4 percentage points, which corresponds to about a 10% increase relative 
to the sample average (Table 3, columns 1–3). The increase is also robust to restricting 
our sample to the bottom 250 stocks of the Russell 1000 and top 250 stocks of the Russell 
2000 (columns 4–6).  In all cases, the increase is statistically significant at the 1% level.33  
The lack of a difference in ownership for non-passive institutional investors is 
also robust to varying the sample bandwidth and the polynomial order of controls for 
Mktcap.  This can be seen in Appendix Tables 3 and 4.  Consistent with actively-
managed funds being unaffected by a stock’s index assignment, we find no evidence of a 
difference in ownership by more active institutional investors, as captured by Bushee’s 
dedicated and transient institutions.  Combined, these findings confirm that assignment to 
the Russell 2000 increases a stock’s relative mix of passive institutions.  
We also do not find evidence that membership in the Russell 2000 is associated 
with an increase in the visibility of a stock and subsequent analyst coverage, which is 
another mechanism by which index assignment might improve firms’ governance.  In 
particular, if we re-estimate Equation (2) instead using the number of analysts as the 
dependent variable, we find no evidence that assignment to the top of the Russell 2000 is 
associated with greater analyst coverage; if anything, we find evidence that inclusion in 
the Russell 2000 is associated with less analyst coverage but the estimates are not robust 
to wider bandwidths.  Likewise, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) find no evidence 
                                                           
33 Because our IV model is just-identified, the IV estimation is median-unbiased and weak instruments are 
unlikely to be a concern in our setting, especially given the strong first stage estimates (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009).  Additionally, the Kleibergen-Paap F stat on the excluded instrument exceeds 10, providing 
further confidence that a weak instrument is unlikely to be a concern (see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) 
and Angrist and Pischke (2009)).   
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of an increase in media coverage among firms at the top of the Russell 2000.  The lack of 
an increase in either analyst or media coverage among firms at the top of the Russell 
2000 bolsters our assumption that index assignment in our setting will only affects firms’ 
governance structure through its effect on passive ownership.   
 
D. Why index assignment may matter   
A question that naturally arises is why index assignment might matter at all for 
firms’ passive ownership. If the increased ownership stake that comes with a stock being 
assigned to the Russell 2000 index allows passive investors to exert additional influence 
and correct a governance structure they deem suboptimal (as shown below), why would 
passive investors not also increase their ownership stake among stocks at the bottom of 
the Russell 1000 so as to exert more influence among those companies as well?  In other 
words, what would prevent passive institutions from being more active, and hence, 
undoing the potential importance of index assignment? 
There are two likely explanations for why index assignment may matter for firms’ 
governance structures. First, passive institutions are simply more focused on minimizing 
expenses and tracking errors than on affecting governance. While increasing an 
ownership stake for one stock at the bottom of the Russell 1000 might not significantly 
affect a fund’s tracking errors relative to a Russell 1000 benchmark, a similar increase for 
a number of other stocks would. Moreover, such targeted activism would likely increase 
fund expenses since the passive investor would need to research which stocks to target.  
Combined these two effects would likely result in lost market share to competitors with 
lower costs and lower tracking errors. Second, index assignment may create a 
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coordinated increase in ownership by passive institutions that might otherwise be hard to 
replicate. An ownership stake increase of about 3 percentage points, the average increase 
in our setting, may be prohibitively large for any one passive institution to achieve, and 
coordinating a combined ownership increase among multiple passive institutions may 
either be too costly or impose additional regulatory disclosure requirements these 
institutions wish to avoid.  
Overall, our finding that index assignment corresponds with a shift in passive 
ownership confirms that passive institutions are not active in the traditional sense of 
trying to accumulate or exit positions since such actions would undo the importance of 
index assignment. We now turn to analyzing whether passive ownership and index 
assignment affect firms’ governance structures and the potential mechanisms by which 
passive investors may exert influence. 
 
IV. How passive investors affect firms’ corporate governance 
Many of the largest passive investors, like Vanguard and State Street, express 
strong views regarding what constitutes effective governance.  In particular, they support 
greater board independence and oppose takeover defenses, like poison pills, restrictions 
on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, and dual class shares (see Appendix).  
But, do passive investors, whose impact is limited to “voice,” have an effect on corporate 
governance? In this section, we investigate these questions using the identification 
strategy and instrumental variable estimation described in Section III.   
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A. Independent directors 
We first assess whether passive institutions exert influence on board composition, 
as measured by the percentage of independent directors.  Increasing the percent of 
independent directors is a specific concern of many passive investors (see Appendix) and 
is one dimension of governance where passive investors have a direct say via their proxy 
votes in director elections. Passive investors support for independent director likely stems 
from the belief that independent directors are more likely to be effective monitors (Fama 
and Jensen (1983), Weisbach (1988)). Table 4 reports results for our IV estimation using 
percentage of independent director as the dependent variable. 
We find that passive investors do indeed have a significant impact on this key 
dimension of corporate governance.  We find a statistically significant positive relation 
(in most cases at the 1% level) between Quasi-index and the percentage of independent 
directors that is robust to various bandwidths and polynomial order controls for market 
capitalization.  The economic magnitude of the relation is sizable.  In the bandwidth of 
250 stocks, a 1 percentage point increase in ownership by passive investors is associated 
with a 1.42 to 1.58 percentage point increase in number of independent directors on a 
firm’s board (Table 4, columns 4–6).  Relative to the sample average, this corresponds to 
a 9% increase in the share of directors that are independent for a 10% increase in shares 
outstanding held by Quasi-index institutions.  In unreported analysis, we find this 
increase in director independence is not driven by an increase in board size; to the 
contrary, greater ownership by passive institutions is associated with smaller boards. The 
magnitudes for board independence are smaller, but still large and statistically significant, 
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in the wider bandwidth of 500 stocks (columns 1–3).34  
The impact of passive investors on board independence is even larger prior to 
changes regarding board independence requirements at the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges.  
In late 2002, both exchanges proposed changes to require that all firms listed on the 
exchange have a majority of independent directors, and the SEC approved the proposed 
changes in 2003. Consistent with passive investors having more of an influence on board 
independence prior to 2003, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in ownership by 
passive investors is associated with a 2.27 to 2.72 percentage point increase in number of 
independent directors on a firm’s board prior to 2003 in the smaller bandwidth of 250 
stocks (Table 5, columns 1–3) but only a 0.74 to 0.78 percentage point increase after 
2002 (columns 4–6).  The differences in the estimates across time period are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level.35   
   
B. Takeover defenses 
 We now consider the association between passive investors and two additional 
dimensions of corporate governance related to takeover defenses – poison pills and 
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.  Opposition to takeover 
                                                           
34 Because Riskmetrics only covers firms in the S&P 1500, the sample size in Table 4 is about a third 
smaller than the first stage estimates reported in Table 3.  However, this reduced sample size does not pose 
a problem for our estimation.  There is a similar coverage of observations by Riskmetrics across the two 
indexes; in our sample that includes the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 and the top 500 firms of the 
Russell 2000, 58.3% of the Russell 2000 observations are in the S&P 1500 while 59.7% of the Russell 
1000 observations that are in the S&P 1500. The balance is also similar in each of the separate Riskmetrics 
databases we use. More importantly, the first stage estimates in the smaller sample of observations with 
non-missing data on director independence remain large and statistically significant.  This can be seen in 
Appendix Table 5A.  The first stage estimates for our later estimates in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 11 can be found 
in Appendix Tables 5B-5D, respectively.  We do not separately report first stage estimates for Tables 9, 10, 
and 12 since their samples are comparable to that used in Table 3. 
35 While the proposed exchange listing requirements did not become effective until 2004, many firms began 
complying in 2003.  Given this, we follow Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and use the year 2003 as the 
potential breaking point; see Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) for more details. 
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defenses are common themes of passive investors’ proxy voting guidelines (see 
Appendix). Table 6 reports the results of our IV estimation for each of these variables, 
and for brevity, we only report findings using the smaller bandwidth of 250 firms.  
Findings when using the wider bandwidth of 500 firms are qualitatively similar. 
While poison pills may be in shareholders’ interests under some circumstances, 
they are often seen as a mechanism used to shelter managers from the disciplining effects 
of hostile takeovers. Specifically, poison pills (formally known as “shareholder rights 
plans”) effectively bar any single shareholder from acquiring more than a pre-defined 
percentage of shares (often between 10% and 15%) without significantly diluting their 
holdings (Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell (2009)).  While Coates (2000) notes that essentially 
every firm has a “shadow pill” in place because a pill may be implemented by a board at 
any time without shareholder approval, having a poison pill in place is still thought to 
provide managers with advantages in fighting off hostile bids and unwanted activists.36  
Moreover, institutional investors widely call for the redemption of poison pills and 
support efforts to subject them to shareholder votes in order to improve the accountability 
of managers and boards.37  
We find evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated with an 
increase in the removal of poison pills.  To determine the influence of passive institutions 
on the removal of poison pills, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm’s poison pill is either withdrawn or allowed to expire and zero 
                                                           
36 As noted by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), “having a pill in place saves the need to install it in ‘the 
heat of battle’… [and] signals to hostile bidders that the board ‘will not go easy’.” 
37 For example, Dimensional Fund Advisors has a policy to vote against or withhold votes for directors of 
corporations that have poison pills with a “dead hand” provision (i.e., those that cannot be redeemed by 
new directors) or that are not approved by shareholders.  See the Appendix in 
http://us.dimensional.com/media/documents/downloads/pub/pdf/sai/idg_equity_i_sai.pdf. The views of 
other large passive institutions, such as Vanguard, regarding poison pills can be found in the Appendix.  
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otherwise.  These estimates are reported in Table 6.  The estimated coefficient when 
using a first- or second-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap) is positive and 
statistically significant (at the 10% level).  A one percentage point increase in Quasi-
index is associated with a 0.5–0.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a poison 
pill being removed (Table 6, columns 1–2).  We find a similar magnitude when adding a 
third-order polynomial control for market cap, but the estimate is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (column 3).  The estimate is economically sizable given 
that, on average, only 4% of firms remove a poison pill each year. 
 We next analyze whether ownership by passive investors is associated with a 
greater ability for shareholders to call a special meeting, another important aspect of 
governance (Daines and Klausner (2001); Cremers and Nair (2005)).  Similar to poison 
pills, restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings can represent a potential 
impediment to effective governance by delaying dissident shareholders’ ability to remove 
directors, and such restrictions, especially if combined with a poison pill, are also seen as 
an effective takeover defense for entrenched managers (Daines and Klausner (2001)). To 
assess the ability of passive institutions to reduce restrictions on shareholders’ ability to 
call special meetings, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm eliminates such restrictions, and zero otherwise.  These estimates are reported in 
columns 4–6 of Table 6.   
We find evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated with the 
removal of restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. The estimated 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all of the estimations; in particular, a 
one percentage point increase in Quasi-index ownership is associated with about a 0.5 
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percentage point increase in the likelihood that a firm eliminates restrictions on 
shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.  Relative to the average share of firms that 
lift restrictions each year in our sample, which is about 0.7%, the magnitude is sizable.38  
 
C. Equal voting rights and dual class shares 
 Finally, we consider whether ownership by passive investors is associated with 
whether or not a firm has dual class shares, as determined by Riskmetrics.  Passive 
institutions uniformly support equal voting rights and oppose dual class shares and other 
forms of unequal voting rights (see the Appendix for examples).  Moreover, by 
concentrating voting power among insiders, Klausner (2012) argues that dual class shares 
are one of the most powerful takeover defenses, and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) 
find evidence that dual class shares can significantly impact firm value. To assess 
whether ownership by passive institutions is associated with fewer dual class share 
structures, we construct an indicator that equals one if the firm has dual class shares, and 
zero otherwise.  These estimates are reported in Table 7.  We find evidence that 
ownership by passive investors is associated with firms being less likely to have dual 
class shares. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant (at the 5% 
level) in all of the estimations; a one percentage point increase in Quasi-index ownership 
is associated with about a 5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a firm has 
                                                           
38 In unreported analysis, we also analyzed the impact of passive ownership on whether firms have a 
classified board, another type of takeover defense that passive institutions typically oppose (see Appendix).  
We find suggestive evidence that passive ownership is also associated with firms being less likely to have a 
classified board, but the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The statistically 
weaker results for classified boards may partially be an artifact of the time period of our sample; Guo, 
Kruse, and Nohel (2008) note that shareholder efforts to de-classify boards intensified significantly in 2003 
following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  However, we have only two years of observations for 
governance provisions after 2003. 
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dual class shares.39  
 
V. Possible mechanisms by which passive investors influence governance 
There are many possible mechanisms by which passive investors might influence 
a firm’s governance structure. First, relative to retail investors they displace at the top of 
the Russell 2000, passive investors may have stronger, more uniform views on what 
constitutes an effective governance structure and may be more effective at using their 
ownership stake and “voice” to monitor firms and ensure conformity with their views.  
Second, relative to the dispersed retail investors they replace, passive investors’ 
concentrated ownership may facilitate activism by others, such as hedge funds, by 
lowering the costs for activists attempting to coordinate votes against management (Brav 
et al. (2008), Bradley et al. (2010)).  In this section, we investigate these possible 
channels.  
 
A. The power of passive investors’ “voice”  
To address whether passive investors’ influence firms’ governance through their 
large voting blocs and the power of voice such blocs can wield, we analyze whether 
passive ownership is associated with a difference in the amount of shareholder support 
for management proposals and support for governance-related shareholder proposals.  
We also analyze whether passive ownership is associated with a shift in the types of 
                                                           
39 Unlike poison pills and restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, we do not find 
evidence that passive ownership is associated with firms being more likely to remove dual class shares.  
We only find an association between passive ownership and the indicator for whether a firm has dual class 
shares.  While the estimates for the removal of dual class shares are suggestive, they are not statistically 
significant.  This is likely attributed to the relatively small number of companies that make such changes 
following their initial public offering; on average, only about 0.9 percent of firms remove a dual class share 
structure each year in our sample (and, about 0.8 percent of firms add dual class shares each year).   
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proposals being voted on.   
We first analyze the amount of support for management proposals. Shareholder 
voting at annual meetings is a fundamental duty of shareholders, and votes against 
management proposals can be a proxy for increased monitoring by shareholders 
(Easterbrook and Fischel (1983)). It is also argued that institutional passive investors may 
be more attentive and active in voting than retail investors that directly hold stocks but 
lack the time or experience to evaluate management proposals.  To assess whether 
passive institutions influence voting outcomes, we estimate equation (1) with the 
dependent variable defined as the average percentage of shares that vote in support of 
management proposals.  
Consistent with increased monitoring of managers, we find that greater ownership 
by passive investors is associated with less support for management proposals. The 
estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant (in two cases at the 1% 
level), indicating that the greater is the percentage of passive institutional ownership, the 
lower is the shareholder support for proposals initiated by management (Table 8, columns 
1–3).  Again, the economic magnitudes are sizable.  On average, a one percentage point 
increase in ownership by passive investors is associated, on average, with a 0.85 to 1.07 
percentage point decline in support for management proposals.  Relative to the sample 
average, this corresponds to about a 4% decline in support for a 10% increase in 
ownership by Quasi-index institutions. Consistent with institutional investors being more 
attentive than individual retail investors, management appears to be confronted with a 
more contentious shareholder base when passive investors, who are less able to vote with 
their feet, make up a larger percentage of the ownership. 
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The decline in support for management proposals does not originate from a shift 
in the number or type of management proposals put to a vote.  In unreported analysis, we 
find that greater ownership by passive investors is not associated with the total number of 
management proposals, and we find little evidence of an association with the composition 
of proposals.  Specifically, we consider the prevalence of the 25 most common types of 
management proposals (which account for about 85% of management proposals), and 
with the exception of fewer proposals related to adoption of equity incentive plans and 
the approval of bonus plans, we detect no systematic difference in the types of proposals 
voted on.  The lack of difference in the composition of proposals suggests the lower 
support for management proposals is not driven by managers submitting a greater number 
of less-shareholder-friendly proposals.40   
We next analyze support for shareholder proposals and find evidence that 
ownership by passive investors is associated with an overall increase in support for 
governance-related shareholder proposals.  While these proposals are non-binding, they 
potentially increase pressure on boards to make changes to firms’ governance. On 
average, a one percentage point increase in ownership by passive investors is associated 
with a 0.87–1.25 percentage point increase in support for governance proposals (Table 8, 
columns 4–6). While the increase in support is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels when adding second- or third-order polynomial controls (p-values 0.102 and 0.100, 
respectively), the implied magnitudes are economically large. Relative to the sample 
average, a 10% increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with a 9%–13% 
                                                           
40 We also only find weak evidence that the lower support for management proposals translates into fewer 
management proposals being passed; the point estimates are negative, but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The lack of difference in the total number of proposals passed is likely attributable to 
many management proposals being related to routine business matters. 
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increase in support for shareholder proposals.  The lower statistical significance likely 
reflects the relatively small number of such proposals.  Finally, with the exception of 
fewer proposals related to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we find no relation 
between ownership by passive investors and differences in the types of shareholder 
proposals voted on.  
 Overall, our findings regarding shareholder votes support the possibility that the 
voice of passive investors has a significant impact on corporate governance of firms.  
 
B. Increased activism by others  
Another possible mechanism by which passive ownership might influence firms’ 
governance structure is by facilitating activisms by others.  In particular, the size and 
concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes may increase activist investors’ 
ability to rally support for their demands (Brav et al. (2008), Bradley et al. (2010)).  
Bringing just a few of these large investors on board can lend creditability to an activist 
campaign, and activists are known to gauge the support of firms’ largest passive 
institutional investors before pursuing demands from management.  Such added pressure 
from activist investors might also explain a number of the governance differences we 
observe.   
We find no evidence, however, that greater ownership by passive investors is 
associated with more hedge fund activism; if anything, we find suggestive evidence of 
less activism among firms with greater passive ownership.  To determine the influence of 
passive institutions on hedge fund activism, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm experiences a hedge fund activism event, as defined in 
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Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010), and zero 
otherwise.41  These estimates are reported in Table 9. The point estimates are always 
negative, and while not statistically significant at conventional levels, the estimates are 
economically large.  In the 250 bandwidth, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in 
quasi-index ownership is associated with at 0.26 to 0.44 percentage point decline in the 
likelihood of hedge fund activism (p-values = 0.11, 0.11, and 0.12 when including 
polynomial controls of order N = 1, 2, and 3, respectively).  This magnitude is large given 
that a firm’s likelihood of an activism event in a given year in our sample is, on average, 
only 1.3%.     
The absence of increased activism, however, does not negate the possibility that 
the concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes increases the threat of activism 
by others, or that this threat increases the influence of passive investors “voice”.  
Concerned about an increased threat of activism, managers may be responding to the 
views of passive investors and be taking actions even on issues not necessarily subject to 
shareholder votes, such as poison pills, to preempt an actual activist campaign.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that informal discussions between passive institutions and 
managers, backed up with the threat of voice, are often used to exert influence.42  Such 
preemptive actions would reduce the need for activism and could explain the suggestive 
                                                           
41 We thank Alon Brav for making these data on hedge fund activism events available to us.  The database 
is an updated sample [1994-2011] using the same data collection procedure and estimation methods as in 
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010).  For more information on how 
the database is constructed, please see 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~brav/HFactivism_SEPTEMBER_2013.pdf.  
42 Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard funds, notes that engagement with directors and management of 
companies is a key component of Vanguard’s governance program, and that Vanguard has “found through 
hundreds of discussion every year” that it is “frequently able to accomplish as much—or more—through 
dialogue” as through voting (see Booream (2013)).  And in a speech from October 2014, the CEO and 
Chairman of the Vanguard group, F. William McNabb, noted that Vanguard sent out 923 letters to firms in 
2013, 358 of which requested specific changes in governance, and that 80 of these companies had adopted 
substantive changes without having to go through a shareholder proposal (see McNabb (2014)). 
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decline in actual activism events.  
 
VI. Do passive investors affect firm performance or corporate policies? 
 Ownership by passive investors might also be associated with differences in firm 
performance, managerial compensation, or corporate policies.  Overall performance or 
corporate policies might differ if the observed differences in governance associated with 
passive investors help mitigate managerial agency conflicts or if managers adjust 
corporate policies so as to preempt hedge fund activism campaigns that rely on the 
support of passive investors. We now explore this possibility. 
      
A. Overall performance  
There is considerable debate about the value implications of various governance 
structures or whether the potential influence of passive investors will necessarily improve 
firm performance.  Because greater board independence, fewer antitakeover defenses, 
and the absence of dual class shares arguably increase shareholder rights, one might 
expect that passive ownership mitigates agency conflicts and is associated with improved 
performance. However, theory suggests that board independence might be a result rather 
than a cause of performance (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)), and the empirical 
evidence regarding the performance implications of board independence is mixed (e.g., 
Bhagat and Black (2002); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).  Likewise, the value 
implication of removing poison pills and other takeover defenses is debatable (e.g., Stein 
(1988), Coates (2000)). More broadly, one might also argue that the optimal governance 
structure may vary considerably across firms (e.g., Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2008); 
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Duchin, Matsusaka, Ozbas (2010)), and hence, the potential “one-size-fits-all” 
governance view of passive investors may not always represent an improvement for 
individual firms.  
Consistent with the governance structure promoted by passive investors having a 
positive impact on performance for the average firm, we find evidence that ownership by 
passive investors is related to an overall improvement in firms’ future performance, as 
measured using firms’ return on assets (ROA). Although passive ownership is not 
associated with significant differences in firms’ overall ROA in our main specification 
(Table 10, columns 1-3), it is positively associated with firms’ ROA after adding controls 
for whether a firm switched indexes that particular year (columns 4-6).  This is because 
improvements in performance may take time to manifest, and one would not expect to 
find a relation between changes in passive ownership and performance for firms that just 
switched indexes.  Consistent with this, we find that adding controls for such recent 
movers reveals a positive and statistically significant association between passive 
ownership and ROA.  On average, a 10 percent increase in passive ownership is 
associated with about a fifth of a standard deviation increase in ROA.  In unreported 
estimates, we also find that passive ownership is positively associated with Tobin’s Q, 
another commonly used measure of firm performance.43  
 
B. Executive compensation 
There has been much debate regarding managerial pay and whether its growth 
                                                           
43 Similar to ROA, we find a positive association between passive ownership and Tobin’s Q only after 
controlling for whether a firm switched indexes that year. Importantly, our earlier estimates for governance 
and vote outcomes are unaffected by the inclusion of the additional controls for whether a firm switched 
indexes that year.  These robustness tests are discussed in Section VII.A. 
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reflects an efficient market outcome or an agency conflict and passive investors 
commonly discuss the importance of using compensation to properly reward and 
incentivize managers (see proxy-voting guidelines in the Appendix).  It is unclear, 
however, whether or how passive investors might weigh into this debate regarding 
compensation.  To assess whether passive ownership affects CEO compensation 
structure, we examine total CEO pay, its composition, and the sensitivity of CEO pay to 
stock price movements.  
We find less evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated with a 
difference in overall managerial pay.  When using the wider bandwidth of 500 firms, a 
one percentage point increase in Quasi-index is associated with a decline in total pay 
(Table 11, columns 1-3), and the estimate is statistically significant when using either a 
first- or second-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). However, the point estimates 
tend to decrease and are not statistically significant when using the 250-stock bandwidth 
(columns 4-6).  In unreported analysis, we find no evidence that passive ownership is 
associated with differences in the composition of managerial pay (salary, bonuses, and 
grants of restricted stock, each scaled by total pay) or the sensitivity of total CEO pay to 
stock price movements (as measured using the delta or vega of the manager’s stock 
portfolio; see Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) for variable definitions). Thus, for 
our sample at least, passive institutions appear to have a relatively small impact on 
decisions regarding executive compensation. However, it is important to note that our 
sample predates the implementation of “Say on Pay” by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. 
This provision, which requires nonbinding votes on executive pay packages, potentially 
provides an added mechanism for passive investors to influence compensation 
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decisions.44 
 
C. Cash, dividend, financing, and investment policies 
 There is an extensive literature addressing the relation between corporate 
ownership structure and payout policy; for example, agency theories suggest that better 
monitoring by shareholders might lead to lower cash levels and higher payouts in the 
form of dividends (Jensen (1986), La Porta et al. (2000)).  To examine whether 
ownership by passive investors is associated with differences in cash and dividends, we 
estimate equation (1) with the log of cash holdings in year t and the ratio of common 
dividends paid during year t to market value of equity at the end of year t.  The results are 
reported in Table 12. 
   Consistent with either improved governance or managers responding to an 
increased threat of activism, we find evidence of both a decrease in cash holdings and an 
increase in the dividend yield.  The estimated coefficient on Ln(Cash) is negative and 
statistically significant (Table 12, columns 1-3).  The implied magnitudes are large; 
relative to the sample average, a 10% increase in Quasi-index is associated with about an 
8% decline in cash holdings. The decline in cash holdings corresponds with an increase 
in dividend payouts.  The estimated coefficient on Dividend yield is positive in all three 
estimations and significant (at the 10% level) when using a first- or second-order control 
for Ln(Mktcap) (columns 4–5).  Relative to the sample average, a 10% increase in Quasi-
                                                           
44 These findings might also support anecdotal evidence that passive investors focus more attention on 
overall governance of the firm than on issues related to managerial pay.  For example, while Vanguard 
provides clear guidance on how it views specific governance-related votes, such as those related to 
independent directors and board declassification, it is more deferent to managers and directors regarding 
issues of pay.  For example, Vanguard states, “While we do not want to determine the policies of the 
companies in which we invest–that is appropriately left to their boards and management, we believe that 
the following principles are critical in linking compensation and shareowner value.” See 
https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/executive-compensation/.  
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index is associated with about a 2% increase in firms’ dividend yield.  These findings are 
consistent with the earlier findings of Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014), which finds 
an association between total institutional ownership and both dividends and cash 
holdings, using a similar estimation involving the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff.45   
We find relatively little evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated 
with corporate policies related to investment or capital structure. We do find some 
evidence of fewer equity issuances, but this does not appear to translate into a significant 
difference in firms’ overall leverage.  The estimated coefficient on Leverage is 
insignificant and economically small.  In unreported results, we also find little evidence 
of a difference in firms’ debt issuances, capital expenditures, R&D expenses, or 
acquisitions. These findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence that passive investors 
lack the resources necessary to research and influence corporate policies that are 
inherently more firm-specific.  
 
VII. Additional robustness checks and choice of specification 
 In this section, we discuss the robustness of our IV estimates.  In particular, we 
demonstrate that our findings are not sensitive to how we measure end-of-May market 
caps, to adding additional controls, or to instead using alternative definitions of passive 
institutional ownership as our key explanatory variable.  We also discuss our choice of 
specification with respect to other recent papers that have used the construction of the 
Russell indexes to analyze other questions.   
                                                           
45 The findings are qualitatively similar if we instead use a payout ratio and scale firms’ annual dividends 
by their net income.  On average, a one standard deviation increase in Quasi-index is associated with a 
quarter of a standard deviation increase in firms’ payout ratio, though the estimates are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (p-values of 0.16, 0.15, and 0.35 when using polynomial controls of order 
N = 1, 2, and 3, respectively). 
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A. Robustness to choice of controls, choice of bandwidth, and placebo tests 
 The assumption of our identification strategy is that after limiting the sample to 
stocks close to the threshold and controlling for the one factor that determines index 
membership (i.e., end-of-May market cap), index membership does not directly affect our 
outcomes of interest except through its effect on ownership by passive investors.  This is 
the exclusion restriction of the IV estimation. However, because Russell Investments uses 
a proprietary method to calculate firms’ total market caps, we are only able to imperfectly 
control for the underlying market cap used to determine index assignment.46   
 Our findings, however, are robust to using alternative ways to measure firms’ 
end-of-May market cap.  In particular, using the noisy end-of-May market caps obtained 
directly from Russell to measure Mktcap does not affect our findings. This is shown in 
Appendix Table 6, where we re-estimate our main IV regressions for the period 1998-
2006 using the 250 bandwidth with second-order polynomial controls for Ln(Mktcap) 
after replacing the CRSP market cap with the Russell-provided market cap for the years 
2002-2006.  The estimates are nearly the same as before; in particular, we still find a 
strong association between higher ownership by passive investors and more independent 
directors, fewer restrictions on special meetings, fewer dual class share structures, less 
support for managerial proposals, less cash, and greater payouts. In fact, the drop in 
hedge fund activism becomes statistically significant at the 10% confidence level when 
                                                           
46 According to Russell’s documentation, their proprietary calculation of market capitalization includes 
some ownership stakes, like common stock, non-restricted exchangeable shares, and partnership units, but 
excludes other forms of shares, such as preferred stock or redeemable shares (Russell 2013). The share 
price chosen by Russell to compute market capitalization can also vary for firms that have multiple share 
classes or did not trade on the last day of May.  Similar to Mullins (2014), we contacted Russell 
Investments and were only able to obtain a noisy measure their proprietary measure of market 
capitalizations for the years 2002 through 2006.  Russell does not have the data prior to 2002. See Mullins 
(2014) for more details regarding the likely sources for this noise. 
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using Russell, rather than CRSP, to calculate end-of-May market capitalization. We also 
continue to find a positive association between ROA and passive ownership after 
controlling for recent movers.  Our findings are also robust to instead using the 
Compustat security monthly file to determine end-of-May market cap. These findings are 
reported in Appendix Table 7. 
 Our findings are also robust to controlling for firms’ industry, to controlling for 
whether a firm switched indexes that year, and to controlling for a stock’s liquidity. If we 
add 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects to the specification, we still find that passive 
ownership is associated with more independent directors, more poison pill removals, 
fewer restrictions on special meetings, fewer dual class share structures, and less support 
for managerial proposals.  These findings are reported in Appendix Table 8.  Our findings 
are also largely unaffected if we add two additional controls to account for firms that 
moved from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 that year, and vice versa.  These 
findings are reported in Appendix Table 9.  If such switchers differ in other dimensions 
and represent a disproportionate share of either index, this could affect our earlier 
estimates.  However, with the exception of the point estimate for dividend yield, which is 
no longer statistically significant, all of the findings are robust to the inclusion of these 
controls.  And, as already shown in Section VI.A, the association between ROA and 
passive ownership is positive and statistically significant when we control for recent 
moves. Finally, in unreported tests, we find that our estimates are unaffected by the 
inclusion of additional controls for a stock’s liquidity, such as the Amihud measure of 
illiquidity or a stock’s average bid-ask spread.  
Our estimates are also robust to our choice of bandwidth around the Russell 
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1000/2000 threshold.  This is shown in Appendix Figure 1, where we plot the point 
estimates and 95th percentile confidence intervals when varying the bandwidth between 
100 and 500 firms and using a first-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap); estimates 
are reported for both the first stage and IV specifications of Tables 3-12. While the IV 
estimates are noisier at smaller thresholds, which is when the first stage estimates are also 
noisier and statistically insignificant, the estimates are relatively similar across the 
various bandwidths, and there is no evidence to indicate that our findings are sensitive to 
the choice of bandwidth.  
Finally, in further support that our findings are not driven by omitted variables 
that may be correlated with firms’ end-of-May market cap, we do not find an association 
between passive ownership and our outcomes of interest in placebo IV tests that use 
alternative thresholds.  For example, if we restrict the sample to the top 500 firms of the 
Russell 2000, and replace our R2000 indicator with an indicator for the bottom 250 firms 
of this subsample, our IV estimation does not detect an effect of passive ownership on 
any of our outcomes.  Likewise, we do not find an effect of passive ownership in a 
similar placebo test that uses the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000. 
 
B. Robustness to alternative definitions of passive ownership 
An advantage of our identification strategy is that it does not depend on our 
ability to classify institutional investors. Because the IV estimation only uses variation in 
institutional ownership that is driven by passive funds attempting to minimize their 
tracking errors across the two Russell indexes, the exclusion restriction is satisfied when 
using either total institutional ownership as the key explanatory variable to be 
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instrumented or a narrower measure of passive institutional ownership, as we use in this 
paper. The interpretation of the local average treatment effect we estimate will remain the 
same with either measure.  We confirm this in unreported tests in which we find 
qualitatively similar results when using total institutional ownership (rather than quasi-
index ownership) as the main explanatory variable. 
For our main analysis, we measure the ownership stake of passive investors by 
summing up the ownership of institutions classified as quasi-indexers by Bushee (2001).  
Bushee defines quasi-indexers as institutions with low turnover and highly diversified 
portfolios, and this categorization likely captures most passive institutions.  Consistent 
with this, we find that three of the largest institutions most commonly associated with 
passive investing, Barclays Bank (which owned iShares during our sample period), State 
Street, and Vanguard, are classified as quasi-indexers.   
Our findings are also robust to using alternative definitions of passive investors.  
In particular, if we instead measure passive ownership as just the sum of holdings by 
Barclays Bank, State Street, and Vanguard, we get similar findings.  In unreported first 
stage estimates, we find that being assigned to the Russell 2000 is associated with a very 
large and statistically significant increase in the combined holdings of these three passive 
institutions; they account for about half of the 2-4 percentage point increase in Quasi-
index ownership shown in Table 3. Moreover, our IV estimations become larger and 
more statistically significant when we use the combined ownership of these three firms as 
the explanatory variable instead of all quasi-index ownership. This can be seen in 
Appendix Table 10.47 In unreported estimates, the findings are also similar if we do not 
                                                           
47 For our main analysis, however, we prefer to use the broader classification of passive investors that 
includes all quasi-indexers.  Because some passive investors are excluded in the narrower definition, the 
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use Bushee’s “permanent” classification and instead use the time-varying classifications 
provided by Bushee or restrict the measure of passive ownership to institutions that are 
classified as a quasi-indexer in every year of our sample period. These findings provide 
additional confidence that our earlier estimates are capturing the influence of passive 
investors and that the IV estimation is not sensitive to how we measure passive 
ownership. 
 
C. Alternative specification choices 
A seemingly attractive alternative approach to estimating the effect of passive 
investors in our setting would be to make use of regression discontinuity estimation. This 
approach would make use of the discontinuity in ownership by passive investors imposed 
between the 1000th and 1001st largest firms at the end of May each year to identify their 
effect on corporate outcomes. An advantage of this approach would be the ability to 
focus on a subset of firms very close to cutoff, thus reducing concerns that the estimation 
is not adequately controlling for the one variable that determines index assignment—the 
end-of-May market caps calculated by Russell—or other possible differences among 
firms that might be correlated with a firm’s index assignment even after conditioning on 
market capitalization and other controls.   
 If the variable used to determine index assignment, end-of-May market 
capitalization, was perfectly observable, then researchers interested in determining the 
effect of the being assigned to the Russell 2000 could estimate the following sharp 
regression discontinuity estimation:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
R2000 instrumental variable may also affect the outcomes of interest through its effect on the ownership 
stake of other passive investors.  
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   (3) 
where Y is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t, Rank is the ranking of firm i in year 
t in terms of end-of-May market capitalization (e.g., the 995th largest firm would have a 
rank of 995), and R2000 is, as in the specification above, an indicator that equals one for 
firms assigned to the Russell 2000.  The sample could then be restricted to firms very 
close to the cutoff threshold of Rank = 1000, and the polynomial order of controls, N, 
could also be varied.48  The above estimation of  would identify the effect of being 
assigned to Russell 2000 on outcome Y  by testing for a discontinuity in Y between the 
1000th and 1001st largest firms, as determined using end-of-May market capitalization.   
It is not possible to estimate the above equation, however, since the market 
capitalization used by Russell to determine firms’ index assignment at the end of May is 
not observable to the econometrician.  Specifically, Russell calculates firms’ market 
capitalization using a proprietary calculation that does not perfectly match up to market 
capitalizations reported elsewhere, such as in CRSP, and because of this, econometricians 
can only imperfectly predict firms’ index assignments.    
Some have proposed switching to a fuzzy regression discontinuity to overcome 
this problem (see e.g., Mullins (2014)).  In particular, fuzzy regression estimation could 
be achieved by estimating Equation (3) and using Treatment as an instrument for R2000, 
where Treatment is an indicator that equals one for firms with a Rank greater than 1000, 
where Rank is determined using end-of-May market capitalizations.  
                                                           
48  One could also add an additional set of controls, , to allow the functional 
form of the relation between Rank and outcome Y to vary above and below the cutoff.  See Angrist and 
Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux (2010), and Roberts and Whited (2013) for more details regarding 
regression discontinuity estimations. 
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 We do not use the end-of-May market capitalization as an instrument in a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity, however, because even the market caps provided by Russell 
(and used in Mullins (2014)), are a weak predictor of index assignment near the cutoff.  
As can be seen in the top panel of Appendix Figure 2, having a ranking above or below 
1000 is a poor predictor of being in the Russell 2000 for firms near threshold between the 
1000th and 1001st largest firms.  In fact, firms with a ranking of 995-1000 are equally 
likely to be in the Russell 2000 as firms ranked 1001-1005.  While the predictive power 
of end-of-May market caps is better further from this threshold, this is not helpful in that 
fuzzy regression discontinuity estimations rely on a discontinuity in probability of 
treatment at the threshold, not at points further away from the threshold (Angrist and 
Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux (2010), Roberts and Whited (2013)).  Absent such a 
discontinuity, the estimation will suffer from a weak instrument problem.   
 The weakness of using fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation in this setting 
can be further seen in a graph of average quasi-index ownership by firms’ ranking in the 
vicinity of the threshold.  This is shown in the bottom panel of Appendix Figure 2, which 
provides a graphical representation of the reduced form version of the fuzzy regression 
discontinuity estimation.  As shown in Appendix Figure 2, there is no meaningful jump in 
passive investors close to the 1000/2000 threshold using this approach.  The reason is that 
each missed index assignment is introducing considerable noise in the estimation.  For 
example, every firm ranked between 950 and 1000 that is actually in the Russell 2000 
will likely be at the top of their index (and hence receive a large jump in ownership by 
passive investors), while every firm ranked between 1001 and 1050 that is actually in the 
Russell 1000 will likely be at the bottom of their index. This correlation in the structure 
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of noise near the threshold can also cause a fuzzy RD estimation to yield estimates that 
are the opposite of the true effect, thus potentially explaining why Mullins (2014) finds a 
counterintuitive decrease in institutional ownership for firms at the top of the Russell 
2000.49   
 We also do not use the actual rankings assigned by Russell in a regression 
discontinuity framework, as done in Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) and Lu 
(2013).  If actual Russell-assigned rankings, rather than end-of-May market cap rankings, 
are instead used to calculate the forcing variable, Rank, then other variables will no 
longer be continuous at the threshold, which violates the underlying identification 
assumption of the regression discontinuity (Angrist and Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux 
(2010), Roberts and Whited (2013)).  In particular, there will be a discontinuity in firms’ 
float-adjusted market cap since Russell resorts firms within each index based on their 
float-adjusted market cap after index assignments are made; firms at the bottom of the 
Russell 1000 will have a smaller float-adjusted market cap than firms at the top of the 
Russell 2000. This is seen in the top half of Appendix Figure 3, where we plot the 
average Ln(float-adjusted market cap) by firms’ Russell-assigned ranking.  On average, 
the firm with a Russell-assigned ranking of 1000 (i.e., the bottom firm in the Russell 
1000) has a float-adjusted market cap that is more than two log points smaller than the 
                                                           
49 See the appendix of Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) for more details.  Chang, Hong, and 
Liskovich (2014) also use a fuzzy regression discontinuity in this setting to analyze the price effects of 
additions and deletions from a market index, but their RD estimation is considerably different.  Because 
they are interested in the immediate price effects of firms that switch indexes, their fuzzy regression 
discontinuity makes use of stocks that move from one index to the other each year.  Limiting the analysis to 
such movers does not make sense in our setting because many of the governance and corporate outcomes 
we study are unlikely to respond immediately to such moves or when such moves are transitory (i.e., the 
stock switches back the following year).   
123 
 
firm with a Russell-assigned ranking of 1001 (i.e., the top firm in the Russell 2000).50 To 
avoid such concerns, we choose to use a broader IV estimation that makes use of stocks’ 
index assignment for variation in passive ownership.   
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 While there is a large literature that studies the important governance role of 
active investors, like hedge funds and pension funds, there is surprisingly little analysis of 
passive institutions like Vanguard, State Street, and DFA, which represent an 
increasingly important component of U.S. stock ownership.  This lack of focus on passive 
institutional investors likely stems from a common presumption that passive investors 
lack both the motives and resources to monitor their large and diverse portfolios. Yet, 
there are multiple reasons why passive investors may have a vested interest in affecting 
firms’ governance structures and why their ownership stakes might play an important role 
in firms’ policy choices. For example, the size and concentration of their ownership stake 
can have a significant influence on the outcome of shareholder votes and increase the 
threat of activism by facilitating activist investors’ ability to rally support for their 
demands.  Economies of scale may also allow passive institutional investors to be more 
effective at monitoring managers than retail investors that directly hold stocks, and at 
ensuring compliance with what they consider to be an effective governance structure for 
the average firm. 
                                                           
50 Using May 31st CRSP market capitalization to determine rankings (within the actual assigned index), as 
done in a robustness check by Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014), will be problematic for a similar 
reason.  Because firms are resorted within an index using total end-of-May CRSP market caps in this 
alternative approach, there will now exist a discontinuity in Ln(Mktcap) near the threshold.  The firm with 
the smallest end-of-May CRSP Mktcap within the Russell 1000 will be assigned a rank of 1000, while the 
firm with the largest end-of-May CRSP Mktcap within the Russell 2000 will be assigned a rank of 1001. 
This discontinuity occurs because the CRSP market caps are only a noisy predictor of the true, but 
unobserved, forcing variable. This is shown in Appendix Figure 3. 
124 
 
To examine whether passive institutions affect firms’ governance, and if so, by 
which mechanisms, we exploit variation in passive institutional ownership that occurs 
around the cutoff used to construct the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes. 
Benchmarking to these indexes leads to a jump in ownership by passive institutions for 
stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.  
Thus, we instrument passive institutional ownership with an indicator for being assigned 
to the Russell 2000 in a given year and analyze the influence of passive investors in an 
economically important sample of large U.S. publicly listed firms.  Our instrumental 
variable estimation relies on the assumption that after conditioning on firms’ market 
capitalization, which determines index assignment, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index 
does not directly affect our governance or corporate outcomes except through its impact 
on ownership by passive investors.   
Our findings suggest that while passive institutional investors are not “active” in 
the traditional sense of accumulating or selling shares in a target company with the 
express purpose of influencing management, they are not entirely “passive” either. In 
particular, we find that ownership by passive institutions is associated with more 
independent directors on a board, more poison pill removals, the elimination of 
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, and fewer dual class share 
structures. The observed differences in actual governance structures suggests that passive 
institutions may be more attentive to firms’ governance structures than the retail investors 
they displace, and that they use their large voting blocs to exert influence. For example, 
we find that higher passive institutional ownership is associated with less support for 
management proposals and a greater support for shareholder-initiated governance 
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proposals. While we do not find direct evidence that the concentrated ownership of 
passive investors facilitates activism by other, non-passive investors, it is possible that 
managers and boards are particularly sensitive to the views of passive investors because 
their presence (and potential dissatisfaction) increases the threat of activism by other 
investors.   
The growing influence of passive investors appears, on average, to have a positive 
impact on long-term firm-level performance and value. If we add controls for firms that 
switch indexes during reconstitution, so as to better isolate the longer-term impact of 
passive ownership, we find evidence that, on average, greater passive ownership is 
associated with an improvement in performance. We also find that passive ownership is 
associated with a decrease in firms’ cash holdings, an increase in dividends, and a 
suggestive decline in managerial compensation.  These findings are consistent with the 
observed differences in governance having a positive influence on firm value. 
Our findings, however, do not resolve the ongoing debate regarding the value 
implications of various governance structures, including board independence, 
antitakeover defenses, and equal voting rights for shareholders, and whether the optimal 
governance structure may vary across firms in ways that do not always conform to the 
proxy-voting guidelines of the largest passive institutions. The findings also do not 
address whether passive investors attempt to determine the individual governance needs 
of each company in their large portfolios or instead follow a “check the box” approach to 
governance. While some large passive investors do vary their voting strategies across 
firms in ways that are not consistent with such a one-size-fits-all approach to governance 
(e.g., see Davis and Han, (2007)), additional analysis regarding these questions would 
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seem to be a promising direction for further research.  
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Figure 1 
Growth of passive investors, 1984-2010 
This figure plots the percent ownership stake of quasi-index institutional investors, as 
defined in Bushee (2001), between 1984 and 2010 for the total market, the Russell 1000 
index, and the Russell 2000 index. 
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Figure 2 
Portfolio weights in the Russell 1000 and 2000 by within-index ranking for 2006 
This figure plots the portfolio weights of the bottom 500 firms in the Russell 1000 index and the 
top 500 firms in the Russell 2000 index for the end-of-June 2006.  Observations are ordered by 
their within-index ranking such that rankings of 1 and 1000 represent the firms with the largest 
and 1000th largest portfolio weight in the index, respectively.  The portfolio weights are given as 
a percent. 
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Figure 3 
Market capitalization, index assignment, and ownership by market cap rankings for the 
bottom 500 firms of Russell 1000 and top 500 firms of Russell 2000 
This figure plots the average end-of-May Ln(market capitalization), fraction of firm-year 
observations in the Russell 2000, and quasi-index, transient, and dedicated institutional ownership 
(%) by ranking, where ranking is determined using end-of-May market capitalization, as reported 
in CRSP.  The sample includes the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 and the top 500 firms of 
the Russell 2000, as determined using end-of-June Russell-assigned portfolio weights for each 
index.  Institutional ownership is calculated as of September each year, and all averages are 
calculated using bins of 25 firms and data from 1998-2006. 
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD
Institutional ownership % 8,268 64.5 68.3 22.2 4,105 63.6 67.8 23.2
Quasi-index % 8,268 39.1 39.7 15.3 4,105 38.3 39.3 16.1
Dedicated % 8,268 9.2 7.15 9.1 4,105 9.2 6.9 9.7
Transient % 8,268 16.1 14.2 10.7 4,105 16.0 14.2 10.7
Independent director % 5,604 65.3 66.7 17.9 2,685 64.9 66.7 18.2
Poison pill removal 5,472 0.04 0 0.19 2,708 0.04 0 0.18
Greater ability to call special meeting 3,552 0.006 0 0.07 1,740 0.007 0 0.08
Indicator for dual class shares 3,552 0.12 0 0.32 1,740 0.12 0 0.33
Mngt. proposal support % 2,485 84.9 87.9 12.0 1,219 85.0 87.5 11.8
Shareholder gov. proposal support % 408 39.2 38.0 23.7 190 35.9 31.5 22.5
Indicator for hedge fund activism 8,268 0.014 0 0.12 4,105 0.014 0 0.12
ROA 8,061 0.03 0.04 0.11 3,998 0.03 0.04 0.11
Ln(Cash) 8,019 4.53 4.72 1.51 3,983 4.51 4.72 1.49
Dividend yield 8,011 0.149 0.003 0.03 3,976 0.144 0.002 0.03
Ln(Total CEO pay) 5,633 7.85 7.88 0.87 2,657 7.83 7.85 0.84
This table reports summary statistics for our key variables.  Summary statistics are reported separately for our two main 
samples: firms in the 250 and 500 bandwidths around the cutoff between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes.   Definitions 
for all variables are provided in Appendix Table 1.  Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level, and we delete 
observations where the ratio of institutional shares owned to shares outstanding is missing or greater than 1.
500 bandwidth 250 bandwidth
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Table 2
First-stage estimation, impact of index assignment on institutional ownership
All 
institutions
Quasi-      
index
Dedicated Transient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2000 1.974* 2.756*** -0.742 0.013
(1.068) (0.661) (0.609) (0.501)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 500
Polynomial order, N 3 3 3 3
Float control yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# of firms 2,318 2,318 2,318 2,318
Observations 8,268 8,268 8,268 8,268
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.05
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of institutional holdings on an 
indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  Specifically, we 
where R2000 it  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i  is in the Russell 2000 Index at end 
of June in year t , Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i  measured at 
May 31 in year t , Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) 
at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  IO it  measures institutional ownership 
for stock i  at the end of September in year t .  In this table we use four different definitions 
for IO  for stock i : (1) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by all institutional 
investors (from 13F filings); (2) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by "quasi-
indexers" as classified by Bushee (2001); (3) the percentage of shares outstanding owned 
by “dedicated” institutions as classified by Bushee; and (4) the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by “transient” institutional as classified by Bushee.  The Bushee 
classifications are defined in the text.  The sample consists of the top 500 firms in the 
Russell 2000 index and bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 index (i.e., bandwidth = 500) 
for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with data 
from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period.  The 
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable =
Percent of firm's common shares held by:
( )
1
( ) ( )
N
n
it it n it it t it
n
IO R2000 Ln Mktcap Ln Float uη λ χ σ δ
=
= + + + + +∑
138 
 
Table 3
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 3.820*** 3.974*** 2.756*** 3.006*** 2.999*** 2.041***
(0.637) (0.630) (0.661) (0.715) (0.701) (0.763)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 2,318 2,318 2,318 1,566 1,566 1,566
Observations 8,268 8,268 8,268 4,105 4,105 4,105
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.25
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an 
indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  Specifically, we 
estimate
where R2000 it  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i  is in the Russell 2000 Index at end of 
June in year t , Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i  measured at May 31 
in year t , Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 
in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  Quasi-index it  is the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions, as classified by Bushee (2001), for stock i  at the 
end of September in year t .  The Bushee classifications are defined in the text.  The data 
consist of  firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from 
Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is 
estimated over the 1998-2006 period using bandwidths of 500 firms (columns 1-3) and 250 
firms (columns 4-6) around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for 
Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 1, 2, and 3.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Quasi-index %
Robustness of first stage estimation for quasi-index ownership
( )
1
( ) ( )
N
n
it it n it it t it
n
Quasi ndex R2000 Ln Mktcap Ln Float uη λ χ σ δ
=
= + + + + +∑-i
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Table 4
Ownership by passive investors and the percentage of independent directors
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % 0.885** 0.941*** 0.771** 1.415*** 1.579*** 1.407***
(0.347) (0.360) (0.381) (0.416) (0.459) (0.490)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,037 1,037 1,037
Observations 5,604 5,604 5,604 2,685 2,685 2,685
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable 
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on the 
percentage of independent board directors.  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is the percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i  in year t  (from 
Riskmetrics), Quasi-index it  is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index 
institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at the end of September in year t , 
Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i  measured at May 31 in year t , 
and Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in 
year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  We instrument Quasi-index  in the above estimation 
using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.  
The Bushee classifications are defined in the text.  The data consist of  firms in the two 
Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we 
match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 
period using bandwidths of 500 firms (columns 1-3) and 250 firms (columns 4-6) around the 
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 1, 2, 
and 3.  Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The symbols ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Independent director %
( )
1
( ) ( )
N
n
it it n it it t it
n
Y Quasi index Ln Mktcap Ln Floatα β θ γ δ ε
=
= + + + + +∑-
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Table 5
Passive ownership and independent directors, pre- versus post-2002 
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % 2.270** 2.720** 2.484** 0.778** 0.774** 0.738
(0.887) (1.162) (1.262) (0.333) (0.384) (0.491)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 858 858 858 502 502 502
Observations 1,616 1,616 1,616 1,069 1,069 1,069
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable 
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on the 
percentage of independent board directors both before and after the 2002 change in 
exchange-listing requirements regarding board independence.  The estimation is the same 
as in Table 4, except we now separately estimate the model over the 1998-2002 and 2003-
2006 time periods using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, 
and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 1, 2, and 3.  Standard errors, ε, are 
clustered at the firm level.  The symbols ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.
 Independent director %
Sample years = 1998-2002 Sample years = 2003-2006
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Table 6
Ownership by passive investors and takeover defenses
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % 0.005* 0.006* 0.011 0.005** 0.005* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,087 1,087 1,087 1,000 1,000 1,000
Observations 2,708 2,708 2,708 1,740 1,740 1,740
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable 
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on 
takeover defense outcomes.  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is the governance variable for firm i  in year t , Quasi-index it  is the percentage 
of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) 
for stock i  at the end of September in year t , Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of 
equity of stock i  measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it  is the float-adjusted market 
value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  
The governance variables investigated in this table, from Shark Repellent (Factset) and 
Riskmetrics, are: an indicator for either the withdrawal or expiration (without renewal) of 
a poison pill in year t , and an indicator for there being fewer restrictions on shareholders' 
ability to call a special meeting in year t.  We instrument Quasi-index  in the above 
estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 
index in year t.   The Bushee classifications are defined in the text.  The data consist of 
firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from 
Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is 
estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold and first, second, and third polynomial order controls for 
Ln(Mktcap ).  Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Poison pill removal
Greater ability to                                  
call special meeting
( )
1
( ) ( )
N
n
it it n it it t it
n
Y Quasi index Ln Mktcap Ln Floatα β θ γ δ ε
=
= + + + + +∑-
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Table 7
Ownership by passive investors and dual class shares
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3)
Quasi-index % -0.047** -0.064** -0.066**
(0.019) (0.027) (0.031)
Bandwidth 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
# of firms 1,000 1,000 1,000
Observations 1,740 1,740 1,740
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental 
variable estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive 
investors on the likelihood of dual class shares.  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i  has dual class shares in year t  according 
to Riskmetrics, Quasi-index it  is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by 
quasi-index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at the end of 
September in year t , Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i 
measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of 
equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  We 
instrument Quasi-index  in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to 
one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.   The Bushee classifications 
are defined in the text.  The data consist of  firms in the two Russell indexes for 
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with 
data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period 
using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and 
polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 1, 2, and 3.  Standard errors, ε, are 
clustered at the firm level.  The symbol ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
Indicator for dual class shares
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Table 8
Ownership by passive investors and shareholder support for proposals
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % -0.871***-0.862***-1.002* 0.872** 1.111 1.253
(0.296) (0.296) (0.513) (0.443) (0.679) (0.763)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 751 751 751 122 122 122
Observations 1,219 1,219 1,219 190 190 190
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental 
variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors 
on shareholder support for management proposals and shareholder-initiated 
governance proposals.  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is either the average percentage of shareholders that vote along with 
management proposals at annual meetings for i  in year t  (from Riskmetrics) or the 
average percentage of shareholders that vote in support of a shareholder-initiated 
governance proposal for firm i  in year t  (from Riskmetrics), Quasi-index it  is the 
percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by 
Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at the end of September in year t , Mktcap it  is the CRSP 
market value of equity of stock i  measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it  is the 
float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and 
δ t  are year fixed effects.  We instrument Quasi-index  in the above estimation using 
R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.  
The Bushee classifications are defined in the text.  The data consist of firms in the 
two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and 
which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over 
the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 
threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 1, 2, and 3.  
Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 Management                                     
proposal support %
Governance                                       
proposal support %
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Table 9
Ownership by passive investors and hedge fund activism
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3)
Quasi-index % -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0044
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0029)
Bandwidth 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
# of firms 1,566 1,566 1,566
Observations 4,105 4,105 4,105
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable 
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on the 
likelihood of hedge fund activism.  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i  experiences a hedge fund activism event in year 
t , as defined in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010), 
Quasi-index it  is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as 
classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at the end of September in year t , Mktcap it  is the 
CRSP market value of equity of stock i  measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it  is the float-
adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year 
fixed effects.  We instrument Quasi-index  in the above estimation using R2000 it , an 
indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.   The Bushee 
classifications are defined in the text.  The data consist of  firms in the two Russell indexes for 
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from 
the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth 
of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for 
Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 1, 2, and 3.  Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.
Indicator for hedge fund activism event
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Table 10
Ownership by passive investors and firms' return on assets
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0058** 0.0061** 0.0121*
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0064)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for movers no no no yes yes yes
# of firms 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520
Observations 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable 
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on firms'  
performance, as measured using firms' return on assets (ROA).  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is the ROA for firm i  in year t , Quasi-index it  is the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at 
the end of September in year t , Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i 
measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of equity 
(provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  We instrument 
Quasi-index  in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part 
of the Russell 2000 index in year t.   The specification in columns (1)-(3) are the same as in 
earlier tables, but in columns (4)-(6), we add two additional controls to the specification: an 
indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 2000 index in year t  but were in the 
Russell 1000 in year t-1 , and an indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 
1000 index in year t  but were in the Russell 2000 index in year t-1 . The Bushee 
classifications are defined in the text.  The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for 
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from 
the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth 
of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and first, second, and third polynomial 
order controls for Ln(Mktcap ).  Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The 
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 11
Ownership by passive investors and CEO compensation
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % -0.046* -0.042** -0.051 -0.025 -0.022 -0.062
(0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.075)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,501 1,501 1,501 996 996 996
Observations 5,633 5,633 5,633 2,657 2,657 2,657
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental 
variable estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive 
investors on the total CEO compensation.  Specifically, we estimate
where Y it  is the log of total CEO compensation for firm i  in year t (from 
Execucomp), Quasi-index it  is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-
index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at the end of 
September in year t , MktCap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i 
measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of 
equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.   We 
instrument Quasi-index  in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to 
one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t .  The Bushee classifications 
are defined in the text.  The data consist of  firms in the two Russell indexes for 
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with 
data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period 
using bandwidths of 500 firms (columns 1-3) and 250 firms (columns 4-6) around the 
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N  = 
1, 2, and 3.  Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. * and ** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 12
Ownership by passive investors, cash holdings, and dividend policy
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quasi-index % -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.100* 0.0008* 0.0008* 0.0010
(0.028) (0.027) (0.046) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,514 1,514 1,514
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,976 3,976 3,976
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation 
used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on corporate decisions 
regarding cash holdings and payout policy.  Specifically, we estimate
where: Y it  is cash it , defined as the log of cash holdings for firm i  in year t , or Payout it , defined as 
the ratio of common dividends to net income for firm i  in year t  (data from Compustat); Quasi-
index it  is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by 
Bushee (2001)) for stock i  at the end of September in year t ; MktCap it  is the CRSP market value of 
equity of stock i  measured at May 31 in year t ; and Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of 
equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  We instrument Quasi-
index  in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 
2000 index in year t.  The Bushee classifications are defined in the text.  The data consist of firms in 
the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we 
match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using 
a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and polynomial controls for 
Ln(Mktcap ) of order N  = 1, 2, and 3.  Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The symbols 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix  
 Excerpts from Fund Governance/Voting Policies   
 In this appendix, we provide excerpts regarding the voting policies of various 
institutional investors that offer index-related investment products.  A common theme of 
these governance/voting policies is (1) to either withhold support or vote against boards 
that are not sufficiently independent, and (2) broadly oppose takeover defenses, like 
poison pills, restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting, dual class 
shares, and classified boards.  Some institutions also provide guidance regarding their 
views related to equity issuances, executive pay, and corporate social responsibility 
initiatives, which we also provide some excerpts of here.    
 
A. Blackrock: Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities51  
 
• We expect that a board should be majority independent. We believe that 
an independent board faces fewer conflicts and is best prepared to protect 
shareholder interests.  
 
• Where a poison pill is put to a shareholder vote, our policy is to examine 
these plans individually. Although we oppose most plans, we may support 
plans that include a reasonable ‘qualifying offer clause.’ Such clauses 
typically require shareholder ratification of the pill, and stipulate a sunset 
provision whereby the pill expires unless it is renewed. 
 
• We believe that classification of the board dilutes shareholders’ right to 
evaluate promptly a board’s performance and limits shareholder selection 
of their representatives. By not having the mechanism to immediately 
address concerns we may have with any specific director, we may be 
required to register our concerns through our vote on the directors who are 
subject to election that year. Furthermore, where boards are classified, 
director entrenchment is more likely, because review of board service 
generally only occurs every three years. Therefore, we typically vote 
against classification and for proposals to eliminate board classification. 
                                                           
51 http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-
us.pdf  
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• In exceptional circumstances and with sufficiently broad support, 
shareholders should have the opportunity to raise issues of substantial 
importance without having to wait for management to schedule a meeting. 
We therefore believe that shareholders should have the right to call a 
special meeting in cases where a reasonably high proportion of 
shareholders (typically a minimum of 15% but no higher than 25%) are 
required to agree to such a meeting before it is called. 
 
• BlackRock supports the concept of equal voting rights for all shareholders. 
Some management proposals request authorization to allow a class of 
common stock to have superior voting rights over the existing common or 
to allow a class of common to elect a majority of the board. We oppose 
such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying 
shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic 
importance to them. 
 
B. Dimensional Fund Advisors: Prospectus (Statement of Additional Information)52 
 
• Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from Inside Directors and Affiliated 
Outside directors when:  
 Independent directors make up less than a majority of 
directors. 
 
• Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the entire board of directors 
(except new nominees, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE) for 
the following: 
 
 The board adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12 
months (“long-term pill”), or renews any existing pill, 
including any “short-term” pill (12 months or less), without 
shareholder approval. 
 
 The board is classified, and a continuing director 
responsible for a problematic governance issue at the 
board/committee level that would warrant a 
withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for 
election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be 
held accountable.  
 
                                                           
52 http://us.dimensional.com/media/documents/downloads/pub/pdf/sai/idg_equity_i_sai.pdf  
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• Generally vote AGAINST proposals to create a new class of common 
stock unless: 
 
 The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the 
voting power of an insider or significant shareholder. 
 
• Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all other proposals to increase the number of 
shares of common stock authorized for issuance. Take into account 
company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:  
 
 The company's use of authorized shares during the last 
three years 
 
 The dilutive impact of the request as determined by an 
allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent 
of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's 
need for shares and total shareholder returns. 
 
C. State Street Global Advisors: Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines – US53 
 
• In principle, SSgA believes independent directors are crucial to good 
corporate governance and help management establish sound corporate 
governance policies and practices.  A sufficiently independent board will 
most effectively monitor management and perform oversight functions 
necessary to protect shareholder interests.   
 
• SSgA will support mandates requiring shareholder approval of a 
shareholder rights plans (“poison pill”) and repeals of various anti-
takeover related provisions. In general, SSgA will vote against the 
adoption or renewal of a US issuer’s shareholder rights plan (“poison 
pill”). 
 
SSgA generally supports annual elections for the board of directors. In 
certain cases, SSgA will support a classified board structure; if the board 
is composed of 80 percent independent directors, the board’s key 
committees (auditing, nominating and compensation) are composed of 
independent directors, and consideration of other governance factors, 
including, but not limited to, shareholder rights and antitakeover devices. 
 
                                                           
53 
http://www.ssga.com/library/capb/713689_Proxy_Voting_and_Engagement_Guidelines_US_1_CCRI139659505
4 .pdf  
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• SSgA will vote for shareholder proposals related to special meetings at 
companies that give shareholders (with a minimum 10% ownership 
threshold) the right to call for a special meeting in their bylaws if:  
 
 The current ownership threshold to call for a special 
meeting is above 25% of outstanding shares. 
 
SSgA will vote for management proposals related to special meetings. 
 
• SSgA will not support proposals authorizing the creation of new classes of 
common stock with superior voting rights and will vote against new 
classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend 
distribution, and other rights. In addition, SSgA will not support 
capitalization changes that add “blank check” classes of stock (i.e. classes 
of stock with undefined voting rights) or classes that dilute the voting 
interests of existing shareholders. 
 
However, SSgA will support capitalization changes that eliminate other 
classes of stock and/or unequal voting rights. 
 
• SSgA considers numerous criteria when examining equity award 
proposals. Generally, SSgA does not vote against plans for lack of 
performance or vesting criteria … There are numerous factors that we 
view as negative, and together, may result in a vote against a proposal. 
 
D. Vanguard: Proxy Voting Guidelines54 
 
• Good governance starts with a majority-independent board, whose key 
committees are comprised entirely of independent directors. As such, 
companies should attest to the independence of directors who serve on the 
Compensation, Nominating, and Audit committees.  
 
• A company's adoption of a so-called poison pill effectively limits a 
potential acquirer's ability to buy a controlling interest without the 
approval of the target's board of directors. Such a plan, in conjunction with 
other takeover defenses, may serve to entrench incumbent management 
and directors. However, in other cases, a poison pill may force a suitor to 
negotiate with the board and result in the payment of a higher acquisition 
premium. In general, shareholders should be afforded the opportunity to 
approve shareholder rights plans within a year of their adoption.  
 
                                                           
54 https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/voting-guidelines/  
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• The funds will generally support proposals to declassify existing boards 
(whether proposed by management or shareholders), and will block efforts 
by companies to adopt classified board structures in which only part of the 
board is elected each year. 
 
• The funds support shareholders’ right to call special meetings of the board 
(for good cause and with ample representation) and to act by written 
consent. The funds will generally vote for proposals to grant these rights 
to shareholders and against proposals to abridge them. 
 
• We are opposed to dual-class capitalization structures that provide 
disparate voting rights to different groups of shareholders with similar 
economic investments. We will oppose the creation of separate classes 
with different voting rights and will support the dissolution of such 
classes. 
 
• Bonus plans, which must be periodically submitted for shareholder 
approval to qualify for deductibility under Section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, should have clearly defined performance criteria and 
maximum awards expressed in dollars. Bonus plans with awards that are 
excessive in both absolute terms and relative to a comparative group 
generally will not be supported. 
 
• Often, proposals [related to corporate social policy] may address concerns 
with which the Board philosophically agrees, but absent a compelling 
economic impact on shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require 
expensing of stock options), the funds will typically abstain from voting 
on these proposals. This reflects the belief that regardless of our 
philosophical perspective on the issue, these decisions should be the 
province of company management unless they have a significant, tangible 
impact on the value of a fund's investment and management is not 
responsive to the matter. 
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Appendix Figure 1 
Point estimates in the 100 through 500 bandwidths around the threshold 
This figure plots the point estimate and 95th percentile confidence intervals by bandwidth choice  
for the outcomes reported in Tables 3-12. The first stage and IV estimations are the same as in  
Tables 3-9, 11, 12 and columns 4-6 of Table 10 except the bandwidth is varied between 100 and  
500 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. A first-order polynomial control for 
Ln(Mktcap) is also included in all estimations.   
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Appendix Figure 2 
Probability of treatment and quasi-index ownership by ranking near the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold using Russell-provided market capitalizations 
This figure plots the average fraction of firm-year observations in the Russell 2000 and percent  
quasi-index ownership by size ranking for the 950th to 1050th largest firms, where ranking is  
determined using end-of-May market capitalization numbers provided directly by Russell  
Investments for firms in the Russell 1000/2000 indices between 2002 and 2006. Averages are  
calculated using bins of five rankings and data from 2002-2006.  
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Appendix Figure 3 
Average Ln(Float) and Ln(Mktcap) by ranking, where ranking is calculated using  
either float-adjusted portfolio weights assigned by Russell or within-index rankings  
based on end-of-May market capitalizations 
The top panel of this figure plots the average Ln(float-adjusted market cap) by Russell 
Determined rankings for the bottom 50 firms in the Russell 1000 index and the top 50 firms in the  
Russell 2000 index for the years 1998-2006.  A ranking of 1000 reflects the firm with the lowest 
portfolio weight in the Russell 1000 index, while a ranking of 1001 reflects the firm with the 
highest portfolio weight in the Russell 2000 index.  The bottom panel of this figure plots the  
average Ln(end-of-May CRSP market cap) by size ranking for firms ranked between 950 and  
1050, where ranking is determined using within-index end-of-May CRSP market caps.   A  
ranking of 1000 reflects the firm with the lowest end-of-May market cap in the Russell 1000  
index, while a ranking of 1001 reflects the firm with the highest end-of-May market cap in the  
Russell 2000 index.  Averages are calculated using bins of five rankings for the years 1998-2006.   
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Appendix Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable Name Source Definition
R2000 Russell Investments Indicator equal to 1 if firm is in the Russell 2000
Institutional ownership % Thomson/CDA 13F files % of shares outstanding held by institutional investors in September of year t
Quasi-index % Brian Bushee website % of shares outstanding held by quasi-indexer institutions in September of year t
Dedicated % Brian Bushee website % of shares outstanding held by dedicated insitutions in September of year t
Transient % Brian Bushee website % of shares outstanding held by transient insitutions in September of year t
Independent director % Riskmetrics (Directors) % of board seats held by directors classified as independent by Riskmetrics
Poison pill removal Shark Repellent (FactSet) Indicator equal to 1 if poison pill is withdrawn or allowed to expire at time t
Greater ability to call spec. meet. Riskmetrics (Governance) Indicator equal to 1 if shareholders better able to call a special meeting at time t
Indicator for dual class shares Riskmetrics (Governance) Indicator equal to 1 if a firm has dual class shares at time t
Mngt. proposal support % Riskmetrics (Voting Results) Percentage of 'Yes" votes for management proposals
Shareholder gov. prop. support %Riskmetrics (Voting Results) Percentage of 'Yes" votes for sharehold governance proposals
Indicator for hedge fund activism Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) Indicator equal to 1 if a firm has an activism event at time t
ROA Compustat Net income (ni ) / total assets (at )
Ln(Cash) Compustat Ln(Cash and short term securities (che ))
Dividend yield Compustat Common dividends (dvc ) normalized by market value of equity (prcc_f *csho )
Ln(Total CEO pay) Execucomp Ln(Total CEO compensation (tdc1 ))
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Appendix Table 3
First stage estimation for transient institutional ownership
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 0.421 0.363 0.013 0.475 0.257 0.259
(0.495) (0.493) (0.501) (0.572) (0.570) (0.573)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 2,318 2,318 2,318 1,566 1,566 1,566
Observations 8,268 8,268 8,268 4,105 4,105 4,105
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of transient institutional ownership 
onto an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  The 
specification is the same as in Table 3, except that the dependent variable is now Transient it , 
which is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by transient institutions, as classified by 
Bushee (2001), for stock i  at the end of September in year t .  
Transient %
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Appendix Table 4
First stage estimation for dedicated institutional ownership
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 -0.757 -0.837 -0.742 -0.750 -0.851 -0.743
(0.602) (0.570) (0.609) (0.768) (0.700) (0.831)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 2,318 2,318 2,318 1,566 1,566 1,566
Observations 8,268 8,268 8,268 4,105 4,105 4,105
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of dedicated institutional ownership 
onto an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  The 
specification is the same as in Table 3, except that the dependent variable is now 
Dedicated it , which is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by dedicated institutions, 
as classified by Bushee (2001), for stock i  at the end of September in year t .
Dedicated %
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Appendix Table 5A
First-stage estimations for Table 4
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 3.668*** 3.552*** 3.279*** 3.892*** 3.663*** 3.380***
(0.752) (0.762) (0.758) (0.888) (0.930) (0.905)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
1st stage estimate for…
Table 4, 
Col (1)
Table 4, 
Col (2)
Table 4, 
Col (3)
Table 4, 
Col (4)
Table 4, 
Col (5)
Table 4, 
Col (6)
# of firms 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,037 1,037 1,037
Observations 5,604 5,604 5,604 2,685 2,685 2,685
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an indicator 
for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  The specification is the same as in 
Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with non-missing 
Riskmetrics (Directors) data on board independence.  Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates 
for the IV estimates reported in Table 4. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Quasi-index %
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Appendix Table 5B
First-stage estimation for Tables 6 & 7
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 3.207*** 3.160*** 1.735* 3.262*** 2.824** 2.556**
(0.892) (0.843) (0.967) (1.094) (1.124) (1.108)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
1st stage estimate for…
Table 6, 
Col (1)
Table 6, 
Col (2)
Table 6, 
Col (3)
Table 6, 
Col (4)
Table 6, 
Col (5)
Table 6, 
Col (6)
# of firms 1,087 1,087 1,087 1,000 1,000 1,000
Observations 2,708 2,708 2,708 1,740 1,740 1,740
R-squared 0.251 0.251 0.257 0.18 0.18 0.18
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an 
indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  The specification is 
the same as in Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations 
with non-missing Shark Repellent (FactSet) data on poison pills or non-missing Riskmetrics 
(Governance) data on shareholders' ability to call special meetings and dual class share 
structures.  Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates reported in 
Tables 6 and 7. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level; * indicates significance at the 10% level.
Quasi-index %
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Appendix Table 5C
First-stage estimation for Table 8
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 4.242*** 4.209*** 3.111** 8.554*** 6.894** 6.537**
(1.138) (1.136) (1.297) (2.787) (3.174) (3.154)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
1st stage estimate for…
Table 8, 
Col (1)
Table 8, 
Col (2)
Table 8, 
Col (3)
Table 8, 
Col (4)
Table 8, 
Col (5)
Table 8, 
Col (6)
# of firms 758 758 758 122 122 122
Observations 1,219 1,219 1,219 190 190 190
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an indicator 
for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  The specification is the same as 
in Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with non-
missing Riskmetrics (Voting Results) data on % support for management proposals and shareholder-
intitiated governance proposals.  Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates 
reported in Table 8. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level.
Quasi-index %
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Appendix Table 5D
First-stage estimation for Table 11
Dependent variable =
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2000 2.443*** 2.682*** 2.062*** 1.732* 1.912** 1.221
(0.740) (0.725) (0.776) (1.004) (0.944) (1.083)
Bandwidth 500 500 500 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 1 2 3 1 2 3
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
1st stage estimate for…
Table 11, 
Col (1)
Table 11, 
Col (2)
Table 11, 
Col (3)
Table 11, 
Col (4)
Table 
11, Col 
Table 11, 
Col (6)
# of firms 1,501 1,501 1,501 996 996 996
Observations 5,633 5,633 5,633 2,657 2,657 2,657
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an indicator for 
membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls.  The specification is the same as in Table 
3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with non-missing Execucomp 
data on total CEO pay.  Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates reported in 
Table 11. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Quasi-index %
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Appendix Table 6
Robustness of findings to using Russell-provided market capitalization
Dep. variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison 
pill 
removal
Ability to 
call 
special 
meeting
Ind. for 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support 
% 
Gov. 
proposal 
support 
%
HF 
activism 
event
ROA Ln(cash)
Dividend 
yield
Ln(total 
CEO pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Quasi-index % 1.329*** 0.005 0.005** -0.027** -0.825*** 0.724 -0.003* 0.007*** -0.088*** 0.001* -0.008
(0.391) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) (0.288) (0.776) (0.002) (0.003) (0.028) (0.0004) (0.024)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,037 1087 1000 1,000 758 122 1,566 1,520 1,516 1,514 996
Observations 2,685 2,708 1,740 1,740 1219 190 4,105 3,998 3,983 3,976 2,657
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by 
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead measure end-of-May market caps using Russell-provided 
market caps for the years 2002-2006. The estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4-12, except Mktcap it  is the Russell-provided end-of-
May market cap of stock i in year t , except when it is missing (i.e., years 1998-2001), in which case, we use the CRSP market value of equity of stock 
i  measured at May 31 in year t.  We instrument Quasi-index  using R2000 it ,  an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in 
year t .  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second 
polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, 
we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA  (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are 
clustered at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 7
Robustness of findings to using Compustat market capitalization
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison 
pill 
removal
Ability to 
call 
special 
meeting
Ind. for 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support 
% 
Gov. 
proposal 
support 
%
HF 
activism 
event
ROA Ln(cash)
Dividend 
yield
Ln(CEO 
pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Quasi-index % 1.765*** 0.005** 0.004** -0.064*** -0.898*** 1.139* -0.0022 0.005** -0.090*** 0.0008** -0.012
(0.457) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0209) (0.295) (0.610) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.027) (0.000) (0.030)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 983 1,016 943 943 711 115 1,470 1,425 1,422 1,419 939
Observations 2,562 2,536 1,652 1,652 1,159 181 3,887 3,785 3,773 3,763 2,523
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by 
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead measure end-of-May market caps using Compustat  The 
estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4-12, except that Mktcap it  is the the Compustat market value of equity of stock i  measured at May 
31 in year t .  We instrument Quasi-Index  in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i  is part of the Russell 2000 index in 
year t .  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second 
polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, 
we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA  (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered 
at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 8
Robustness of findings to including industry fixed effects
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison 
pill 
removal
Ability to 
call 
special 
meeting
Ind. for 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support 
% 
Gov. 
proposal 
support 
%
HF 
activism 
event
ROA Ln(cash)
Dividend 
yield
Ln(Total 
CEO pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Quasi-index % 1.182*** 0.005* 0.005** -0.044** -0.858*** 0.734 -0.0026 -0.001 -0.099*** 0.0002 -0.001
(0.333) (0.003) (0.002) (0.018) (0.312) (0.607) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.028) (0.0002) (0.024)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
2-digit industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,037 1,087 1,000 1,000 758 122 1,566 1,520 1,516 1,514 996
Observations 2,685 2,708 1,740 1,740 1,219 190 4,105 3,998 3,983 3,976 2,657
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by 
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects.  The data, outcome variables, and 
specification are the same as in Tables 4-12 except that we now also include 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects in the specification.  The model is 
estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second polynomial order control for 
Ln(Mktcap ).  To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional 
controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA  (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The 
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 9
Robustness of findings to including controls for firms that recently switched indexes
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison 
pill 
removal
Ability to 
call 
special 
meeting
Ind. for 
dual 
class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support 
% 
Gov. 
proposal 
support 
%
HF 
activism 
event
ROA Ln(cash)
Dividend 
yield
Ln(Total 
CEO 
pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Quasi-index % 1.315*** 0.005* 0.003** -0.052*** -1.319** 1.306** -0.0047** 0.006** -0.149*** 0.0004 -0.037
(0.445) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) (0.548) (0.651) (0.0023) (0.003) (0.0486) (0.0005) (0.052)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for recent movers yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,037 1087 1000 1,000 751 122 1,566 1,520 1,516 1,514 996
Observations 2,685 2,708 1,740 1,740 1,219 190 4,105 3,998 3,983 3,976 2,657
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by 
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add controls to account for firms that recently switched indexes.  
Specifically, the data, outcome variables, and specification are the same as in Tables 4-12 except that we now two additional controls to the specification: 
an indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 2000 index in year t  but were in the Russell 1000 in year t-1 , and an indicator that equals one 
for firms that are in the Russell 1000 index in year t but were in the Russell 2000 index in year t-1 .  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period 
using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ).  Standard errors, ε, are 
clustered at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 10
Robustness of findings to using only ownership of Barclays Bank, State Street, and Vanguard
Dependent variable = 
Ind. 
directors        
%
Poison 
pill 
removal
Ability to 
call 
special 
meeting
Ind. for 
dual class 
shares
Mngt. 
proposal 
support 
% 
Gov. 
proposal 
support 
%
HF 
activism 
event
ROA Ln(cash)
Dividend 
yield
Ln(Total 
CEO pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Passive % 4.371*** 0.009** 0.011*** -0.130*** -3.064*** 1.110 -0.006* 0.014*** -0.224*** 0.002** -0.037
(0.954) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.794) (3.162) (0.0031) (0.005) (0.065) (0.001) (0.053)
Bandwidth 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Polynomial order, N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Float control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of firms 1,037 1,087 1,000 1,000 758 122 1,566 1,520 1,516 1,514 996
Observations 2,685 2,708 1,740 1,740 1,219 190 4,105 3,998 3,983 3,976 2,657
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of aggregate institutional ownership 
by Vanguard, State Street, and Barclays Bank on our governance and corporate outcome variables.  Specifically, we estimate
where: Y it  is the outcome variable for firm i  in year t ; Passive it  is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by Barclays Bank, State Street, and 
Vanguard of stock i  at the end of September in year t ; Mktcap it  is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i  measured at May 31 in year t ; and 
Float it  is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t  are year fixed effects.  The outcome variables 
investigated in this table are the same as in earlier tables, and we instrument Passive in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if 
firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.  The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from 
Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file.  The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 
firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association 
between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when 
analyzing ROA  (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.
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